The subject of the text is the problem of the mind’s effect on the body in Margaret Wilson’s interpretation. Part I presents Margaret D. Wilson’s interpretation of the Cartesian dualism against the background of the debates on dualism conducted in Anglo-American philosophy as well as that of debates that were contemporary to Descartes. In Part II Descartes’ argument is presented for the distinction of the soul and the body on the basis of analysis of cogito (epistemological argument). In Part III the problem of the soul’s effect on the body is defined from the point of view of the conception of the role played by sensual perception. In the final chapter it is stated that Descartes’ position ranges from the Natural Institution Theory to the Coextension Theory. Margaret D. Wilson herself is in favor of the former conception of the Cartesian understanding of the relation between the soul and the body, according to which sensual perception is an argument for the union of the soul and the body on the strength of the union instituted in a natural way by God. In the conclusion it is stated that the Natural Institution Theory – albeit not free from problems – is a more comprehensible explanation of the relations between the soul and the body, whereas by using the Co-extension Theory Descartes, even though he wants to ensure a close union of the soul and the body, does not give a clear solution, and what is more, he exposes his position to contradiction.

The main goal of submitted paper is to present the crucial trains of Spinoza’s conception of freedom. The focal point of undertaken analysis aims to demonstrate the originality and uniqueness of Spinoza’s proposal. In first step the different aspects of definition of freedom is examined. Next, the Spinoza’s arguments concerning the rejection of free will are scrutinized. Finally, the connection between freedom and reason is presented. In conclusion, the distinguished characteristics of free person are spelled out.

The aim of the article is to present and analyze three doctrines of Thomas Reid that underlay his many sided philosophy. The first one is dualism of active minds and passive bodies that Reid simply assumes as obvious. In contrast to other interpreters I think that dualism is not marginal thesis that can be omitted in Reid’s theory of perception. On the contrary, it shapes characteristic features of that theory, such as presentationalism, and direct realism. It is also responsible for the fact, that some historians of philosophy treat Reid as a proponent of occasionalism. The second doctrine is pluralistic foundationalism. It is quite different than foundationalism of Descartes since it assumes many different principles that cannot be proved. As such they have to be accepted as obviously true and obligatory in our thinking. Hume would agree with Reid that we cannot prove such principles but his conclusion would be different: that for this reason they are not true. The third doctrine I called agnosticism within theism. Reid accepts certain metaphysical theses (mind-body dualism, theory of substance as a basis for e.g. personal identity, etc.) as obvious principles, but he rejects any metaphysical speculation about their nature and relation between them. He does it on the basis of his theism that stresses limits of human cognition in relation to trustworthy God. Reid encourages scientific research that applies Newtonian empirical method (also in philosophy of mind). However, on the basis of such research we can reach only physical causes of various phenomena and present them in the form of laws of nature. From metaphysical perspective the only answer we can give is that the ultimate cause is God. Mediate metaphysical causes (between God and phenomena that are to be explained) cannot be known to us.

D. Sherry’s main theses included in his essay entitled “Formal Logic for Informal Logicians” are presented in the article. In a discussion with his theses it is shown that he prefers this kind of logic that has a lot of elements that are the same as in Aristotle’s logic understood as the art of thinking and the technique of discussion taken from Topics, and not the logic that was started in his Prior Analytics. It is also shown that not only patterns of inferring, but also the theses of logic, as well as theses to which no patterns correspond, that are guarantee reliability of inference patterns, may be intuitively obvious. In the article also attention is drawn to the fact that the PLsystem of logic presented by Sherry was characterized by him by means of a rather poor logical terminology. In the American author’s argument there are no clear distinctions between the thesis of logic, the logical inference pattern and the rule of the procedure of proving. However, it can be established that the PL- system is constituted by argumentation patterns that are reliable owing to such theses of propositional logic as modus potens, modus tollens, disjunctive syllogism, conjunctive syllogism, complex destructive dilemma, and the two rules concerning creating proofs, i.e. the rule of conditional proof and the rule of reduction to the absurd. In the PL- system there are fewer theses than in the classical propositional calculus, but this has nothing in common with the so-called multivalent logics to which some theses of classical logic supposedly do not apply.Everything suggests that some systems of non-classical logic systems may be built on the PLsystem; namely, the ones in which theses are given that govern the correct use of non-extensional operators connected with key terms appearing in many sciences, like e.g. “time”, “change”, “causality”. Sherry’s essay reveals that he is a supporter of the thesis that knowledge of formal logic is necessary for using informal logic efficiently, which is necessary for teaching logic properly.

