The so-called chronological and causal structure of spece-time is discussed within the conceptual framework of general relativity. Leibniz with his causal theory of time could be regarded as a forerunner of the present views on time and causality inspired by Einstein's theory. In Leibniz’s opinion, time is of a relational character, and relations in question can be reduced to the "order of causality". In the early relativistic period many authors attempted at clarifying this problem by constructing various axiomatiza- tions of the theory of relativity. Such axiomatizations proposed by Robb, Carnap, Reichenbach and Mehlberg are brefly presented. A new line of research emerged out of global analyses of particular solutions to Einstein’s equations /the Godel solution played here an important role/. It turned out that previous axiomatizations a priori eliminated many interesting situations. These studies led to the formulation of the present chronological and causal structures of space-time. It is argued that they can be consistently interpreted in the spirit of the structuralistic view.

The assumptions of the problem of the infinity in Robertson-Walker’s Cosmology are discussed. The very concept of the infinity is defined by means of the topological and metrical terms. With reference to the Universe it is understood as the infinity in time and space.The main assumptions in the approach to the infinity of the Universe in Robertson-Walker's Cosmology ares homogeneity of space and time, their relational conception as well as their topological and metrical structures.Because of these assumptions the question remains open - is the actual Universe finite or not?

In the article two ways of understanding of multitude of universes in modern cosmology are presented. One of them allowing to avoid the strong antropio principle /namely the Everett's concept taken from quantum mechanics/ has been given more consideration. It has been shown that by doing this the strong antropic principle is only shifted to the ensamble of universes.

We discuss the concept of dimension in its mathematical and cosmological bearings. According to Kaluza-Klein and superstring theories the Universe is fully N-dimensional /with N> 3/ but all except three spatial dimensions are confined to sizes close to the Planck length. As the energies necessary to probe the extra spatial dimensions are not attainable in terrestrial accelerators, it is natural to use the Big Bang to study the effect of extra dimensions, The particular cosmology we present here is the /Friedman-Robertson-Walker/ x /n-sphere/ universe. The cosmological evolution of such a world with n + 3 spatial dimensions can be studied using higher-dimensional extensions of general relativity. It turns out that, within the class of both vacuum and radiation filled models, the qualitative features of the universe do not depend on the specific number of dimensions and, particulary, the cosmological dimensional-reduction occurs, i.e., the universe passess from multi-dimensional phase to the Friedman-like one. However, at present there is no theoretical explanation why just three dimensions have expanded to a large size.

Some recent trends of stressing the role of subject in physics are dealt with. Three examples of them, taken from antropic cosmology, quantum mechanics, and thermodynamics of irreversible processes, have been presented.

The two questions: that of the initial singularity and of the temporal origin of the Universe belong to two different sphers of cognition - cosmology and philosophy. They are also examples of the problems which might be called "terminal11. The mutual implications occuring between them may serve as a starting-point for the discussion of mutual relations that seem to occur between cosmology as a natural science and philosophy.But can one practise "philosophy in the context of science" as philosophy of natural science or philosophy of science?The condition of modern research in general and that of interdisciplinary discussion in particular shows that the answer to the above questions cannot be but positive. As far as discrepancies between the two kinds of knowledge are concerned they are due to either monopolistic aspirations of natural sciences and philosophy or to indiscriminate transfer of arguments and statements, or to neglect of epistemological and metodological differences.The existing differences, however, do not result in acute isolation, setting rigorous limits or mutual disrespect. The dialogue is possible and desirable as well as coexistence and search for the correlation in the fields of "terminal problems". Philosophy, unless it is to "seal itself up in metaphysics" or cut itself off from numerous directly inaccessible sphers of reality must take adventage of natural sciences. Likewise, if natural sciences are not to fall into extreme empiricism and refer to unconscious pseudo-philosophie^ they must not only recognize the existence of philosophy not as a purely different and not altogether nonsensical kind of cognition but also realize the existence of philosophical elements in themselves.

