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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 40
陳清 春
Qing-Chun Chen
牟宗三「智的直覺」理論的內在矛盾與出路
On the Internal Contradictions and Solution to Mou Zong-san’s “Intellectual Intuition”
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由於牟宗三的直覺理論繼承了康德(Immanuel Kant)直觀理論的感性 (Sinnlichkeit)與智性(Intellektuell)二分的理論前設以及康德智性直觀 (intellektuelle Anschauung)的非感性和創造性這兩個性質,使得其“智的 直覺"理論產生兩個內在矛盾:其一,道德感情和道德興趣的感性與智性的 矛盾;其二,本體的存在與創造的矛盾。於是,他在用直覺理論解釋中國傳 統儒釋道哲學時就陷入難以克服的困境。根據胡塞爾(Edmund Husserl)的 現象學直觀理論,感知(Wahrnehumung)的意向性(Intentionalität)事實上 已經取消了康德感性與智性的截然二分,而他關於感覺(Empfindung)與感 知的區分又為解決牟宗三“智的直覺"的內在矛盾提供了現象學的理論基 礎,即,感覺是與“智的直覺"意義相當的本體直觀方式,但由於感覺是 感性的和非創造性的,就避免了牟宗三的兩個理論矛盾,而感覺正是直觀 的本義。
Mou Zong-san’s “intellectual intuition” contains two internal contradictions: first, a contradiction between intellect and sensibility regarding moral feeling; second, a contradiction between being and creation of the thing-in-itself. These contradictions are caused by his acceptance of Kant’s theoretical assumption of a dichotomy between sensibility and intellect as well as by the characteristics of non-sensibility and creativity in Kant’s theory of intuition. In turn, this has led to unresolvable difficulties in Mou’s “intellectual intuition” reading of Chinese philosophy. While Husserl’s theory on the intentionality of perception resolved Kant’sdichotomy between sensibility and intellect, his distinction between sensation and perception also provides a phenomenologically based theoretical foundation for solving the internal contradictions of Mou’s “intellectual intuition”: while sensation is equivalent to intellectual intuition as a way for intuiting the thing-in-itself, it involves sensibility and non-creativity, and therefore avoids Mou’s two theoretical contradictions.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2010 >
Issue: 40
彭孟 堯
Eric Peng
心智構造模組性的爭議
The Debate Over the Modularity of Cognitive Structure
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本文探討人類心智構造的模組程度問題,著重在如何掌握最小模組論與 演化心理學的大量模組假設之間的爭議。最小模組論的「模組」概念與演化 心理學的「模組」概念有非常大的差異,這不僅是由於前者將「資訊膠封性」 視為模組的要件,而演化心理學並不接受,甚至就連雙方關於「論域特定性」 的理解也不同。但本文不將雙方的歧異視為表面的文字或概念之爭。本文論 述,一方面從最小模組論的立場來說,由於中央系統的機制大都具有整體論 的性質以及等方位的性質,它們是資訊不膠封的,這一點是演化心理學無法 否認的;另一方面,本文對大量模組假設提出六點批駁,並結論:即使在大 量模組假設下,不以「資訊膠封」作為模組的標準,而以「功能分殊」以及「適應難題」取而代之,中央系統的心理機制仍未必是大量模組的。
This essay investigates the problem about the modularity of central cognitive architecture, focusing on how to grasp the debate between Fodorian minimal modularism and the Massive Modularity Hypothesis (MMH) proposed by evolutionary psychologists. Both conceive of the idea of "modularity" in different ways. While minimal modularism takes "informational encapsulation" to be essential to modules, the MMH does not. Furthermore, their idea of "domain specificity" does not even agree. This essay does not take the debate to be mere verbal issue. Instead, this essay argues that from the minimal modularist point of view, due to the holistic and isotropic features essential to central mechanisms, such mechanisms are informationally unencapsulated and hence are not modular in the Fodorian sense. This is something not denied by evolutionary psychology. This essay then raises six objections to the MMH and concludes accordingly that even on the MMH conception of modularity, the central cognitive system need not be massively modular.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 40
李淳 玲
Esther C. Su
康德的後學:是「善紹」?還是「別子」?—從萊因赫德到牟宗三
Kant’s Successors: Legitimate Heirs? Or Not? -From Reinhold to Mou Zongsan