This paper seeks to show Frédéric Bastiat’s views against the backdrop of his epoch. He lived in the first half of the nineteenth century, in the period when the rationalistic paradigm was submitted to a revision. In line with this paradigm, the social order is constructed above all on the foundation of institutions. Hence the ideas to construct new social communities deprived of private property, communities that live in conformity with an imposed and prearranged model.Bastiat criticises such ideas and points instead to the natural forces of progress inherent in each individual human being and in natural communities that this being established. The French thinker refers – unlike Rousseau – on the one hand to the fact of evil and imperfection, and on the other to our inherent drive towards good and perfection, i.e. our perfectibility. Evil and imperfection of human nature are our driving and creative forces. On the way to progress, planned by the Creator, the individual is governed by the principles of responsibility and solidarity, and seeks to integrate the areas of knowledge and faith. The communities that individuals establish result from their struggle against evil in all dimensions.

Aristotle in Analytica Posteriora presented a notion of proof as a special case of syllogism. In the present paper the remarks of Aristotle on the subject are used as an inspiration for developing formal systems of demonstrative syllogistic, which are supposed to formalize syllogisms that are proofs. We build our systems in the style of J. Łukasiewicz as theories based on classical propositional logic. The difference between our systems and systems of syllogistic known from the literature lays in the interpretation of general positive sentences in which the same name occurs twice (of the form SaS). As a basic assumption of demonstrative syllogistic we accept a negation of such a sentence. We present three systems which differ in the interpretation of specific positive sentences in which the same name occurs twice (of the form SiS). The theories are defined as axiomatic systems. For all of them rejected axiomatizations are also supplied. For two of them a set theoretical model is also defined.

In ancient and medieval philosophy three traditions may be pointed to, in which three conceptions were formed of understanding of the essence. One of them is the identity conception of the essence, according to which “essence” is another name for pre-element. The second one may be called epistemological; according to this conception the essence is what is signified with the definition of the thing. And the third conception may be called metaphysical (relational), where the essence is understood as one of the constitutive elements of being that may fulfill the function of the subject, and also of the correlate of the act of existence.The problem of understanding the essence of being, especially in Aristotle’s philosophy, lies at the foundations of the so-called essentialist philosophies, that is ones, for which something general, constant and unchanging, with different statuses of being, are the subject of analyses. No wonder then that the accepted conception of the object of academic study of cognition and the general conception of cognition are at the foundations of understanding of the essence (of being). For this reason the issue of understanding the essence (of being) does not occur in the noncompositional conceptions of being and interpretations of reality that tend to monism, but it does appear and assumes the form of a dispute, along with accepting the compositional conception of being and distinguishing of the cognition order and the being order, which we first of all owe to Aristotle. He tied understanding of the essence with the proper object of philosophical cognition.In the Middle Ages the issue of the essence (of being) assumed a new form of explanation owing to St Thomas Aquinas. He tied understanding of the essence and its correlate, that is the act of existence, and rejected understanding of the essence as an arrangement of necessary features, which are realized on various levels of being: in individuals, in cognitive approaches (generic), and in pure capacities that were induced by Avicenna and developed by John Duns Scott and other philosophers of that age. It is owing to these two latter ones that the issue of the essence was transferred from metaphysics to epistemology and became binding for essentialist trends in modern and contemporary philosophy.

The article characterizes my way of recognizing the Catholic religion as the true religion. This recognition is a multi-motif process. I recognize the Catholic religion as religio vera, which does not mean that I completely justify the fact that it is a religio vera.I characterize the following ways to recognize the Catholic religion as being true:1. The way of using philosophical arguments.2. The way of recognizing legitimacy of the claims made by the Magisterium (the teaching authority of the Catholic Church).3. The way of recognizing the sign character of the Church.4. The way of assessment of the explanative value of the Church’s doctrine.

