This paper is an attempt to meta-subjective revision of contemporary “ecological” issues concerning glorification of science (called by the Author „science-centrism) present in paradigm and practice of nature protection. Assuming that science can be often treated as conditio sine qua non of effective pro-ecological activity, and that such approach isn’t in fact appropriate, the Author led diverse arguments supporting the thesis that the presence of science isn’t necessary in theoretical and applied protection of nature. Within the discourse he tried to defend the possibilities of the wide spectrum of environmental-friendly approaches and appreciate alterscientific paradigms and tools of nature protection. The Author attempted to emphasize that science-based tools of nature protection aren’t of absolute type. He tried to present a relativized scientific approach (possibility against necessity) as an opportunity to create wiser and more rational vision of nature protection, not based on idolatry of science.

In the article attention is paid to the analogy between considerations concerning the number of objects that are the empirical basis for the theory of being and investigations concerning the size of the models necessary for solving formulas on the ground of calculus of names without quantifiers. In both cases a minimum of two objects appear as an answer to the question that has been posed. In explaining the noticed similarity the meaning aspect, as different from the referential aspect of cognition of reality, is pointed to.

The article is concerned with the possibility of formulating moral judgments with respect to actions whose results may influence the quality of life, existence, number and identity of the future people. Because of the problems connected with defining the addressees and the reasons of responsibility for future generations on the ground of the ethical theories existing now, new theories are formulated on the basis of the so-called impersonal or personal premises. According to the impersonal theories moral evaluations are based on the final assessment of all the effects of the action, whose total value may be defined as a positive or negative state of affairs. According to the representatives of personal theories, the question whether an action has a beneficial or a harmful effect on the addressee of the action, is the main criterion of the moral evaluation. Since there is no satisfactory justification for the responsibility for the future generations, both in personal and impersonal theories argumentation is analyzed that is based on a predicted responsibility for the people who will exist in the future.

The aim of this article is to show that John Versor’s concept of esse presented in his commentary on De ente et essentia by Thomas Aquinas is not in accordance with the Thomistic view. Versor distinguishes two kinds of esse: esse essentiae and esse existentiae. The former pertains to non-substantial beings, and the latter pertains only to the substances. Additionally, esse existentiae is regarded as the proper act of substance. This theory of “double esse” is not to be found in Aquinas’ works; yet, it has been worked out by Giles of Rome, who seems to be the source of inspiration for Versor. Moreover, the further influences of Giles of Rome upon Versor’s philosophy can be found in his consideration of real difference between essence and existence. Therefore, in respect of the concept of esse, due to influences of Giles of Rome, John Versor cannot be regarded as the follower of Thomas Aquinas in the strict sense.

In the present article I critically analyze the conception of the “language of thought” formulated by J. Fodor, and I suggest a solution of the question of the relation between the language and thought that refers to the studies of intentionality conducted by E. Husserl. I argue that our (mono-subjective) thinking is not reducible to the language (especially understood in the cybernetic way), and mental processes that we usually recognize as verbalized ones, are in fact operations on specific intentional forms that are not language units at all, but are our formulation of phrases (spoken, written, and so on). I question both the physicalist view of the issue of internalization of the language and the use of it in mental processes, and the position that perceives these processes as exclusively (or first of all) linguistic ones.According to the conception I suggest the natural language is intentionally transformed, deverbalized, by the subject, and the intentional forms, by means of which the subject of cognition performs acts of “linguistic” thinking, have a subjective character, analogous to the intentional forms that take part in processes of recognizing external objects. The subject does not assume a metalinguistic attitude in the acts of thinking, but an attitude directed to the objects it thinks about. This objective character is also revealed in communicating with other subjects, and it does not have (as is usually assumed) the character of coding/decoding the message, but is an interpretation of defined objective domains, that is objects, that are the theme of the subjects’ communication.

Friendship for ages has been viewed as a specific kind of relationship with a positive moral value. In my article I am trying to answer the question of the source of that value. Among many other questions I enquire whether such a normative (positively valuing friendship) approach presumes that any action out of friendship must be morally good and morally right; whether such relationship is exclusive; whether it requires a special kind of engagement and high quality moral dispositions or it is rather an all inclusive relationship and independent of moral traits and dispositions; and finally I ask how the contemporary ethical theories which highly value impartiality manage to explain the nature of the fascinating phenomenon of friendship and its specificity.

In this paper we continue our previous investigation od Akaike simplicity criterion [16] which plays the crucial role in the E. Sober philosophy of science [29] in the context of the modern cosmology.We consider different models of accelerating Universe which describe the current evolution of the Universe. We demonstrate that the generalized Akaike criterion (Bozdogen criterion) distinguishes the very simple standard cosmological model called LCDM (Lamda Cold Dark Matter model) whereas the standard Akaike criterion doesn’t give such unique indication. We demonstrate that the case study of cosmological models may be suitable in searching for more adequate criterion of the simplicity in the context of the philosophy of science.

Leibniz intended to create a lingua characteristica universalis, a language, in which all knowledge (expressiveness) could be recorded, and a calculus ratiocinator, a method that would make it possible to define in a calculational manner the truth of any sentence in this language. Such an idea is at the basis of contemporary logic. With respect to the correctness of the equipment and of programs such an idea is at the foundations of logical methods of verification of software systems.Today we can see that a further development of informatics indeed depends on the progress of research in logic, and logic – this ancient discipline – has found a rich field for investigations; it has gained new perspectives for studies. Its applications may have a significant practical dimension that philosophers have never dreamed about.

Wittgenstein’s RFM remarks on Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem have been widely criticized, ridiculed or dismissed out of hand. The principal reason for this is negative evaluation of Wittgenstein’s critique is not Wittgenstein rejection of the standard interpretation of Gödel’s result but rather an exaggerated reaction to a alleged “mistake” Wittgenstein makes while discussing GIT. The aim of my paper, which due to Wittgenstein’s method is merely a draft, is to pull apart the different and the very distinct strands in these remarks to understand them in the context of Wittgenstein’s own philosophy of mathematics, and to determine what merit they have.To understand Wittgenstein’s attitude I will point out his hostility towards mathematical realism, hostility based on the “rule-following considerations” and his conventionalism. As I shall show, the aim of Wittgenstein’s critique is not a proof itself but it’s certain philosophical interpretation (prose). On a number of occasions this leads Wittgenstein to say that we should simply ‘withdraw’ or ‘give up’ this interpretation as if the contradiction goes away with the natural language interpretation.

Sentences with the form: x is δ y, where δ is one of the modal operators (of the n/n category) is usually interpreted as rendering modalities of the de re type, as contrary to sentences included in the scheme: ΔP(x), where the modal operator Δ (of the s/s category) is semantically ambiguous (de re or de dicto). In literature treating modality as de dicto modality dominates. This results mainly from the fact that modal calculi are practiced mainly as sentential calculi, built over the classical sentential calculus, where – in the nature of things – the structure of sentences is not analyzed. We also have some extensions of elementary ontology (Lebedev’s) with the modal operator of the is-δ (s/nn) type as the primary operator.In the article a construction is suggested, in which an operator of the δ (n/n) type is the primitive term. It is an elementary modal ontology that is an inferential extension of one of the mentioned systems, despite a formal simplification of its axioms.