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John R. Searle, Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik
John R. Searle
O niektórych słabościach tradycyjnej koncepcji racjonalności
Some Weaknesses in the Traditional Conception of Rationality
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The paper aims to show that the model of rationality dominating in our culture is based on a series of misunderstandings. According to the author this model consists of the following claims: (1) all our actions are caused by beliefs and desires; (2) rationality is a matter of following rules; (3) rationality is a separate cognitive faculty or capacity; (4) the weakness of the will can arise only in cases where there is something wrong with the psychological antecedent of the action; (5) practical reason has to start with the primary desires that are beyond the scope of rationality; (6) rationality cannot be exercised if desires are inconsistent. The author discusses each of these claims, arguing that they are not tenable if we are to stay adequate to real cases of rational action. In particular the author develops an idea according to which rationality and freedom are coextensive, human beings are capable of commitment what creates desireindependent reasons for action, and desires can be inconsistent, for they constitute a kind of mental states different from beliefs: they represent not as the world is, but how we would like it to be.
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John R. Searle, Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik, Rafał Lizut
John R. Searle
Kilka uwag o metodach w filozofii
Some Remarks on Philosophical Methods
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The paper argues that a good philosophical investigation employs various methods, but there exists a constant temptation in philosophy to become obsessed by one method as opposed to another. It was once supposed to be two rival methods for practicing analytical philosophy: the ordinary language method and the formal logic method. Yet, those methods were not genuinely rival, as they were usually used to answer different questions. A method supposed to be in opposition to the analytic methods was developed by phenomenology. The phenomenological method — suitable for analyzing phenomena of our own experience — is not however applicable to certain important philosophical issues. One of them is: how do we get from sound to meaning? The answer to this question provided by the Heideggerian method proves that phenomenologists cannot hear the question and cannot grasp the answer given by the author, for they mistakenly think that the question: “what is the logical relation between sound and meaning” is reducible to the phenomenological question; how does it seem to the agent. The same problem arises with regard to social reality. Thus, the phenomenological method is inadequate to answer such questions, because it does not allow to recognize the distinction between brute facts and reality built upon them (such as institutional facts), and logical relations between them. Phenomenology will enable us to begin the investigation, but in order to keep going with the investigation we should go beyond the level of phenomenology to the level of underlying logical structures.The lesson to be drawn from the above considerations is that there is a variety of methods suitable for philosophical investigations and the general principle is to let the nature of the problem dictate the method for its solution rather than letting the nature of methods dictate the sort of problems regarded as important.
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Roman P. Godlewski
Roman P. Godlewski
O semantyce Donalda Davidsona:
Uwagi interpretacyjne i krytyczne
On Donald Davidson’s Semantics
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The article is concerned with D. Davidson’s semantic views. The aim of the article is to explain some misunderstandings that have arisen in the course of reception of these views. The author tries to prove that according to Davidson semantic properties and relations do not come under classical definitions, but under contextual ones, like in L. Wittgenstein’s semantics. Hence the interpretation presented by J. Kmita is incorrect, whereas that by R. Rorty is right. Causal explanation of semantics is out of the question; hence Rorty’s interpretation is false with respect to this point. Propositions talk about what they talk about, so Kmita is wrong. According to Davidson the concept of reference is permissible, so Putnam is wrong in his interpretation. Moreover, there is only one logic semantics and for all languages it is the same, hence Kmita is wrong when he says that Davidson’s interpreter arbitrarily pushes foreign semantics into his own. He is also wrong when he puts in Davidson’s mouth the conviction that non-determination of a translation does not consist in impossibility to cognize foreign semantics.