Space-based experiments in fundamental physics are presently capable of uniquely addressing important questions related to the fundamental laws of nature. In this article we discuss the advances in our understanding of fundamental physics that recently proposed space-based gravitational experiment such as Gravity Probe B Space Research Mission. Gravity Probe B is a satellite that will check two predictions of the general theory of relativity: the geodetic effect and socalled frame-dragging or Lense-Thirring effect. The purpose of this article is to describe the results that have been obtained in Gravity Probe B mission from the point of view of the history and philosophy of science. This article discusses also a problem of the financial challenges for the GP-B team.

In the article two ways of understanding cognitive relativism are presented: as a thesis about equivalence (theoretical relativism) and as a thesis about the arbitrariness of choice (normative relativism). According to the former way of understanding, relativism is the thesis saying that all, including mutually contradicting, views on a given subject are equally true (in one version) or justified (in another); and according to the latter one it is a thesis saying that any proposition on a given subject may be accepted. These two ways of understanding cognitive relativism are not systematically analyzed or used in contemporary debates. However, even a preliminary analysis of these theses and relations between them shows that there are interesting problems hidden behind them, which means that they are worth being considered in a broader range than it has been done up till now.

The paper seeks to answer the question about the actual influence of the Lockean thought on Berkeley’s philosophy. It promotes the view that though scepticism that arises from the representational theory of perception is an important factor for motivating Berkeley to built his antisceptical strategy, it is the so-called corpuscular scepticism that was in fact an essential element of this influence. The latter was a consequence of assuming the notion of corpuscular, yet unknown material substance by Locke, and motivated Berkeley to consider an argument for rejection of the existence of such substance. The Berkeleian anti-sceptical argument here seems congenial to the Cartesian origins of his definition of existence, and enables us to combine the Lockean perspective with the Cartesian reading of sources of Berkeley’s philosophy.

Anselm of Canterbury’s method to avoid antinomies in theology is presented and analyzed. In Monologion Anselm argues in favour of God’s existing at every time and every place on one side, and in favour of God’s existing at no time and no place on the other side. But this constitutes an antinomy, because e.g. for any time t God’s existing at the time t and God’s not existing at the time t are equally provable. Anselm claims ambivalence of terms of natural languages to be responsible for the antinomy. Anselm’s solution is to introduce to theological discourse two artifical terms: „existing at a time” and „coexisting with a time”. Those terms are provided with precise meaning, which constitutes deductional relationship between them. For any x and t , if x is existing at a time t , then x is coexisting with the time t. The converse is, however, not valid. This Allows Anselm to avoid the antinomy. The anticipation of Duns Scotus’ theory of univocity and some contemporary ideas of non-classical logics is also discussed.

In Balmes’ philosophical thought a significant – it seems – co-dependence is revealed, a peculiar logic of consequence that is sketched already in the starting point of his eclectic philosophy. First it is being given in purely common-sense, popular cognition (it is not quite the realism that is presented by St Thomas Aquinas, although Balmes clearly sympathizes with him). From this common-sense background (which is the influence of Reid’s thought) Balmes’ epistemology stems (here, in turn, Cartesian and Leibnitzian origins of his thought are revealed), whose foundation is not consistently realistic, either, and it rather tends towards philosophy of consciousness (philosophy of the subject). And finally, a significant role is played here by Balmes’ concept of the truth – ontic (the concept of being) and logical (epistemology). His discourse is unified by the concept of God as the first Cause of beings, the ultimate source of clarity and certainty of cognition, the ultimate justification (objective and subjective) of the obviousness of the truth, and in the end – the aim, to which the world of things and persons is heading. So, the basic categories of Balmes’ whole neo-scholastic epistemology are “the existence of God” as, in fact, the only guarantee of the truth and certainty, and “human consciousness” as a necessary condition of the possibility to recognize various types of obviousness.

The author refers to the construction that includes two types of negation – external (~) and internal (¬). When we consider an object belonging to a given universe and a given set of predicates, some of them belong to it, and others do not. There may also be such predicates about which it cannot be sensibly stated that they belong to the object – and this is the third case (vagueness) that can be explained by such a construction. It is a non-classical theory of predication. In the classical theory of predication (whose standard realization is the classical predicate calculus) we only have one negation operator (external negation).The idea may be transferred to the calculus of names. In the article a certain broadening of elementary ontology is suggested, where analogous distinctions among predication operators and name negation allow (from the meta-linguistic perspective) perceiving the phenomenon of indefiniteness (vagueness) of names in a new light.