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1. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 3
Wenceslao J. Gonzalez Presentation
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2. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 3
Elie G. Zahar The Interdependence of the Core, the Heuristic and the Novelty of Facts in Lakatos’s MSRP
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In this paper I try to explain why Lakatos’s (and Popper’s) conventionalist view must be replaced by a phenomenological conception of the empirical basis; for only in this way can one make sense of the theses that the hard core of an RP (Research Programme) can be shielded against refutations; that this metaphysical hard core can be turned into a set of guidelines or, alternatively, into a set of heuristic metaprinciples governing the development of an RP; and that a distinction can legitimately be made between novel predictions and facts to which a theory might have been adjusted post hoc. Two basic metaprinciples are finally examined: the (conservative) Correspondence Principle and various (revolutionary) symmetry requirements; both of these heuristic devices illustrate the fundamental role which, according to Lakatos, mathematics plays in the progress of empirical science.
3. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 3
Donald Gillies, Yuxin Zheng Dynamic Interactions with the Philosophy of Mathematics
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Dynamic interaction is said to occur when two significanrly different fields A and B come into relation, and their interaction is dynamic in the sense that at first the flow of ideas is principally from A to B, but later ideas from B come to influence A. Two examples are given of dynamic interactions with the philosophy of mathematics. The first is with philosophy of scicnce, and thc sccond with computer science. Theanalysis cnables Lakatos to be charactcrised as thc first to devclop the philosophy of mathematics using ideas taken from thc philosophy of science.
4. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 3
Peter Machamer, Franccsca Di Poppa Rational Reconstructions Revised
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Imre Lakatos’ idea that history of science without philosophy of science is blind may still be given a plausible interpretation today, even though his theory of the methodology of scientific research programmes has been rejected. The latter theory captures neither rationality in science nor the sense in which history must be told in a rational fashion. Nonetheless, Lakatos was right in insisting that the discipline of history consists of written rational reconstructions. In this paper, we will examine possible ways to cash out different, philosophically interesting, relationships: between rationality and science, between rationality and philosophy of science and/or epistemology, and, of course, between history and philosophy of science. Our conclusion is that the historian of science may be a philosopher of science as weIl, but if that philosophy of science is essentially a historical and dogmatic, it either cannot be used for history or it will deprive history of some of its most interesting and useful categories.
5. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 3
Jarret Leplin Lakatos’s Epistemic Aspirations
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Imre Lakatos argued that a theory of scientific method must be empirical, and therefore self-applicable; the standards it imposes on scientific theories must be ones it satisfies itself. But in relying on this standard of self-referential consistency to protect his theory from criticism, Lakatos becomcs vulnerable to relativism. He escapes by hypothesizing that scientific changes which are methodologically progressive according to his theory are also progressive epistemically. The question is whethcr his theory of method has the resources to warrant this hypothesis. I construct a line of argument logically open to him, and use its inevitable failure to show that his epistemic aspirations depend on precepts of method that he has wrongly rejected.
6. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 3
Wenceslao J. Gonzalez Lakatos’s Approach on Prediction and Novel Facts
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Lakatos’s approach to prediction and novel facts is of considerable interest. Prediction appears in his conception in at least three different levels: a) as an important aim of the research programs; b) as a procedure -a key method- for increasing our scientific knowledge both theoretically and empirically; and c) as the way to assess the scientific character of knowledge claims -means for evaluating results-. At all these levels he envisions a close connection between prediction and novel facts. The paper has four aims. First, to examine his concept of “prediction” in Lakatos’s MSRP, taking into account different aspects (semantical, logical, epistemological, methodological and axiological). Second, to clarify the notion of “novel facts”, which requires the consideration of the various ways in which new facts can be understood. Third, to examine the prediction of novel facts as criterion of appraisal (theoretical, empirical and heuristical). Fourth, to explore Lakatos’s approach (i.e., the concept of prediction linked to novel facts) in connection with the field of economics, in order to shed new light on issues that have been discussed in recent years.
7. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 3
Javier Legris Deducción y conocimiento en los orígenes de la teoría de la demostración (Deduction and Knowledge in the Origins of Proof Theory)
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Este trabajo tiene por objetivo examinar la idea de deducción metamatemática en el programa de Hilbert, mostrando su dependencia de conceptos gnoseológicos, tales como el de conocimiento intuitivo. También se comparará esta concepcion de la deducción con la fundamentación intuicionista de la logica. Sostendré que esta deducción metamatemática lleva a una caracterización de la logica como una teoría de las deducciones formales en un sentido particular.This paper aims to examine the idea of metamathematical deduction in Hilbert’s program showing its dependence of epistemological notions, such as intuitive knowledge. This conception of deduction will be also compared with the intuitionistic foundation of logic. I will argue that this metamathematical deduction leads to a characterization of logic as a theory of formal deductions in a particular sense.
8. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 3
Xavier Caicedo, Alejandro Martín Completud de dos cálculos logicos de Leibniz (Completencss of Two Logical Systems of Leibniz)
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Este trabajo se encuadra dentro de una nueva visión de la lógica de Leibniz, la cual pretende mostrar que sus escritos fueron ricos no solamente en proyectos ambiciosos (Característica Universal, Combinatoria, Mathesis) sino también en desarrollos lógico-matematicos concretos. Se demuestra que su “Caracteristica Numerica” que asigna pares de números a las proposiciones categóricas es una semántiea para la cual la silogística aristotélica es correcta y completa, y que el sistema algebraico presentado en Fundamentos de un Cálculo Lógico es una lógica algebraica similar a la de Boole.This work is a contribution to a new view of Leibniz’s logic, pretending to show that his writings were not only rich in projects (Characteristica, Combinatoria, Mathesis), but also in concrete logico-mathematical developments. We prove that his “Numerical Characteristic” assigning pairs of numbers to terms of categorical propositions, is a complete and correct semantics for aristotelian syllogistic, and the algebraic system presented in Fundamentals of Logical Calculus is essentially a complete version of boolean algebraic logic.
9. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 3
Joan Pagès EI realismo nómico de universales: algunos problemas (Nomical Universal Realism: Some Problems)
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EI desarrollo de su teoría de las leyes como relaciones entre universales condujo a Armstrong a establecer un marco metafísico general mas complejo que el que sus anteriores trabajos presentaban. En este artículo se exponen los aspectos principales de la metafísica de particulares y universales exigida por la identificación original de Armstrong de las leyes con estados de cosas universales. Además, se presentan diversas dificultades que pueden hallarse en su propuesta, y algunas soluciones para las mismas. Los temas principales que se discuten son las leyes con excepciones, las leyes con restriccionesespacio-temporales, las leyes probabilísticas y las leyes no ejemplificadas.The development of his theory of laws as relations between universals led Armstrong to set up a more complex general metaphysical framework than that advanced in his previous works. In this paper I present the main traits of the metaphysics of properties and particulars required by Armstrongsoriginal identification of laws with universal states of affairs. Besides, I advance some serious drawbacks that can be found in his proposal and I also offer some solutions to them. The main subjects to be discussed here will be laws with exceptions, laws with spatio-temporal limitations, probabilistic laws and uninstantiated laws.
10. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 3
Jesús Padilla Gálvez Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe
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libros recibidos
11. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 3
Libros recibidos / Books Received
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cronicas y proximas reuniones
12. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 3
Agenda / Notebook
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13. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 3
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14. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 3
Boletín de suscripción / Order Form
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15. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Antonio Blanco Relacionalidad y atomicidad (Relationality and Atomicity)
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Se presenta un esquema ontológico en el que el par relacional/atómico desempeña un papel central. La noción basica, la que se define en terminos positivos, es la de “relacionalidad”. La atomicidad es definida negativamente, como no-relacionalidad. En realidad, se distinguen diversas nociones positivas, emparentadas entre sí, que pueden verse como diferentes formas de relacionalidad a las que corresponden diferentes formas de atomicidad (o no-relacionalidad). A continuación, ese instrumental ontológico se aplica al planteamiento de dos cuestiones semánticas: se trata brevemente la cuestión deI individualismo y, más en detalle, la cuestión deI holismo semántico.An ontological framework is presented in which the relational/atomic pair plays a central role. The basic notion, which is defined in positive terms, is that of “relationality”. “Atomicity” is negatively defined as non-relationality. More exactly, we distinguish between several related positive notions that can be seen as different kinds of relationality. Correspondingly, we distinguish between several kinds of atomicity (or nonrelationality). Then, the ontological tools are applied to two semantic issues: we briefly deal with the individualism issue and in more detail with the issue of semantic holism.
16. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Louise Cummings Self-Refutations and Much More: The Dialectical Thinking of Hilary Putnam
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In the following discussion, I examine what constitutes the dialectical strain in Putnam’s thought. As part of this examination, I consider Putnam’s (1981) criticism of the fact/value dichotomy. I compare this criticism to Putnam’s analysis of the metaphysical realist’s position, a position which has occupied Putnam’s thinking more than any other philosophical stance. I describe how Putnam pursues a chargeof self-refutation against the metaphysical realist and against the proponent of a fact/value dichotomy, a charge which assumes dialectical significance. So it is that the self-refuting nature of these positions is linked to their unintelligibility. My conclusion relates Putnam’s dialectical project to his wider philosophical ambitions, ambitions which are influenced in large part by Wittgensteinian considerations.
17. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Alejandro Sobrino Conocimiento absoluto y conocimiento cientifico. Una visión computacional (Absolute Knowledge and Scientific Knowledge: A Computational View)
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EI análisis de algunos programas lógicos y de algunos problemas ya tradicionales de la teoría de la computabilidad -como el problema de la correspondencia de Post-, permiten mostrar algunas claves para argumentar acerca de la posibilidad o imposibilidad de un ordenador omnisciente. Los programas logicos inductivos y alguno de sus resultados más prometedores, como Golem, sirven para valorar la posibilidad de un ordenador corno ayudante cualificado en la tarea de hacer ciencia. Ambas discusiones dan paso a una reflexión final sobre el mecanicismo.The analysis ofsome logical programs and some traditional topics from the computability theory -as the Post Correspondence Problem-, enables us to illustrate some key points for discussing the possibility ofa computer as an omniscient entity. Inductive logical programs and some oftheir most promising representatives, such as Golem, are showed useful for evaluating the possibility ofa computer as a qualified support ofscientific activity. Both topics give rise to a concluding discussion around mechanism.
18. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Charbel Niño EI-Hani, Antonio Augusto Passos Videira Causação descendente, emergência de propriedades e modos causais aristotélicos (Downward Causation, Property Emergence, and Aristotelian Causal Modes)
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O problema da causação descendente é um ponto central na formulação do fisicalismo não-redutivo e na compreensão da emergência de propriedades. Duas interpretações possíveis da causação descendente, nas quais a contribuição do pensamento aristotélico é importante, são examinadas. Os requisitos do programa de matematização da natureza na mecanica clássica, que levaram ao abandono de três dos modos causais aristotélicos, nao parecem igualmente importantes nas ciencias especiais. Isto sugere que a contribuição de Aristóteles pode ser, de certa maneira, retomada. Uma definição de propriedade emergente é apresentada, sendo a causação descendente interprerada de acordo com os modos causais formal e funcional.The problem of downward causation is a key subject in the formulation of nonreductive physicalism as well as in the understanding of property emergence. Two possible interpretations of downward causation, to which Aristotelian thought is relevant, are examined. In the mathematical understanding of nature in classical mechanics, the principle of causality should meet requirements that entailed the rejection of three among the four Aristotelian causal modes. Those requirements do not seem equally important in the special sciences and one may suggest, then, that Aristotle’s contribution may be taken into account. A definition of an emergent property is proposed, in which downward causation is interpreted according to the formal and functional causal modes.
19. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Eleonora Orlando Abduction, Realism and Ethics
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In this paper, I am concerned with the possibility of applying an abductive strategy in founding ethical realism. First, I criticize Harman’s position, according to which abduction, though useful for founding scientific realism, does not serve to found ethical realism. Secondly, I examine Sturgeon’s critique, according to which distinctively moral facts do constitute the best explanations of the moral evidence. Finally,I conclude that Sturgeon is right in as far as the ontological status of moral properties is concerned but his answer to Harman’s point is not properly developed.
20. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Carlos Solís Los cometas contra Copérnico: Brahe, Galileo y los jesuitas (Comets Against Copernicus: Brahe, Galileo, and the Jesuits)
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Brahe creía que su teoría sobre los cometas refutaba el copernicanismo. Analizamos el argumento y mostramos que ningún sistema existente podía acomodarlos. Tras el decreto anticopernicano de 1616, muchos jesuitas que rechazaban a Ptolomeo e incluso coqueteaban con Copérnico se vieron obligados a abrazar el sistema de Brahe. La discusión de los cometas de 1618 permitía a los jesuitas reforzar a Brahe en un momento en que Galileo no podía defender el copernicanismo. La disputa de los cometas se examina bajo esta luz y se conjetura la orientación pro-Brahe de las censuras del Diálogo de Galileo.It was Brahe’s belief that the motion of comets refuted Copernicus’ system and complied with his own. His argument is analyzed to show that neither could explain their motion. After the anti-copernican decree of1616 quite a few Jesuits that rejected Ptolemy and even courted Copernicus were bound to accept Brahe’s system. The appearance of comets in 1618 allowed the Jesuits to describe them and support Brahe, while Galileo could not treat them in copernican terms. So he crossed them off. The comets war is seen under this light and the pro-Brahe bias in the censorship of the Dialogo is strongly conjectured.