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Lech Gruszecki
Lech Gruszecki
O indukcji niezupełnej w matematyce
On Incomplete Induction in Mathematics
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The subject of this article is the role of inductive reasoning (in the meaning of induction by incomplete enumeration) in the methodology of mathematics.The following types of induction have been distinguished:I1) induction which causes formulation of axioms of different mathematical theories;I2) enumerative induction which causes formulation of theorems on the basis of a finite number of cases;I3) induction concerning the range of application of mathematical symbols;I4) induction generalising the properties of finite sets to the infinite case;I5) induction pointing to analogies between problems belonging to different domains of mathematics.Inductive reasoning should not be put against the creativity of scientists, as induction is often an important, though not always conscious part of our cognition. The concept of notional metaphor can be useful for explaining the nature of inductive reasoning. With this concept, a general scheme of inductive reasoning has been proposed, which, in the opinion of the authors, is more adequate for presenting the nature of induction than traditional approaches.
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Jacek Juliusz Jadacki
Jacek Juliusz Jadacki
Etos akademicki
Academic Ethos
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Academic ethos is a set of norms that are binding for a scholar as such. (1) A scholar should especially take up useful research, do it guardedly (so without infringing higher values), formulating well asked questions, using effective methods of searching for true and sufficiently justified answers to those questions — and expressing the research results in an exact, adjusted to the object of the research, simple, forcible, concise and beautiful language. (2) A scholar should undertake vital, i.e. new, fundamental, creative and difficult research. (3) Conducting research should be accompanied by passion, concentration, reliability, imagination, and self-criticism. (4) A scholar should be a guide, minder and supervisor for his pupils and co-workers. (5) A Catholic scholar should also be expected to behave in a morally impeccable way, and if he does not meet this expectation, at least he should feel ashamed of it.
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Kazimierz Jodkowski
Kazimierz Jodkowski
NOMA, cudy i filtr eksplanacyjny
NOMA, Miracles, and Explanatory Filter
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The paper is devoted to the issue of warfare between science and religion. The author describes various positions at this issue, analyzing their faults and merits. He concludes that two most popular ones — of the two books (the Bible, book of Revelation, and the book of Nature), and of complete separated, non-overlapping magisteria (so-called bomb-shelter theology) — are untenable. He proposes a new conception instead of them — the conception of punctuated, or interrupted, discordism — according to which science and religion are predominantly in real conflict which though dangerous is not fatal to both sides of the conflict. It is so because science is ever-changing set of hypothetical claims in comparison to religious claims which are dogmatic and unchangeable.
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Wojciech Kowalski
Wojciech Kowalski
Zagadnienie rozumienia arystotelesowskiej koncepcji substancji przez Whiteheada
Problem of Understanding of the Aristotelian Idea of the Substance by Whitehead
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The problem which was Whitehead’s fundamental concern in the works of his later period was the problem of substance. The origin of theory of substance Whitehead finds in Aristotele’s dictum that a primary substance is neither predicable of nor present in a subject. This theory directly contravenes Whitehead’s own principle of universal relativity, that every actual entity is present in every other actual entity. Aristotelian substances are regarded by Whitehead as bare particulars, each conceived as being just its particular self with no necessary relevance to any other particular, inert and static, incapable of any change which is not a mere external adventure. To Whitehead, the Aristotelian formula is equivalent to Descartes’ definition of substance: “an existent thing which requires nothing but itself in order to exist.”Whitehead’s equation of Aristotelian substance with Descartes’ and Lockean’s definition rests upon a gross misunderstanding. Aristotele’s theory conceives substance as dynamic and interrelated, contrary to what Whitehead supposed. There is no “undifferentiated endurance” for the Aristotelian substance. There is, on contrary, intrinsic development, change, becoming. The reason why it is legitimate to predicate contrary predicates of the same substance at different times is precisely because the substance itself has changed.
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Anna Kozanecka
Anna Kozanecka
Zagadnienie tak zwanego aksjomatu G. Fregego
The Question of the So-called G. Frege’s Axiom
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In the initial part of the article Frege’s texts are analyzed in order to present his position on the question of denotation of propositions and the fragment points to the motives that made Frege recognize logical value as the denotation of proposition. In its further part the article presents the position taken in this question by commentators of Frege’s thought. In the final part of the article it is shown what shape two versions of Frege’s axiom (semantic and ontological) formulated by R. Suszko assume.
