Cover of Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual
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1. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 11
Scott M. Campbell Letter from the Editor
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2. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 11
Lee Braver Preface: Why Generational Heidegger Scholarship?
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3. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 11
Lee Braver Introduction: Why (Heidegger) Scholarship Is Generational
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reciprocative rejoinders
4. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 11
Morganna Lambeth A Proposal for Translating Heidegger’s Interpretation of Kant
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Translators of Heidegger’s interpretations of other thinkers face a challenge: they must contend not only with Heidegger’s distinctive choice of words, but also the terminology of his subject, whether it be Aristotle, Kant, or Schelling. The response by and large has been to focus on Heidegger’s turns of phrase, at the expense of the thinker he interprets. In this paper, I challenge this practice, using Heidegger’s interpretive works on Kant as a test case. If we overlook the terms of the author Heidegger interprets, we miss a major source of Heidegger’s phrasing, and lose the connotations that he invokes by using these terms. Further, such translations reinforce the damaging assumption that Heidegger’s interpretations venture far off-topic. I argue that when Heidegger references Kantian turns of phrase, these terms should be translated to match the standard English translation of Kant, and show how following this method of translation deepens our understanding of Heidegger’s Kant interpretation. In the appendix, I provide two passages exemplifying this method of translation.
5. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 11
Richard Polt Primal Translating and the Art of Translation: On Morganna Lambeth’s “A Proposal for Translating Heidegger’s Interpretation of Kant”
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6. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 11
Harri Mäcklin A Heideggerian Critique of Immersive Art
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Immersive art has been one of biggest trends in the artworld for the past few years. Yet, so far there has been little philosophical discussion on the nature and value of this immersive trend. In this article, I show how Heidegger’s meditations on art can provide a robust assessment of immersive art. On the one hand, immersive art can be taken to culminate in Heidegger’s views on the “machinational” character of modern art, where artworks turn into calculative experience machines, geared to provide “lived experiences” rather than experi­ences of truth. On the other hand, Heidegger’s thought also lends itself to a more positive assessment, where immersive art undermines machination from within and provides experiences of wonder, which are irreducible to and uncontrollable by calculative thinking.
7. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 11
Jussi Backman Heidegger’s Revolutionary (Anti-/Counter-/Post-)Modernism: A Rejoinder to Harri Mäcklin, “A Heideggerian Critique of Immersive Art”
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8. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 11
John J. Preston Heidegger’s Endoxic Method: Finding Authenticity in Aristotle
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I argue that Heidegger’s methodological breakthrough in the early 1920s, the development of hermeneutic phenomenology, and the structure of Being and Time are the result of Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotle’s philosophical method in his Physics and Nicomachean Ethics. In part one, I explain the general structure of Aristotle’s method and demonstrate the distinction between scientific and philo­sophical investigations. In part two, I show how formal indication and phenomenological destruction are the product of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s method by demonstrating their affinity in approach, content, and criteria for success. Lastly, in part three, I show how aspects of Being and Time, specifically das Man and the destruction of history, become more intelligible when framed in terms of an Aristotelian investigation into endoxa.
9. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 11
Lee Braver Preston’s Endoxic Reading of Heidegger’s Endoxic Method: Finding Aristotle in Heidegger
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10. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 11
David Liakos Heidegger and Gadamer on the Modern Age: The Sun Setting in the Western Sky
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This essay contributes to research on, and develops a critique of, the later Heidegger’s conception of the relationship between modernity and a future beyond or after the modern age. It is argued that Heidegger does not engage in a reactionary rejection of modernity, since he is methodologically opposed to pure negation. Rather, as the example of his reading of Van Gogh demonstrates, Heidegger uses suggestive poetic hints from modern culture to transcend modernity from within into a “postmodern” and ontologically pluralistic future. The author argues, however, that a more livable, plausible, and politically hopeful response to, and reformation of, the modern age is found in Gadamer’s work. Gadamerian hermeneutics permits a rehabilitation of modern culture and thought (for example, the tradition of humanism) by charitably and sensitively disclosing overlooked insights and resources that enable us to continue living within, without moving beyond, the modern age.
11. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 11
Iain Thomson Post/Modernity? How to Separate the Stereo from the Styrofoam
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12. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 11
Katherine Ward Responsible for Destiny: Historizing, Historicality, and Community
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Historizing is the way Dasein takes up possibilities and roles to project itself into the future. It is why we experience continuity throughout our lives, and it is the basis for historicality – our sense of a more general continuity of “history.” In Being and Time, Heidegger identifies both inauthentic and authentic modes of historizing that give rise, respectively, to inauthentic and authentic modes of histori­cality. He focuses on historizing at the individual level but gestures at a communal form of historizing. In this paper, I develop the concept of co-historizing in both its authentic and inauthentic modes. I argue that Heidegger’s unarticulated concept of inauthentic co-historizing is what necessitated the planned (but unfinished) second half of Being and Time – the “phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology.” I consider what it means to take responsibility for our destiny as a people and specifically as a community of philosophers.
13. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 11
William Blattner Tradition Is Not the Past
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14. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 11
Megan Altman, Lee Braver The Ethics of Thinking: Heidegger, Levinas, and Kierkegaard Rethinking Ethics
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Ethics usually focuses on actions, with thinking or unthinking only having significance insofar as they lead to good or bad behavior. Heidegger and Levinas, however, argue that thinking in certain ways, or not thinking in general, is ethical or unethical on its own rather than just by having good or bad consequences. Heidegger’s early work makes unthinking conformity (regardless of to what) an important part of inauthenticity, while his later work turns the thinking of being into our central “ethical” task, intentionally blurring the distinction between thinking and acting. Levinas makes thinking about humans in a certain way – namely as thinkable, as fitting into and exhausted by comprehensible categories – itself an act of conceptual violence, regardless of what deeds follow from it. We conclude with Kierkegaard who criticized humanity’s tendency to sleepwalk through their own lives, only waking up by confronting something unthinkable. This thought can be seen as a common source for both Heidegger and Levinas, as well as a way to keep the two in a continuously off-balance strife with each other.
book reviews
15. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 11
Carolyn Culbertson Lawrence Hatab, Proto-Phenomenology, Language Acquisition, Orality, and Literacy: Dwelling in Language II
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16. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 11
Timothy Quinn Ernst Jünger, The Worker: Dominion and Form
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17. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 11
Texts of Heidegger cited and abbreviations used
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18. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 10
Richard Polt Letter from the Editor
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thinking amidst the pandemic
19. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 10
Kevin Aho The Uncanny in the Time of Pandemics: Heideggerian Reflections on the Coronavirus
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This paper offers a phenomenological analysis of Heidegger’s account of “the uncanny” (das Unheimliche) as it relates to the coronavirus pandemic. It explores how the pandemic has disrupted Dasein’s sense of “homelike” (heimelig) familiarity and how this disruption has undermined our ability to be, that is, to understand or make sense of things. By examining our experience of temporality, lived-space, and intersubjectivity, the paper illuminates different ways in which the pandemic has left us confused and anxious about our self-interpretations and future projects. The paper concludes by showing how the uncanny is not simply something we feel in times of crisis; it is, for Heidegger, who we are. This means the secure feeling of familiarity that we embodied prior to the pandemic was an illusion all along, that we are not and never have been at-home in the world.
20. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 10
Robert Manning The Later Heidegger and the Later Levinas in the Time of Coronavirus
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This article addresses the many ways the philosophies of the later Heidegger and the later Levinas speak to us in the time of the coronavirus pandemic. I argue that the pause in the world’s busy industrial life provides an ideal opportunity for what Heidegger called meditative thinking. The pandemic is also a time both of extreme bodily vulnerability and of extraordinary ethical responsibility for others, and so causes us to hear Levinas’ extreme language in Otherwise than Being about anarchic ethical responsibility and the self as a hostage in a very different way.