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牟宗三先生曾說康德在西方無「善紹」,而當代西方康德學家安默瑞克 斯(Karl Ameriks)也說:「那位本來無後的教授,形上學家康德:留下一窩 非法的子嗣。」如果用牟先生的詞語說,這「一窩非法的子嗣」都是「別子」,間接也就是無「善紹」的意思。牟先生認為康德太客氣,把「智的直覺」只歸屬上帝,上達的路徑太虛 歉,所以他從中國哲學「實踐」的立場,把「智的直覺」歸給人類,消彌「現 象與物自身」的二分,還出一個以「價值」為皈依的「絕對實在論」。而安 默瑞克斯則以為康德哲學原是一個比較樸素的系統(modest system),卻因 萊因赫德(K. L. Reinhold)鼓吹「實踐理性的優先」,而使原來樸素的哲學 轉為黑格爾的絕對理念論,不但轉化了康德,也侵蝕了康德。但是英語系的 發展,卻因萊因赫德的《書信》(Letters on the Kantian Philosophy)不曾被 譯成英文,而沒有發展出德國理念論的型態,反之,英美系循《第一批判》 的另一條線索,追究嚴格的科學(exact science),發展出邏輯實證論、科學 實在論及實用主義等說,這其中被流失的,正是康德哲學樸素的原味,這個 原味由耶拿一批名不見經傳的早期浪漫派學者所繼承(early Romantics),可 惜他們完全被後期浪漫派的光芒所掩蓋,這是康德哲學的不幸。本文有意藉安默瑞克斯對康德哲學樸素的詮釋,對比牟先生對康德哲學 的轉化,指出牟先生與西方康德後學之同異,並勾繪康德後學是「別子」還 是「善紹」的輪廓。
Professor Mou Zongsan once proclaimed: “Kant has no great successors in the West.” Recently, Professor Karl Ameriks also uttered: “A supposed childless professor, Kant the metaphysician left behind a fertile family of illegitimate heirs.” By contrasting Mou’s and Ameriks’ perspectives employed to express a somehow shared sentiment, this paper intends to extract the philosophical imports from this seemingly mere sentiment taking place in the history of philosophy.Mou believes that Kant is often too polite to attribute “intellectual intuition” exclusively to God. Instead, Mou, by taking the stand of Chinese practical philosophy, attributes “intellectual intuition” to humans, thus dissolves the gap between “phenomena and thing-in-itself” and further establishes an “absolute realism” based on values. Ameriks, on the other hand, thinks that Kant’s philosophy is apologetic and modest in comparison to its direct successors in German Idealism. The transformation of Kant into the German Idealism through advocating “the primacy of practical reason” by K. L. Reinhold, however, also misunderstands Kant's very basic discourse of critical philosophy. On the other hand, in the absence of English translation of Reinhold’s Letters on the Kantian Philosophy, theAnglo-American Kantians, get Kant’s philosophy expressed in a completely different direction. By following the thread of exact science, they convert the Kantian philosophy to logical positivism, scientific realism and pragmatism, and thus miss the critical flavor of Kant's original insights. Only the early Romantics, in Ameriks’ view, have inherited Kant's critical philosophical thinking.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 40
王 禕
Yi Wang
《禮記•樂記》中的「理」範疇根源與內涵
On the Origin and Meaning of the Category of “Li” in the Liji Yueji
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《禮記•樂記》中的「理」範疇頗具討論意義。一方面在理範疇的發展 史上,它首先提出了「倫理」一詞。另一方面,它繼莊子之後,較早地使用 了「天理」的概念,並增之為「天理人欲」。在先秦所有理字的涵義中,〈樂 記〉繼承了其中「萬事萬物內在屬性和運行規律」、「天命人性之理」、「倫理」 幾個義項。從學派來看,它雜糅了儒家、道家、墨家等多家思想,而又以儒 家思想為主。形成了以理為「體」,以禮樂為「相」,以移風易俗之施為「用」 的「體─相─用」三層融通契合結構。〈樂記〉之理亦與其他哲學範疇產生密切聯繫,再現了先秦理範疇的思想脈絡。
The category of “li” as it appears in the Yueji (Record of Music) chapter of the Liji (Book of Rites) is of considerable significance. On the one hand, the Liji Yueji contains the first instance of the word ‘lunli’ in the history of the category of “li.” On the other hand, following Zhuangzi, it contains an early use of the concept of “tianli” (principle of nature) and broadens this to “tianli renyu” (principle of nature and human desires). From all meanings of the character ‘li’ in the pre-Qin period, the Yueji inherited its aspects of “internal property and operational pattern of all things and events,” “consciousness of destiny and life,” and “ethics” (lunli). From a school perspective, the Yueji blends the thought of the Confucian, Daoist and Mohist schools, yet with Confucianism as its main framework. It moreoverbuilds a three-level tacit structure with li as body (ti), etiquette and music as performance (xiang), and the practice of social traditions and customs as function (yong). Moreover, the Yueji also generates close connections between “li” and other philosophical categories, thereby revealing the intellectual context of the category of “li” in the pre-Qin period.