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Marek Lechniak
Marek Lechniak
Niektóre filozoficzne problemy logik zmian przekonań
Some Philosophical Problems of Logics of Belief Change
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The article presents some problems of logical representation of belief change. The problem of beliefs (approached in a synchronic way) was analyzed on the ground of epistemic or intuitionist logics. In the 1980’s works concerning logical reconstruction of belief change appeared. The basic conception here is the conception of belief change formulated by C. Alchouron, P. Gärdenfors and D. Makinson (abbreviated as AGM), based on the assumption that the belief state is represented by a non-contradictory set of propositions and that a belief change should be minimal (the postulate of economy). However, the AGM theory, characterized by a good formal shape, gives rise to several problems of the intuitive nature. Some of them are: the way the object of beliefs is understood, logical value of propositions that induce a change, the propositional way of representing beliefs, putting beliefs in an order and the way this order is formally represented.
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Marcin Molski, Wiktor Chmielarczyk, Andrzej Pruszyński
Marcin Molski
Onkogeneza i emergencja
Oncogenesis and Emergence
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The population, molecular and submolecular (quantum) levels of oncogenesis are considered. The quantum description takes into account the nonlocal Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations, interactions at-the-distance, quantum entanglement and macroscopic quantum coherence. In this approach, cancerogenesis is initiated by destruction of the quantum entanglement of the DNA molecules due to mutation, which leads to appearance of an oncogen and a local decoherence of the organism. In the genetic approach a cancer is the gene disease, whereas in the quantum approach — a disease of the living system. On the basis of the Humphreys criteria, an attempt of the ontological classification of bio- and ontogenesis is made. Those phenomena can be considered in terms of the coherent, synchronic and holistic emergence.
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Paweł Skrzydlewski
Paweł Skrzydlewski
Prawo stanowione a wolność człowieka:
(z perspektywy filozofii nowożytnej i św. Tomasza z Akwinu)
Positive Law and Man’s Freedom
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Modern and contemporary times have brought a juxtaposition and a peculiar rivalry between the positive law and man’s freedom that have not been known earlier. This is accompanied not only by a tendency to give law and freedom autonomy, but also to separate them from man’s nature, from real order of social life and from the moral dimension of human activities.The article undertakes an attempt at revealing the ostensible character of the antagonism between positive law formulated by man and freedom. In the author’s opinion, this antagonism, so distinct in modern conceptions referring to liberalism, anarchism, as well as to totalitarianism and collectivism and other trends — can be solved not by engaging in a discussion with participants of the dispute, but by showing the truth of reality itself, or by understanding the nature of human freedom itself and the nature of law itself. Thus the author of the present article claims that basic explanation of the relation of human freedom to positive law needs studying reality of law itself and reality of human freedom itself. Non-antagonistic character of the relation between positive law and human freedom was best shown and explained by St Thomas Aquinas (STh I-II, q. 90-97).
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Marek Szydłowski
Marek Szydłowski
Ciemna energia problemem kosmologii XXI wieku
The Dark Energy as a Problem of the Cosmology in XXI Century
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The current cosmological observations of distant supernovae type Ia suggest the existence of dark energy component with negative pressure. The most obvious candidate for this dark energy is the cosmological constant which raises several theoretical difficulties. The problem of dark energy, due to our Universe is accelerating at present in principle is open. We argue that this problem will dominate the cosmology in XXI century. From the philosophical point of view it is interesting to provide evidence and comments for the key issues related to the dark energy models just at the moment before scientific revolution.
