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Stanisław Adamczyk
Stanisław Adamczyk
Arystotelesowa koncepcja ruchu
Aristotle’s Idea of Motion
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Motion, which St Thomas Aquinas made the starting point of his "first way”, is so universal and obvious that when Aristotle comes to discuss it in his two books of Metaphysics, and even more in his six books of Physics, he does not attempt to prove its reality. But, bearing in mind what Parmenides, Zeno of Elea, Heraclite s, and Plato in particular had told of motion, he tries to determine it with a strict definition, then to divide it into genera, among which he puts the local movement to the foreground. That is why, the present article, dealing with the Stagirite’s position in that regard, is divided in three essential parts.In part I the author attempts to show the difference — as seen by Aristotle — between "change” and "motion”, then to submit to thorough analysis the only Aristotelian definition of motion as "act” of being existent in potentiality, insofar as it is in potentiality, (III Phys., 1,201 a 10 ff.). There he remarks that the subject of motion belongs to the essence thereof so that the act cannot be as much as thought of without an object. It is, however, an unfinished act, remaining, as regards its destination point, in the relation of potentiality to actuality. From the definition of motion derive some of its properties, first of all that of its sequential continuity, enclosed between two extremes (a quo and ad quem), in the relation of contrariness to one another. This implies that motion must take place in time.In part II it is emphasised that movement, thus defined, divides-according to Aristotle, in three basic genera: motion belonging to the category of quantity (increase and loss), to that of quality (arising and destruction of accidental sensuous qualities), and that of location (local movement). In doing so, the author shows that what Aristotle calls "arising” and "destruction” in his Phys. III ch. 1, is not substantive arising and destruction, but those of accidental physical qualities, the so-called ’’varieties” in the general acceptation of the word. On the other hand, the ’’variety” referred to by Aristotle earlier in the same text, is variety in the narrow sense (i. e. augmentation or diminution of a type of motion). Variety is, in fact, described as motion not only as of something which is capable of changing, but "insofar as it is variable”. We then have here a fresh attempt at eliminating the apparent contradiction between the definition of motion and what Aristotle says of its genera in Bk. III, c. 1, and next between these and his statements on the essence and genera in Bk. V and the following.Part III, using the Stagirite’s own words- shows the primacy of local motion on quantitative as well as qualitative motion, primacy regarding nature, time and perfection. Consequently, and on the basis of contemporary natural science, Aristotle comes to the acceptance of one continuous movement which, being eternal, requires the existence of an eternal first mover, Motor, who, while remaining immobile itself, sets the whole world into motion.
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Stanisław Mazierski
Stanisław Mazierski
Metoda filozofii przyrody inspiracji arystotelesowsko-tomistycz
Method in Natural Philosophy Inspired from Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas
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Natural philosophy follows the method of physical abstraction which Thomas Aquinas conceives as an intellectual operation through which, separating "form from matter” we break off t(or become independent of) matter in isome way. The application of different abstracting operations leads to the distinction of various proper objects or aspects of the study of reality. These may remain in diverse dependence on matter, on concrete bodies. The diversity of the methods used in making objects dependent on — or distant from — matter serves, according to St Thomas, as a basis for the distinction among different philosophical disciplines.Thomas makes the abstracting methods dependent on the structure of the object which undergoes the intellectual operation. Abstraction is carried out on integral objects, the elements of which are in organic relation to one another. In the process of abstraction, the intellect separates the elements from one another. This operation is not carried out arbitrarily but it depends on the structure of things. It is true that the intellect can create fictitious, hypothetical objects, as well as substantialize or hypostasize accidents, but then it does not perform the function of abstraction stricto sensu.Abstraction consists in a number of diverse intellectual activities, which permit to distinguish in objects between essential and inessential factors, substance and accidents, matter and form, and to create the concepts of genus and species, of specific and interspecific properties. Abstraction results in definitions. The different ways of defining concepts are, at the same time, a criterion of the distinctness of one discipline of learnning from another. Thus, for instance, traditional mathematics does not treat its objects as real accidents of bodies. In the abstracting process it stops at intelligible matter, hence on matter not falling under sense cognition (i. ę. beyond the reach of external senses). Indeed, the philosopher of nature abstracts from individual matter and reaches the knowledge of the essence of the most general properties, but he considers these as real attributes of bodies. In cosmological definitions appears the concept of sensuous matter.Between cosmology and traditional mathematics there exist differences in particular as to the idea of quantity (extension). The philosopher of nature deals with quantity as a be sic real property of bodies, beside other attributes as space, time, and variability. In mathematic considerations extension is a quantity geôme- trically differentiated, detached from concrete manifestations of material beings. However, according to Thomas, mathematics does not abstract from the substance of