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research articles
1. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Daniele Bertini Anecdotal Pluralism
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Anecdotal pluralism (AP) is the claim that, when two individuals disagree on the truth of a religious belief, the right move to make is to engage in a communal epistemic process of evidence sharing and evaluation, motivated by the willingness to learn from each other, understand the adversary's views and how these challenge their own, and re-evaluate their own epistemic position in regards to external criticisms. What I will do in my paper is to provide a presentation of AP and give a few reasons in support. I will begin with showing how pluralism can be promoted by religious experiences inhering in any (historical) tradition. To this regard, my purpose is to analyse such experiences as conducive to the assumption of the two main principles defining any pluralist view. Subsequently, I will construe AP by seven claims, and I will focus my efforts on justifying its superiority both to exclusivism/inclusivism and other varieties of pluralism. My next and final move is to list a few reasons which support my view.
2. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Elliott R. Crozat Why Fallibilistic Evidence is Insufficient for Propositional Knowledge
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In this article, I argue that fallibilistic justification is insufficient for propositional knowledge if veritic luck is involved. I provide a thought experiment to demonstrate that even very strong non-factive evidence is insufficient for knowledge if veritic luck is present. I then distinguish between precise justification (PJ), which I suggest is required for knowledge in cases of veritic luck, and loose justification (LJ), which is sufficient for practical cases in which beliefs are reasonable to hold even if they fall short of being items of knowledge. In addition, I provide a reason for holding that PJ is required for all items of propositional knowledge, and not only for cases of veritic luck. Lastly, I propose that Gettier-style cases pertain to an ambiguity between PJ and LJ.
3. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Ron McClamrock How Big Do Things Look?
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The idea that we have direct and infallible knowledge of appearances is still deeply entrenched; and even scholars who reject this idea often still presume that our normal awareness of the shape and size of objects includes awareness of something like the shape and size of the image it projects onto the retina. I show here how these ideas are undermined by some new empirical evidence regarding these features, as well as by some observations concerning the phenomenology of size, the familiar moon illusion, and the persistence of illusions more generally. These considerations further suggest a path for dealing with the phenomenology of appearance more broadly.
4. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Santiago A. Vrech The End of the Case? A Metaphilosophical Critique of Thought Experiments
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In this paper I carry out two tasks. First, I account for one of the distinctive uses of thought experiments in philosophy, namely, the fact that just a thought experiment is sufficient to confute a well-established theory. Secondly, I present three arguments to defend the claim that, at least in philosophy, we should remove thought experiments from our metaphilosophical toolkit. The central premise that motivates these arguments is the following: the very methodology of thought experiments permits to construct different scenarios in which philosophical theories are refuted ad infinitum.
5. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Michał Wagner Beyond Typology/Population Dichotomy. Rethinking the Concept of Species in Neo-Lamarckism and Orthogenesis
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Historiography is becoming more critical of the typology/ population dichotomy introduced by Ernst Mayr. Therefore, one should look again at the problem of species in non-Darwinian theories: neo-Lamarckism and orthogenesis, and consider the possibility that this problem was overly simplified. What can be seen in both of them is the existence of a tension between the idea of evolution and the essence of species. In neo-Lamarckism, this tension was resolved by recognizing species as static entities which changed only when triggered by external stimulus. In orthogenesis, evolution was seen as constant phenomena and species – as naturally changeable entities. However, orthogeneticists assumed that not only species, but also whole phyletic lines had essences that constrained their further evolution. Thus, in both cases we can see interpretation of species in tune with essentialism, but essentialism is widely differently integrated with each of these concepts of evolution.
discussion notes/debate
6. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Gustavo Picazo Oliver and Smiley on the Collective–Distributive Opposition
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Two objections are raised against Oliver and Smiley’s analysis of the collective–distributive opposition in their 2016 book: (1) They take it as a basic premise that the collective reading of ‘baked a cake’ corresponds to a predicate different from its distributive reading, and the same applies to all predicate expressions that admit both a collective and a distributive interpretation. At the same time, however, they argue that inflectional forms of the same lexeme (such as ‘is a man’ and ‘are men’) reveal a univocity that should be preserved in a formal representation of English. These two assumptions sit uneasily. (2) In developing their analysis, Oliver and Smiley come to the conclusion that even a singular predication such as ‘Tom baked a cake’ must be regarded as ambiguous between a collective and a distributive reading. This is so artificial that it hardly makes sense, and yet there seems to be no way out of the difficulty unless we are prepared to give up the basic premise just mentioned.
7. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Michael J. Shaffer Further Reflections on Quasi-factivism: A Reply to Baumann
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This paper is a constructive response to Peter Baumann’s comments concerning the argument from inconsistency and explosion that was originally introduced in “Can Knowledge Really be Non-factive?” Specifically, this paper deals with Baumann’s two suggestions for how quasi-factivists might avoid this argument and it shows that they are both problematic. As such, his paper extends and strengthens the case against the view that knowledge is not factive, i.e. the view that knowledge implies that what is known is true or approximately true.
8. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Notes on the Contributors
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9. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Notes to Contributors
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10. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Logos and Episteme. Aims and Scope
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research articles
11. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Cătălin Bărboianu Structural-Epistemic Interdisciplinarity and the Nature of Interdisciplinary Challenges
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Research on interdisciplinarity has been concentrated on the methodological and educational aspects of this complex phenomenon and less on its theoretical nature. Within a theoretical framework specific to the philosophy of science, I propose a structural scheme of how interdisciplinary processes go, focusing on the concepts of availability of the methods, concept linking, and theoretical modeling. In this model, the challenges interdisciplinarity is claimed to pose to its practitioners are of the same nature as the challenges scientists encounter within the evolution of their own disciplines.
12. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Domingos Faria A Knowledge-First Account of Group Knowledge
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The aim of this paper is to relate two trending topics in contemporary epistemology: the discussion of group knowledge and the discussion of knowledge-first approach. In social epistemology no one has seriously applied and developed Williamson’s theory of knowledge-first approach to the case of group knowledge yet. For example, scholars of group knowledge typically assume that knowledge is analyzed in terms of more basic concepts, such as group belief or acceptance, group justification, and so on. However, if Williamson’s theory of knowledge is correct, these are not good analyzes for understanding group knowledge. For, in such framework, knowledge is not analyzed in terms of belief and justification, and the same should apply to group knowledge. Thus, we propose to analyze which consequences Williamson’s theory has for social epistemology, namely for an understanding of group knowledge. The questions that will guide this article are the following: What is a knowledge-first approach to group knowledge? And what does a knowledge-first approach teach us with regard to one of the most pressing issues of social epistemology, namely the dispute between summativists and non-summativists accounts of groups? We claim that a knowledge-first account of group knowledge can be offered and that it favors non-summativism.
13. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Mario Günther A Connexive Conditional
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We propose a semantics for a connexive conditional based on the Lewis-Stalnaker conditional. It is a connexive semantics that is both classical and intuitive.
14. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Mohammad Mahdi Hatef Ontological Solutions to the Problem of Induction
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The idea of the uniformity of nature, as a solution to the problem of induction, has at least two contemporary versions: natural kinds and natural necessity. Then there are at least three alternative ontological ideas addressing the problem of induction. In this paper, I articulate how these ideas are used to justify the practice of inductive inference, and compare them, in terms of their applicability, to see whether each of them is preferred in addressing the problem of induction. Given the variety of contexts in which inductive inferences are made, from natural science to social science and to everyday thinking, I suggest that no singular idea is absolutely preferred, and a proper strategy is probably to welcome the plurality of ideas helpful to induction, and to take pragmatic considerations into account, in order to judge in every single case.
15. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Benjamin W. McCraw Alston, Aristotle, and Epistemic Normativity
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Alston (2005) argues that there is no such thing as a single concept of epistemic justification. Instead, there is an irreducible plurality of epistemically valuable features of beliefs: ‘epistemic desiderata.’ I argue that this approach is problematic for meta-epistemological reasons. How, for instance, do we characterize epistemic evaluation and do we do we go about it if there’s no theoretical unity to epistemology? Alston’s response is to ground all epistemic desiderata, thereby unifying epistemology, in truth and truth-conduciveness. I argue that this move over-unifies epistemology, in effect, giving us a single criterion for epistemology on par with the epistemology-by-justification approach he rejects. Perhaps surprisingly, we find a similar theoretical worry in Aristotle’s argument about the science of metaphysics. Aristotle’s resolution in this problem by the ‘analogy of being’ provides a parallel framework to resolve the worries with Alston’s approach. In particular, I argue that we can focus epistemic evaluation on the person of epistemic virtue: this category will be focal, unifying the disparate desiderata, without reducing to one thing all epistemic values or relations that desiderate must bear to the central value. A virtue-centric account of epistemic normativity follows: one that can remain genuinely pluralistic and yet unified as well.
16. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Michael J. Shaffer Deontic Logic, Weakening and Decisions Concerning Disjunctive Obligations
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This paper introduces two new paradoxes for standard deontic logic (SDL). They are importantly related to, but distinct from Ross' paradox. These two new paradoxes for SDL are the simple weakening paradox and the complex weakening paradox. Both of these paradoxes arise in virtue of the underlying logic of SDL and are consequences of the fact that SDL incorporates the principle known as weakening. These two paradoxes then show that SDL has counter-intuitive implications related to disjunctive obligations that arise in virtue of deontic weakening and in virtue of decisions concerning how to discharge such disjunctive obligations. The main result here is then that theorem T1 is a problematic component of SDL that needs to be addressed.
17. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Notes on the Contributors
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18. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Notes to Contributors
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19. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Logos & Episteme. Aims and Scope
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research articles
20. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 12 > Issue: 4
Miguel López-Astorga Reduction, Intuition, and Cognitive Effort in Scientific Language
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In his search for a better scientific language, Carnap offered a number of definitions, ideas, and arguments. This paper is devoted to one of his definitions in this regard. In particular, it addresses a definition providing rules to add new properties to the descriptions of objects or beings by taking into account other properties of those very objects or beings that are already known. The main point that this paper tries to make is that, if a current cognitive theory such as the theory of mental models is assumed, it can be said that those rules are easy to use by scientists and philosophers of science. This is because, following the essential theses of this last theory, the rules do not demand excessive cognitive effort to be applied. On the contrary, they are simple rules that make researchers’ work harder in no way.