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Jerzy Szymura
Jerzy Szymura
„Adaequatio intellectus et rei” w świetle dyskusji ze sceptycyzmem semantycznym
„Adaequatio intellectus et rei” in the Light of the Discussion with Semantic Skepticism
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The article juxtaposes modern skepticism stating lack of the criterion of true beliefs about transcendent reality with respect to their contents, but accepting the assumption about existence and cognoscibility of those contents on the one hand, and — after M. F. Burnyeat — ancient skepticism understood as one that questions this assumption on the other. The doubt as to existence of beliefs — resp. propositions as contents of beliefs — is a link joining ancient skeptics with Wittgenstein. Their skepticism is not – as modern skepticism – an epistemological position, but an ontological one — nominalism — questioning existence of universals that are the conditions of meaning and hence the conditions of truth of propositions. This is why the ancient dispute concerning the truth was in fact a dispute over the problem of universals, i.e. over existence of constant rules deciding which ways of connecting the subject and the predicate in a proposition are right and which are not. Realists referred to such rules, sophists denied their existence, and skeptics stated that without having such a rule at their disposal they do not have a basis for deciding the dispute between realists and sophists. This does not have much to do either with so-called correspondence concept of the truth or with the modern understanding of conceptual realism talking about “ideal paradigms” or “common properties” of things. Today’s typologies of philosophical positions do not fit antiquity. Ch. S. Peirce's and D. Armstrong's arguments lead to the conclusion that Plato was a… nominalist in the modern meaning of the world. P. T. Geach’s and N. Wolterstorff’s analyses allow stating the same about St Thomas Aquinas. This places under the question mark the statement that the latter could be an advocate of the generally ascribed to him correspondence theory of truth, which also cannot be derived from Aristotle’s philosophy without any doubts.
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Józef Turek
Józef Turek
Filozofia kosmologii – zarys problematyki
Philosophy of Cosmology – Outline of the Issue
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The article in the systematic and ordered way presents the most important philosophical problems, which are undertaken with regard to their close connections with contemporary (scientific) cosmology. Lately more and more often the issue mentioned above is called philosophy of cosmology. In the first part of that article, with accordance to the broad understanding of that philosophy, methodological problem of cosmology containing both: its external methodology (general and particular) and so-called internal methodology has been presented. The second part of the article contains various philosophical questions which are undertaken in the context of concrete achievements of contemporary scientific cosmology. They include issues from the field of philosophy of nature, philosophy of God, and ontology.
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Jacek Wojtysiak
Jacek Wojtysiak
Ontologiczne założenia korespondencyjnej koncepcji prawdy
Ontological Assumptions of the Correspondence Conception of Truth
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Philosophers are mainly focused on the epistemological concept of truth. However, if we want to maintain this concept in the classical version (correspondence one) we have to assume at least some minimal ontology (metaphysics), and hence some ontological (metaphysical) concept of truth. Items I. and II. are an attempt at explicating this ontology in the context of Aristotle’s and Tarski’s conceptions, and item IV. is (in discussion with P. Horwich and D. Lewis) taking an attitude towards contemporary challenges that deflationism brings to them. It seems that today one may defend the correspondence conception of truth and its ontological assumptions, that boil down to stating a certain form of the world’s “rationality”.
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Barry Stroud, Marcin Iwanicki
Barry Stroud
Doniosłość sceptycyzmu
Doniosłość sceptycyzmu
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recenzje |
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Andrzej Bronk
Andrzej Bronk
Obrona realizmu w filozofii nowożytnej i współczesnej
Obrona realizmu w filozofii nowożytnej i współczesnej
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Roczniki Filozoficzne:
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Łukasz Kubiak
Łukasz Kubiak
Filozofować w kontekście teologii. Problem religii prawdziwej
Filozofować w kontekście teologii. Problem religii prawdziwej
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Marek Lechniak
Marek Lechniak
Status zasady sprzeczności w świetle logiki współczesnej
Status zasady sprzeczności w świetle logiki współczesnej
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Ryszard Maciołek, Ryszard Mordarski
Ryszard Maciołek
Logic, Cause & Action. Essays in Honour of Elizabeth Anscombe
Logic, Cause & Action. Essays in Honour of Elizabeth Anscombe
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