the body qua metaphysical substratum. Such a view may be explained by the fact that Thomas wishes to dissociate himself from Pythagoras’ and Plato’s doctrines which held the creations of geometry and arithmetic to be ideally existing, and not as abstracted.Physical abstraction comprises different intellectual operations which lead to really different results. In fact, Cosmology once abstracts quantity from the metaphysical substratum of bodies, and, another time, from concrete properties in order to attain the concept of specific and interspecific properties, and again considers the essence of general properties, defines the conditions that make non- -contradictory the possibility of their existence, and establishes the existence of structures in which one individual forms a separate species; moreover, cosmology applies also abstraction in the question of motion, time and space. The common link connecting all the ways of abstraction in cosmology is that they lead to such concepts as are not possessed by the definitions of other philosophical disciplines: properly cosmological definitions contain the concept of sensuous matter. Abstraction is not a set of operations intellectually identical, homogenous, which are gradually applied to concrete objects, then to sensuous in general and to immaterial ones, since each particular type of abstraction consists in many differentiated operations, resulting in different concepts, even within the limits of one philosophical discipline. The three types of abstracting operations are not to be identified with the three degrees of abstraction, introduced into the methodology of traditional philosophy by D. Bannez and accepted by many a neo-Thoimist. It cannot be established that in the process of abstraction the intellect passes through different degrees, i. e. successive intellectual operations. This is so because one type of abstraction does not depend on another no does one contain another. That there exists analogy between these distinct operations is another matter.The idea of the three degrees of abstraction on which allegedly, the tripartite division of philosophical disciplines is based, brings in confusion to the methodology of philosophy, and should, therefore, be discarded. While it is to be admitted that one of the criteria differentiating the philosophy of nature from other philosophical disciplines is the characteristic set of abstracting operations, the result of which is the knowledge of the essence of the properties of bodies, the formation of general concepts and statements dealing ultimately with sensuous matter according to Thomas Aquinas’s methodological remark: In Physicis omnia terminantur ad sensum. To the term „abstraction” correspond different modes (operations) of abstraction — applied in the philosophy of nature, traditional mathematics, and metaphysics — which cannot be reduced to one single group.
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Michał Heller
Michał Heller
Ewolucyjny charakter seryjnych modeli wszechświata
The Evolutionary Aspect of Serial Models of the World (SMW)
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1. The structure and evolution of our universe are sometimes spoken of as being the subject oif modem cosmology. The problem, when a certain cosmological theory may be called evolutionary, is considered.Definition 1: A physical theory T describing a system U of physical objects u1, u2, ... un, ... is evolutionary, if theory T represents a system U as variable in time and if one can define a constant direction of this variability. A condition demanding that the system U must develop from simpler to more perfect forms (as sometimes postulated in biology) is in physics meaningless.According to def. 1. all relativistic world models satisfying the perfect cosmological principle, so called stationary models, ipso facto are not evolutionary. Oscillating models may .be regarded as evolutionary only in limited time intervals: from R-minimum to R-maximum and from R-maximum to R-iminimuim. Considering longer time intervals, one cannot indicate a constant direction of world’s variability. All other nonstationary models are evolutionary ones.2. A chief ideas of SMW-theory (first published in this Journal, XV (1967) fasc. 3, p. 73—88) are briefly presented. The possibility of influence of extragravita- tional factors on cosmic structure and evolution once admitted by SMW, there exists a definite probability that the universe will pass (’’passages hypothesis”) from the state defined by one model to the state defined by another one. SMW then replaces deterministic evolution of singular relativistic model into a 'kind of cosmological indétermination of model series. Owing to this fact, in SMW one cannot define a constant direction of world variability.Definition 2: We shall call a physical theory T describing a system U of physical objects u1, u2, ... un, ... an evolutionary theory in a probabilistic sense, if this theory represents a system U as variable in time and if one can define the probable direction of this variability.SMW-theory can be considered as evolutionary in the sense of def. 2 only.3. The moment, from which starting, we can speak of the world evolution in the direction, that it is holding up to day, we shall call "the beginning” of the universe. According to Lemaître, the same deterministic laws, which could predict the future (by deduction from initial conditions describing "the beginning”), could as well be used for computing some more distant conditions, from which ’’the beginning” might have been evolved. But, as we know, in relativistic cosmology such ’’predictions” backwards beyond the point of "beginning” (the point, which mathematically speaking forms a singularity in space-time) is quite impossible. This is a modern formulation of one of Kant’s famous antinomies. In SMW this antinomy disapears entirely. The universe is described as an assembly of potential states, which can be, or not, occupied. Now ”the beginning” is not a singular point but it is as ’’good” a state as other states of the universe. Only observational tests can indicate the real moment (if such existed) from which the cosmic evolution had begun.