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 39
Chung-Kee Lee
李仲 驥
From Aquinas’ Analogy to Ian Ramsey’s Models and Disclosures – the Possibility of Religious Language Then and Now
從阿奎那的類比法到藍聖恩的 「模型」與「揭示」 ──宗教語言可能性的古與今
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The search for a proper language for God-talk is a perennial task in theology as well as in philosophy. From times of antiquity, the use of analogy was employed in different realms of knowledge. Yet it was not until the medieval era, primarily through the effort of Thomas Aquinas, that analogy was used extensively in religious discourse. However, Thomistic analogy was not accepted by all. The contention between univocal and analogical use of words was never settled. The contemporary scene adds further fuel to the debate. Logical positivism claims that God-talk is totally meaningless, as truth claims can never be established in such a domain. And some critics say that religion belongs to the world of the ‘un-sayable’ and silence is the only response. The situation demands an urgent response from the side of the religious thinkers, and Ian Ramsey, previous Nolloth professor of Philosopy of Christian Religion at Oxford University, has taken up the task to face this challenge. Ramsey’s job is twofold. First, he is of course concerned with defending religious discourse against such philosophical critiques. At the same time, he is eager to show how theological apologetics could actually benefit from the tenets of Logical Empiricism. His method of ‘models’ and‘disclosures’ is used to demonstrate the empirical relevance of religious language. Such approach also reveals that religious discourses do containsomething more than the narrowness of meaning and truth set down by the logical empiricists. The purpose of this paper is to place Aquinas’ analogyside by side with Ramsey’s models approach and see how they compare and contrast each other. Specifically, we will see how these approaches haveroughly the same dynamics of going from what is seen to what is unseen in talking about God. We will also see how the two projects differ owing to a fundamental difference in their ontology.
尋覓一套適切的語言,以便用於有關上帝的言說(God - talk),歷久以 來都是神學及哲學的一個重要課題。比喻作為一種語言的工具,自古已被應 用到不同的知識範疇,但對宗教論述而言,類比的方法卻是經由中世紀的托 馬斯‧阿奎那推廣後,才開始被廣泛採用。但阿奎那式的類比法也並非普遍 被接納。其中的主要爭論,是在於文字究竟是否只可以作單一意義的闡釋,還是可以像比喻那樣具有多重涵義。當代學術界的研究,對宗教語言的討論 更是火上加油:邏輯實證論者堅持認為有關上帝的言說都是毫無意義的,因 為真理的宣稱永不能在這個範疇得以立定。有些批評者更認為,宗教是屬於 「不能言說」的世界,人們只能以沉默來回應。這些批評驅使宗教思想家們急於作出回應。前牛津大學基督宗教哲學教授藍聖恩(Ian Ramsey)對此挑 戰作出了當面的回應。他的回答可分為兩方面。首先,他固然是要在這些哲 學的批判之前為宗教語言作出辯護。與此同時,他也渴望說明護教學其實能 夠從邏輯經驗主義的理論找到支持。藍氏所建構的「模型」(model)與「揭 示」(disclosure)進路,恰能證明宗教語言在經驗世界的基礎。他的進路也 顯示出,宗教言說所涵概的足以超越經驗主義對真理與意義的狹隘定義。本 文的目的,是將阿奎那的類比法與藍氏的模型理論作一個比較,並特別指出 兩個方法同樣是從可見的到不可見的進路來言說上帝。與此同時,本文也會 指出,兩者因着不同的本體論引申而來的基本區別。
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 39
張雪 珠
Maria Chang Hsüeh-chu
概念與存有 ──康德與黑格爾論上帝不可知或可知
Concept and Being—Kant and Hegel on Unknowability or Knowability of God