The paper presents the changes in views of one of the creators of the law-covering model. I distinguish and discuss five periods in which Nagel’s works on explanation were published:1. Pormulation of his primary views /1934—1943/.2. Studies on reduction /1949-about 1952/.3. Analysis of functional explanations /1953/.4. Comprehensive view on explanation /1957—1961/. /4.1/I distinguish three stages in Nagel’s explication of the notion of explanation: In the first one /4.1.1/, explanation is treated as an answer to the question "why?". In the second one /4.1.2/, Nagel tries to sketch the possible contexts of explanation by examples. In the third stage /4.1.3/ Nagel groups the examples in four types of explanation. I complete that explication by general requirements for the explanations /4.2/. I discuss the classifications of explanations ?4.3/ and the deductive model, probabilistic, genetics and functional explanations /4.4-4.7/ and a theory as a system of explanations /4.3; some aspect of the instrumentalism/.5. Defence and modifications of his previous views /1963-1977/.6. In recapitulation I collect persistant views of Nagel /6.2/: /I/ There are not radically differences between domains of science. /2/ Explanation is an answer to the question /in general: "why?"/. The deductive model is an ideal of explanation. /6.3/ Some of Nagel’s are subject to change: 1^1 The Nagel’s publications past 1961 także "history of science" into account. /2/ They are three phases of Nagel’s views on reduction and teleological explanation: /a/ first view /1949— “1953/; /b/ second view /1957-1961/; it is the development of /a/; /c/ third view /1968-1977/; that view has thesis incompatible with /a/ and /b/; third view of teleology has more continuations than third view of reduction. /6.4/ The paper postulates /V a study of basis views of Nagel, /2/ analysis of changes of views of philosophers which are related to Nagel,/3/ a study of problem of change of scientific end philosophical views.

The author describes the main stages of his concept of life during the last 20 years. The first model /Fig. 1/ was essentially a macroscopic one, yet the connection between metabolism and electronic processes was taken into account in it The role they might play in organisms has been inferred from the data on semioonductivity of proteins, nucleic acids and porphyrin compounds. The further deductions from this model were surprizing: electromagnetic nature of life and consciousness, electrostasis, bioplasma, and laser effects in biosystems.In 1984, the present author suggested a model that was enhanced with quantum interdependencies. It has been called "the quantum seam of life" /Fig. 2/. According to it, and contrary to our knowledge from the textbooks of biology, the very nature of life is quantum-mechanical.Ih the above article, which was written in February 1988 the author ascribes special sgnificance to the submolecular realm of living systems: more precisely to the intermolecular one. /Fig. 3/. The molecules, even if packed very densely, leave a lot of free intermolecular space. It is argued that the life was brough about in the vacancies between the orbitals of organlo moleoules. There the interorganismal transfer of information is best, because all the intermolecular spaces are interconnected. In view of this, life, consciousness, and information are electromagnetic in nature and indistinguishable.

Searching for causes of the cancer scientists take into account various agents. Among others, those being products of the contemporary civilization.Electromagnetic radiation and ionizing radiation coming out of artificial sources belong to them. Also, electrostatic and magnetic fields are considered as agents causing the cancer of tissues.Cancerogenesis is also induced by some chemical compounds such ass aromatic hydrocarbons, heterocyclic hydrocarbons, aromatic amins, azo-dyes, some metalic compounds, vinyl-chloride, vinyl-polychloride, carbon-disulfide, some stilbens and nitrites.An effect of cancer causing agent depends on the level of filogenetic and ontogenetic development of the organism.It also depends on certain coordinating factors /properties of biological membranes play herewith a considerable role/.For certain environmental reasons comes a disturbance of the coordination resulting from the evolutionary development and the cancer initiation can result /growth of a new biological structure inside the living organism, which leads to destruction of the organism/.A synergetic action of factors connected to the civilization development in the natural environment considerably enhance the vulnerability to the cancer.However, it should be taken into account, that contemporary civilization scientists find out efficient methods of fighting with the cancer and preventing it. In spite of great achievements in this field the current balance is disadvantageous for living organisms. Possibly, in the near future it will be inversed due to the advances in the medical sciences.

The development, essence, progress and origin of modern experimental science are the Central and most widely discussed problems of philosophy and history of science. The article entitled "Metaphysical implications of mathematization of nature" is aimed to be a contribution to the ongoing discussion. It also attempts to suggest certain solutions to the problems. Basing on the novel interpretation of fundamental facts in the history of physics, the author wishes to determine the essence of physics on the one hand, and to point to the possible criteria of development of the science on the other.When we consider the following facts from the history of physics: the rejection of the hypothesis of philogiston, the theory of ether and the elimination of all demonstrative concepts in favour of more abstract concepts, coupled with the progressive mathematization, we see that the essence of the science seems to lie in its mathematical character and its development is determined by the progressive mathematization of its objects. This viewpoint is confirmed by the analysis of the basic theories of present- day physics: the general and special theory of relativity, the theory of quantum mechanics and the theory of elementary particles.Notice that the adoption of the thesis of the progressive methematization of nature implies another thesis, i.e. the process of mathematization is a realization of a more fundamental program of reducing the qualitative picture of the world to the abstract world of mathematical structures, This program seems to be nothing else than a reformulated Pythagorean-Platonic metaphysics. The history of physics seems to confirm the thesis of the metaphysical core of physics. At the same time, it becomes more logical and understandable. The shape and the content of the central theories of present-day physics supply the best examples of such a viewpoint.