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commentaries
1. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Matti Eklund Reply to Hernandez and Laskowski
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2. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Kenneth G. Lucey Traditional Epistemological Concerns Defended
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3. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Abigail Pfister Aguilar Commentary on Horn: Cosmopolitan Dreaming
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4. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Deborah K. Heikes Comments on Josué Piñeiro’s “Epistemic Peerhood and Standpoint Theory: What Knowledge from the Margins tells us about Epistemic Peerhood”
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5. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
J. Harrison Lee Comments on “Aesthetic Reasons and Aesthetic Shoulds”
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6. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
E.M. Dadlez Metaphor and Misconstrual: A Defense of Tirrell’s Toxic Speech Metaphor against Shane Ralston’s Criticism
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7. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Holly Longair Conceptualizing Microagressions: Comments on Heather Stewart
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8. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
G. M. Trujillo, Jr. Un/Examined Lives: A Comment on Lamont Rogers’ “What Are Internalist and Externalist Analyses of Utopia?”
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9. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Caitlin Maples Commentary on “Utilitarian Aggregation”
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10. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Justin Bell Epicurean Philosophy, Change, and Curiosity: A Commentary on Alex Gillham’s “Epicurean Tranquility and the Pleasure of Philosophy”
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11. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Paul Carron (Im)Permissibility and Psychological Mechanisms: Comments on Samuel Kahn’s “A Problem for Frankfurt Examples”
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12. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Andrew Burnside Why Nietzsche Was So Wise: Comments on Joseph Swenson
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13. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Emily McGill Commentary on Rich Eva’s “Religious Liberty and the Alleged Afterlife”
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14. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Richard R. Eva Commentary on “Why Moral Rights of Free Expression for Business Corporations Cannot Be Justified”
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15. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Sarah DiMaggio Probabilistic Reasons, Belief, and the Presumption of Objective Purport: Comments on Tanner Hammond
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16. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Lucy Alsip Vollbrecht Commentary on Jack Warman’s “Reflections on Intellectual Grandstanding”
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17. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Sarah H. Woolwine Comments on “The Benefits of Being a Suicidal Curmudgeon: Emil Cioran on Killing Yourself”
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18. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Julie Kuhlken The Arendtian Public Space of Black Lives Matter
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articles
19. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
David Antonini Black Lives Matter as an Arendtian New Beginning and Political Principle
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open submission articles
20. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
David Emmanuel Rowe Death Does Not Harm the One Who Dies Because There is No One to Harm
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If death is a harm then it is a harm that cannot be experienced. The proponent of death’s harm must therefore provide an answer to Epicurus, when he says that ‘death, is nothing to us, since when we are, death is not present, and when death is present, then we are not’. In this paper I respond to the two main ways philosophers have attempted to answer Epicurus, regarding the subject of death’s harm: either directly or via analogy. The direct way argues that there is a truth-maker (or difference-maker) for death’s harm, namely in virtue of the intrinsic value the subject’s life would have had if they had not died. The analogy argues that there are cases analogous to death, where the subject is harmed although they experience no pain as a result. I argue that both accounts beg the question against the Epicurean: the first by presupposing that one can be harmed while experiencing no displeasure as a result and the second by conflating a de re with a de dicto reading of death’s harm. Thus, I argue, until better arguments are provided, one is best to agree with Epicurus and those who follow him that death is not a harm.