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康德與黑格爾在知識論立場上的分歧,如水火不相容,有關於此,他們 各自賦予上帝觀念的懸殊意涵,是一個清楚的指標。他們兩位有一個共同的 上帝觀念,即「至真實存有」(ens realissimum),但是這個上帝稱號在雙方 所含有的意義,迥然不同。康德與黑格爾在有關對上帝的認知立場上的不 同,應當可以歸因於他們對上帝問題的旨趣的不同。他們旨趣的差別,則與 他們各自秉持的神學世界觀的歧異,息息相關。本文要從他們各自的形上旨 趣觀點與哲學論述的方法,剖析和比較他們有關上帝觀念的論述。
The epistemological positions of Kant and Hegel are greatly different, and the meanings they give to the idea of God play a clear indication to it. Both of them have the same idea of God as “ens realissimum,” but they understand it differently. The reasons why there is a great difference between the two philosophers could be seen in the fact that the purport of their dealing with the problems of God is different and their theological views of the world are not the same. In this article I propose to contrast Kant’s statement on the idea of God with Hegel’s on the basis of their respective metaphysical ideas and methods.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 39
陳政 揚
Cheng-Yang Chen
程明道與王浚川人性論比較
Comparison of Human Nature Theory between Cheng Mingdao and Wang Junchuan
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王廷相為明代最為推崇張載氣論的思想家之一。但在人性論上,他卻屢 屢引證程顥的言論,而與張載意見相左。王廷相反對「離氣言性」的論性進 路。他指出,自張載以來,宋明儒者將人性分為「義理之性」和「氣質之性」,是一種背離孔子哲學的觀點。他認為,人性即是人的「氣質之性」,根本不 存在著一種不同於人之氣質的「本然之性」。因此,王廷相不僅主張「生之 謂性」說,強調人性兼具善惡,而且他認為這些論點都可以直接從程顥的思 想中找到支持的證據。如此一來,彷彿二者在人性論上見解相通、立場相同。 但在晚近宋明理學研究成果中,則是將前者歸屬於明代「氣本論」的代表者 之一,而把後者視為「圓頓的一本論」的代表者。在此區分中,王廷相與程 顥的思想卻呈現出明顯的差異。本文嘗試通過當代宋明理學的研究成果,並 進一步指出,王廷相與程顥在人性論上的差異,不僅是前者以分解的方式而 後者以圓頓的方式探討人性。更重要的是,由於王廷相在探討人性時不同於 程顥的圓頓一本論;因此,兩人雖都肯定不當離開氣質之性而探討人性,但 是程顥在一本論中仍圓融的接受「義理之性」和「氣質之性」的區分,而王 廷相卻是根本的排除了人具有「義理之性」的可能。基於此,本文由「何謂 人性?」、「人性是善?是惡?抑或二者兼具?」,以及「如何使人去惡從 善?」三組議題,探討程顥與王廷相人性論的異同。
Wang Tingxiang is one of the most highly regarded Qi theory ideologists. Originally developed by Zhang Zai, Qi theory is about the human nature. However, Wang Tingxiang often quoted Cheng Hao’s Qi theory which was different from Zhang Zai’s. He pointed out that since Zhang Zai, neo-Confucian scholars have divided human nature into philosophical connotations and natural disposition. This division is accordingly deviated from traditional Confucian philosophy. He believed instead that human nature is a natural disposition and supported the idea of inherent qualities. He suggests that human nature includes both good and evil, persisting that all these arguments can be directly supported by Cheng Hao’s ideas. In this way, it seems as if the two scholars had the same view on thetheory of human nature. However, in the latest perspective of Neo-Confucianism researches, Wang Tingxiang is regarded as a representative of Monism of Qi from the Ming Dynasty, while Cheng Hao is a representative of the Theory of One Origin. From this perspective, there must be some significant differences between the two. This essay attempts to identify these differences. The former discussed human nature in an analytic way and the latter did it through the idea of integration. Of greatest importance is Wang Tingxiang’s refusal of the aspect of integration. Although both basing their discussion of human nature on natural disposition, Cheng Hao accepted the division between philosophical connotations and natural disposition in his integration theory, whereas Wang Tingxiangabsolutely refused the possibility of philosophical connotations. By taking their theories of human nature into account, this essay attempts to discuss thesimilarities and differences between Cheng Hao and Wang Tingxiang from the following three questions: What is human nature? Is human nature good, evil or both? Is it possible to remove evil and follow the good?