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Mieczysław Lubański
Mieczysław Lubański
Lingwistyka matematyczna a filozofia
Mathematical Linguistics and Philosophy
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The present days witness a steady progress of the sciences connected with, and using cybernetics. One of these is mathematical linguistics. It may be considered as equivalent (in an appropriate sense of the word) with the theory of mathematical machines or that of automata. Provided we give philosophy a sufficiently large acception — such as suggested by W. Tatarkiewicz or G. E. Moore — a relationship between it and mathematical linguistics may be sought. The paper reports four "applications” of theoretical linguistics in philosophy: 1. theoretical linguistics applied to philosophical problems, 2. mathematical linguistics applied to philosophical methods, 3. mathematical linguistics applied to philosophy in general, 4. mathematical linguistics as means to increase and strengthen clear thinking. A number of illustrations are given to substantiate these views.It should be emphasized that the applications mentioned above are by no means comprehensive; the development of that field of cybernetics makes it, in fact, difficult to make out an overall list of these. However, such as enumerated, the problems seem interesting and may well stimulate further research. The development of cybernetics land its significance from the philosophical viewpoint offer promising prospects for a deeper study of the problems discussed. In the literature of the subject, more and more contributions appear dealing with this new style of philosophizing and stressing the importance of mathematical and cybernetic methods in philosophy.
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Zygmunt Hajduk
Zygmunt Hajduk
Niektóre aspekty wyjaśniania
Some Aspects of Explanation
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The paper studies some of the aspects of explanation discussed in recent literature. In the introduction various contexts are presented to answers to requests for an explanation, i. e. to the question: „Why is it so and so?” The register of the answers to that question, though not exhaustive, allows however to distinguish a few essential types of scientific explanation, namely: 1. deductive explanation, 2. probabilistic, 3. functional (teleological), and, 4. genetic. The distinction is based on the different logical relations between the explanatory premises and the statement requiring explanation.The request for explanation does not appear in natural sciences only, or at the level of philosophical knowledge, but also in everyday language. However, the considerations here presented are primarily concerned with the aspects of explanation as found in physical sciences. And again the paper distinguishes: 1. structural explanations, 2. systematic, 3. pragmatic, and, 4. canonic. Structural explanation seeks to find out the essence of things, the various modes of explanation being stages leading to that aim. Explanation itself consists in bringing out the inner nature (elements) of the object investigated and defining the coexistence of these elements. Systemic (contextual) explanation formes a sui generis transposition of the empirism, holistically interpreted. A given fact or law is considered explained when a sufficient knowledge has been reached of the system into which the sentence explained has been introduced; this knowledge allows the interpretation of the sentence as a coherent member of the system. In that aspect, a certain set of characteristics with which we enter into cognitive contact is not understandable by itself, but becomes explained once its relationship with other sets of characteristics has been shown. The basic statement by means of which we express 'the pragmatic (3) aspect can be phrased as follows: a person A explains X to a person B by means of Y. To explain someone something means to make understood to him what he does not understand. The explanatory value of a set of sentences Y regarding the sentence explained X, for the person B, depends not only on X and Y, but also on personal conviction, intelligence, education, criticism and so on. In that sense pragmatic explanation is relative. The canonic model (4) takes into consideration these logical relationships mainly as occur between the explanatory sentences and the explained ones, explanation being treated here not so much as a process as as a result. According to the type of relationship, explanation is a) de- ductive-nomological, b) statistic-inductive, or c) deductive-statistic. The sentences describing the explained events (explanation at the first level of scientific syste- misation) are explained by means of the schemes a and to, while at higher levels schemes a and c are applied.
