There are many different attempts to reconcile or at least to establish a relation between science and religion. The author of this article tries to analyze a few approaches, namely intelligent design theory (ID) and the concept of non-overlapping magisteria (NOMA) created by S. J. Gould. Then the need of seeking the proper ground for a fruitful dialog between science and religion is presented. It seems to be obvious nowadays that ID theory is not a good example of any creative dialog between science and religion. Above all the theory is not methodologically correct. NOMA concept does not seem to be such example as well. It defines religion in a way that it appears rather as a kind of morality. Besides, it sets science and religion completely apart. Gould claims that science and religion are characterized by different areas of investigations. One cannot see any possibility to create a common ground for both magisteria. Despite all difficulties encountered many researchers agree that the creative dialog between those two domains is needed and possible. It is argued here that it is necessary to create a proper ground where both disciplines can cooperate. It should be a ground where as well science as religion retains their methodological autonomy and, on the other hand, where they can provide a coherent picture of reality.

The author claims that neither utility, nor perfection of any object can constitute the essence of good. Utility is the so-called relational attribute, therefore it is variable, and the objects perfect with regard to some respect can be used for bad purposes. Moral virtues also cannot express the essence of good, for their positive character is defined by the fact that they are good. With respect to the scholastic formulation ens et bonum convertuntur, the author says that existence itself, even of the objects perfect to a certain extent, is not good because in the concept of ens scholastics meant the being which is God, and the remaining objects are good inasmuch as they come from God. The scholastic tradition called God good because He created everything according to His good will. Here the author discusses the problem of the universal axiological illusion in the context of the absolute power of God (potestas absoluta). The so-called teleological definition of good (bonum est quod omnia appetunt) is thought to be insufficient, just like the definition that bonum est diffusivum sui. The objection to the first conception says that it understands “good” as an entirely static state of things. In this state all potentialities of an object gain their fulfilment. The second objection, in the spirit of Plotinus’ emanationism, is criticised because it sees good as giving of itself, in which the emanating factor does not participate in its creation. Drawing on some strains of scholastic philosophy and I. Kant, the author formulates a thesis that the essence of good is good will and that God can be called good only then when by creating the world He descends in it (descensio). The God of religion and Christian philosophy fulfils the conditions that determine the essence of good. This is confirmed by the Persons of the Holy Trinity who mutually give Themselves, the creation of finite persons, and the Incarnation. Addressing the problem of evil, the author claims that the only bad thing in the world is bad will. Accordingly, suffering and the so-called natural evil is not evil and the acts of bad will were allowed by God, for otherwise no finite person could know what bad will consists in.

The paper discusses the problems of the expression of some temporal relations and properties of time in the language of the systems of G.H. von Wright’s temporal logic.It seeks to answer the question whether the systems of von Wright’s temporal logic are adequate to express by means of axioms (and theorems) some temporal relations and properties of physical time. What follows, whether they be applied in the natural sciences, mainly in physics.The first part of the paper gives a definition of physical time and briefly discusses its most important properties and temporal relations.The second part of the paper shows a syntactic characterisation of the And Next and And Then systems constructed by von Wright.The third part, the last part of the paper, seeks to answer the above question about the expression of some temporal relations and properties of time in the language of the systems of von Wright’s temporal logic, and how they can be applied in the natural sciences, mainly in physics.

In this article I compare philosophical investigations of S. Frank and epistemology of Kant and neo-Kantians of Marburg school. In accordance with Kant’s conclusions, neo-Kantians claimed that an object of cognition is unknown (x) which is not “given” but “made” by a subject during the process of cognition. Whereas Frank, beginning with an analysis of judgment concluded that an object of cognition (unknown x) is Absolute or all-unity which really exists. Frank insisted that Absolute enables every cognition. Contrary to neo-Kantians, Frank stressed the primacy of being over cognition. These characteristics in Russian philosophy and was named by the term “ontologism.”

Technological rationality seeks to overcome the neutrality, or even strangeness, of the surrounding world by the appropriation of things, by which they obey man. The world ceases to be raw nature, and it appears to us as emanation, projection of human wishes and sensitivity. A special stress is laid here on technological and cybernetic values. They become values in themselves. All efforts are directed towards putting ambitious cybernetic plans into practice. Consequently, the quality of human life seems to lose its importance. This because, to paraphrase Kotarbi(ski’s idea, man has diverged the main road, the road of relatively simple things, and has entered the bog of basic problems. For the activity of technological rationality and for its effectiveness it seems indifferent whether the goal is worthy, or whether is contradicts any ethical sense. From now on all efforts and activity, which once determined means to an end, become the end itself in the era of cybernetic megamachine. This type of rationality rather seeks to be deprived of ethical signs, which could appease all sorrows and human frustrations.

A problem of mutual relationships of the concepts of the conditional by Diodorus Cronus, Philo, Abelard, Pseudo Scotus (Iohannes do Cornubia?) and William of Ockham is examined. Both in ancient and medieval logic there seems to be a discussion on a version of the concept that involves a time variable and one that does not. Diodorus, Pseudo Scotus and Ockham, when defining the conditional, make essential use of temporal concepts, while Philo and Abelard do not. It is discussed, which concepts examined may be identified with one another and what is the rôle that the temporal concepts play.

This article is the first one to examine the evolution of the notion of mathematical proof in a historical perspective. First I present the intuitive, approach of Descartes, according to which mathematical proof is based on self-evident principles. I follow with an analysis of Berkeley’s mathematical instrumentalism and argue that he can be considered a predecessor of modern formalism. The article also deals with the ideas of Peacock and Pasch, and their role in the development of the modern formalistic viewpoint.

In the second part I discuss Frege’s and Hilbert views on the nature of mathematical proof, in particular their discussion concerning the problem of implicit definitions. I also discuss Hilbert’s program and conclude with some remarks concerning the problem of the “decline of intuition” in the formalistic conception of mathematical proof.