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 39
彭文 本
Wen-Berng Pong
阿利森對康德「自由理論」的詮釋
On Allison’s Interpretation of Kant’s Theory of Freedom
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本文要處理阿利森對康德自由理論的詮釋,這也許是他被攻擊最多的詮 釋。他把康德的自由理論區分為1781 之間的自由理論〔以《第一批判》的 內容為主,他稱為半批判的道德理論(Allison, 1990: 67)〕與成熟的自由理 論〔以《第二批判》為代表〕。阿利森在《康德的自由理論》一書第一部分 中展開他對於《第一批判》的自由理論,他的核心命題是:這個時期康德想 要論證一種理性的行為能力,它建立在一種實踐的自由之上;在《康德的自 由理論》的第三部分中,阿利森進一步主張,為了第一個自由理論的證成問 題,康德發展了第二個較成熟的自由理論,康德在這裡提出先驗自由的概念 作為實踐自由得以證成的關鍵。而阿利森認為在1785 年的《道德形上學基 礎》中對先驗自由的證成是失敗的,康德直到《第二批判》才成功地解決先 驗自由的問題,他稱康德這組論證為「相互包含命題」和「理性事實學說」。 本文主要目的要嘗試重構阿利森的論證,並且在一些關鍵點提出自己的 評論。
The main concern of this paper is Henry Allison’s interpretation of Kant’s theory of freedom which received heavy criticism. Basically he divides Kant’s theory of freedom into two different periods, namely the period of semi-critical moral theory around 1781 and the period of mature theory of freedom in second Critique. In the first part of Kant’s Theory of Freedom by Allison, he tries to develop the first period of Kant’s theory of freedom based on the texts of the first Critique. His main thesis is the following: In the semi-critical period, Kant tries to construct a theory of rational agency based on the concept of practical freedom. In the third partof Kant’s Theory of Freedom, Allison argues further that Kant develops a new theory of freedom in order to justify the use of practical freedom, and in the center of this justification lies the concept of transcendental freedom. Allison claimed that Kant did not solve the problem of transcendental freedom in Groundwork III until the publication of the second Critique. He called Kant’s arguments “Reciprocity Thesis” and “Doctrine of fact of pure reason”.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 39
工藤卓 司
Takushi Kudo
《賈誼新書》之禮思想
The Conception of Li in Jia Yi Xinshu
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賈誼是在西漢文帝時代的政治思想家。當時對「禮」的關心有升高的趨 勢,賈誼即是此潮流的引導者之一。前人研究每每指出賈誼的禮思想是受到 《荀子》影響,但實際上,《賈誼新書》受《荀子》的影響並不明顯。相反 地,賈誼談「禮」較常引用的是《管子》、《青史氏之記》、《學禮》、《曲禮》、《王制》等古文獻。本論文根據以上的事實,首先透過《賈誼新書》的「可視化」、「規訓化」 構造來探討賈誼的「禮」思想,最後論及《荀子》與《賈誼新書》之關係。 雖然兩者間思想構造很類似,但《賈誼新書》中從未提及「荀子」二字。可 能主要原因有二:第一,賈誼強烈意識到「秦」的存在。漢初必然貶低秦,荀子正是秦相李斯的老師,所以不能提「荀子」之名。第二,賈誼所參考的 書籍不只《荀子》,還包含相當多今人未知未見的古文獻,並非一定要引用 《荀子》。這一點我們不該忽視,並應當重新評估荀子在漢初思想界的地位。
Jia Yi (賈誼) was a political philosopher active in the West Han Wendi (西漢文帝) period. At this time, Li (‘禮’) was growing in importance and Jia Yi was one of its leading proponents. Most academics point out that Jia Yi’s conception of Li was influenced by Xunzi (荀子). However, in Jia Yi’s book Jia Yi Xinshu (賈誼新書), we cannot find any obvious influence from Xunzi. On the contrary, when Jia Yi spoke about Li he quoted ancient documents such as Guanzi (管子), Qingshishi zhi ji (青史氏之記), Xueli (學禮), Quli (曲禮), Wangzhi (王制).This article will first examine Jia Yi’s conception of Li based on the analytical constructs of ‘visualization (可視化)’ and ‘discipline (規訓化)’ in Jia Yi Xinshu. Second, it will discuss the relationship between Xunzi and Jia Yi Xinshu. Though there is a strong resemblance between the two, Jia Yi Xinshu does not refer to Xunzi. Why is this? On the one hand, Jia Yi was very conscious of the Qin (秦) dynasty, at which time one premier, Li Si (李 斯), was a student of Xunzi. However, in the early days of the Han dynasty, the Qin was not held in particularly high esteem and thus Jia Yi could not overtly refer to Xunzi. Furthermore, Jia Yi had read not only Xunzi, but also many other ancient documents, no longer extant today, and so he did not necessarily need to quote from Xunzi. We should not neglect these points, and accordingly, we must reconsider the role of Xunzi’s thinking at the beginning of the Han dynasty.
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