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Włodzimierz Sedlak
Włodzimierz Sedlak
Biofizyczne podstawy świadomości
Biophysical Foundations of Consciousness
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The starting point chosen by the author is that of minimal consciousness: information received and acknowledged.1. Evolution of information in semiconductor systems. The semiconductor model is the one that allows the best observation of information and its transformation into electric effects, summating processes and semiconducting memory. Electromagnetic information, jointly with the chemical one (acceptor and donor atoms) may modify the substantial contents of the semiconductor, and, in the process, give the latter one a higher degree of order and anisotropic. A semiconductor may perform manifold functions simultaneously, even though possessing a very simple system. Generally speaking, there exists a semiconducting "consciousness”.2. Evolution of information in biological systems. Life with its characteristic feature — consciousness — appears to have evolved out of semiconductive properties. The substantial content was replaced by an organic one, while the basic semiconductive functions were preserved. The evolution affected the quantity and efficiency of information received. The reception itself of information stimulates the development of the system. On the whole one can speak of a philogenesis of information. In the evolution described here, a new element appeared when the reception of information was made dependent on metabolism. The next stage in the development was reached with the appearance of information canals within the biological system. Parallelly, there exists another system of information based on field principles. Field steering is certainly important in old functions of the organism such as morphogenesis and regeneration.The general property of semiconductors — reception »of information and its translation into electric effects — found optimal possibilities in nerves. Ranvier’s choke works on the principle of semiconductive current — voltage junction. Myelin is certainly a waveguide steering the weak electromagnetic wave one way to the choke. The impulsive currents picture should give rise to a wave. The functioning of the nerves without any losses and with minimal self-noise and little stimulating energy required, and action currents with a characteristic spike prove the existence of a current voltage process at the p-n junction. One has to take into account a small électrostriction of the nerve. Hodgkin’s soda pump may not be the cause of nerve stimulation but its result and a necessary condition of depolarisation.3. Evolutive preparation of consciousness. In archaic animal groups, loosely dispersed sensitive cells gather in an anisotropic system terminated with brain. At an earlier stage, nerve cells gathered larger quantities of DNA and RNA. Parallelly, the circulation system develops. The oxygen effect, important for semiconductors, continues to be obligatory in the reception of information by the brain. The archaic field code is apparently respected in brains activity since pigments such as melanin and lipofuscin are found. Pigments are good transformers of electromagnetic energy. Here they may exist either as association against excessive overenergizing of the brain by radiation from outside, or as maximal utilization of weak self-radiations.Another evolutive direction is the increase and differentiation of the cerebral surface. The superficial density of electrons, known from semiconductor physics was apparently necessary for a subtle reception of information and production of consciousness. The development of cerebral cortex is associated with postnatal ontogenesis in man. The cortex is potentiality developing parallelly to reception of information. It is to be supposed that the electrostasis ECS of the brain increases parallel, which is testified by the normalization of the EEG.The action potentials of the brain, the semiconducting properties of DNA and RNA and nerves, electrostasis, the oxygen effect (the blood flow in the brain being 25 times higher than in any other tissue), the presence of melanin and lipofuscin, the reception of all information in the form of electric effect — all this proves that the semiconductor model was the starting point for the reception of information in the brain. The archaic field code also was included in the functioning of the brains. Reflexive consciousness is certainly connected with field reflection from ECS and the reception of the wave reflected by one of the layers of the cerebral cortex.
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Antoni Lićwinko
Antoni Lićwinko
Teoria filozofii przyrody w ujęciu Bolesława Gaweckiego
Teoria filozofii przyrody w ujęciu Bolesława Gaweckiego
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Antoni Klein
Antoni Klein
La notion de temps (equivalence avec l’espace)
La notion de temps (equivalence avec l’espace)
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