Cover of The Journal of Philosophy of Disability
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introduction
1. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 1
Joel Michael Reynolds, Teresa Blankmeyer Burke Introducing the Journal of Philosophy of Disability
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articles
2. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 1
Kim Q. Hall Limping Along: Toward a Crip Phenomenology
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A queer crip embodied experience of limping is the point of departure for my reflections on the differences between a crip phenomenology and a phenomenology of disability. I argue that a crip phenomenology can further understanding of how ableism and heternormativity work together, along with other structures of violence, to shape experiences at the edges of ability and disability, and, indeed, the possibility of queer crip movement in and through worlds.
3. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 1
Desiree Valentine Technologies of Reproduction: Race, Disability, and Neoliberal Eugenics
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When considering the relation between race, disability, and reproduction, race and disability tend to figure as outcomes of reproduction. It is assumed that one births a child with a certain race and ability status as a function of biological and genetic processes. This paper shifts such analyses of race and disability in the context of contemporary reproduction to examine how race and disability are not only produced but are productive. Building on recent work describing race as a technology emergent in certain sociopolitical contexts and used to develop and maintain certain ways of life, intimate and collective relations, and political orders, this essay examines the possibilities for understanding disability as a technology. It argues that race and disability function as technologies in contemporary reproductive practices through the naturalization of choice, the normative production of ‘risk,’ and the making and unmaking of kinship.
4. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 1
Leslie Francis Supported Decision-making: The CRPD, Non-Discrimination, and Strategies for Recognizing Persons’ Choices About their Good
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People with cognitive impairments often have difficulties formulating, understanding, or articulating decisions that others judge reasonable. The frequent response shifts decision-making authority to substitutes through advance directives of the person or guardianship orders from a court. The Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities defends supported decision-making as an alternative to such forms of supplanted decision-making. But supported decision-making raises both metaphysical questions—what is required for a decision to be the person’s own?—and epistemological questions: how do we know what persons judge to be their good, when they have difficulty conceptualizing and articulating? It raises practical questions, too, such as protection against risks of exploitation. This article uses a non-discrimination account of legal personhood drawn from the CRPD to explore how common features of decisions employed by people without cognitive disabilities are important in supported decision-making too. These features include prostheses, guardrails, relationships, and social contexts.
5. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 1
Eva Feder Kittay Why Human Difference is Critical to a Conception of Moral Standing: An Argument for the Sufficiency of Being Human for Full Moral Status
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I argue that the claim that merely being born of two human beings in a condition that supports life is sufficient for full moral status. Not only ought we not to exclude any human being from full moral status because they lack the possession of what some have deemed to be morally relevant properties, we don’t have a full grasp of what is morally relevant unless we include the many different possible lives humans live in their diverse bodies and minds. Our understanding of how we ought to treat nonhuman beings is not of lesser importance, but it necessarily depends on how we understand what is morally significant in human lives.
6. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 1
Jürgen Habermas Public Space and Political Public Sphere—The Biographical Roots of Two Motifs in my Thought
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7. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 1
Andrea J. Pitts The Polymorphism of Necro-Being: Examining Racism and Ableism through the Writings of Leonard Harris
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In this paper, I examine the writings of African American philosopher Leonard Harris as an author who has been read primarily for his contributions to the study of Africana philosophy, U.S. pragmatism, and moral philosophy. Despite contributions to bioethics and reflections on systemic racism within the context of institutional medical settings, Harris’s work has yet to be read in terms of its relevance for disability critique. This paper demonstrates how Harris’s writings may be read as contributing to the field of philosophy of disability by arguing that his concept of “necro-being” helps reveal the mutually reinforcing relationships between race, disability, gender, and class. To carry this out, I consider core themes from his work such as metaphilosophy, health, and autonomy to show the relevance of his writings for philosophy of disability, and, in a parallel manner, the importance of disability critique for expanding his accounts of oppression and racism.
8. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 1
James B. Gould Living in Nowheresville: David Hume’s Equal Power Requirement, Political Entitlements and People with Intellectual Disabilities
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Political theory contains two views of social care for people with intellectual disabilities. The favor view treats disability services as an undeserved gratuity, while the entitlement view sees them as a deserved right. This paper argues that David Hume is one philosophical source of the favor view; he bases political membership on a threshold level of mental capacity and shuts out anyone who falls below. Hume’s account, which excludes people with intellectual disabilities from justice owing to their lack of power, but includes them in charity, is morally deficient. The shortcomings of Hume’s theory underscore the necessity of having a view of justice which ensures that people with intellectual disabilities are not marginalized. In defending the entitlement view, I integrate philosophical analysis and concrete examples of policy issues.
9. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 1
Andrew F. Smith Surviving Sustainability: Degrowth, Environmental Justice, and Support for the Chronically Ill
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The quest for ecological sustainability—specifically via prioritizing degrowth—creates significant, often overlooked challenges for the chronically ill. I focus on type-1 diabetes, treatment for which depends on nonrenewables and materials implicated in the global proliferation of toxins that harm biospheric functions. Some commentators suggest obliquely that seeking to develop ecologically sustainable treatments for type-1 shouldn’t be prioritized. Other medical concerns take precedence in a post-carbon world marked by climate change and widespread ecological devastation. I challenge this view on three grounds. Its proponents (i) fail to treat type-1 as the public health issue it is, particularly within the context of what Sunaura Taylor calls disabled ecologies. They (ii) deny persons with type-1 an equal opportunity to pursue survival. And they (iii) presume without warrant that treating type-1 is an all-or-nothing affair. Indeed, research by biohackers points to suboptimal but potentially workable ways to make type-1 survivable in a post-carbon future—so long, I stress, as their findings are cripped in a manner that foregrounds the demands of environmental justice.
special cluster on covid-19
10. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 1
Joseph A. Stramondo Tragic Choices: Disability, Triage, and Equity Amidst a Global Pandemic
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In this paper, I make three arguments regarding Crisis Standards of Care developed during the COVID-19 pandemic. First, I argue against the consideration of third person quality of life judgments that deprioritize disabled or chronically ill people on a basis other than their survival, even if protocols use the language of health to justify maintaining the supposedly higher well-being of non-disabled people. Second, while it may be unavoidable that some disabled people are deprioritized by triage protocols that must consider the likelihood that someone will survive intensive treatment, Crisis Standards of Care should not consider the amount or duration of treatment someone may need to survive. Finally, I argue that, rather than parsing who should be denied treatment to maximize lives saved, professional bioethicists should have put our energy into reducing the need for such choices at all by resisting the systemic injustices that drive the need for triage.
11. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 1
Joseph J. Fins Disorders of Consciousness, Disability Rights and Triage During the COVID-19 Pandemic: Even the Best of Intentions Can Lead to Bias
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As a member of the New York State Task Force on Life and the Law and the author of Rights Come to Mind: Brain Injury, Ethics and the Struggle for Consciousness, the author draws upon his work as a clinical ethicist during the COVID-19 Spring surge in New York to analyze the impact of ventilator allocation guidelines proposed by the Task Force on people with disorders of consciousness. While a non-discriminatory methodology was intended by the Task Force, the author concludes that the guidelines would have discriminated against people with disorders of consciousness had they been promulgated. This was due to errors in exclusion criteria, the utilization of the Sequential Organ Failure Assessment (SOFA) score, and the Glasgow Coma Scale which assesses motor output and not consciousness. While allocation and triage decisions may be neccessary during a pandemic, the ethical integrity of these determinations depend upon proper metrics.
book reviews
12. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 1
Melissa Rees Disability, Health, Law and Bioethics
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13. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 1
Erica Bigelow What Can a Body Do? How We Meet the Built World
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