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Aleksander R. Bańka
Aleksander R. Bańka
Klasyczna definicja prawdy w epistemologicznych poglądach Désiré Merciera
The Classical Definition of Truth in Désiré Mercier’s Epistemological Thought
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The main aim of this article is to present an outline of the most important part of a theoretical-cognitive conception by Désiré Mercier, a founder of a Neo-scholastic Louvain school, showing not only the issue crucial to his philosophy, but also an evolution of an epistemological thought by a Belgian cardinal.In this main part, the article examines an evolution of Mercier’s means of interpretation of a classical definition of truth, and shows a prospect for the analysis of his understanding of a judgement’s nature, especially the nature of the references between its two basics constituents: a subject and predicate. In Mercier’s opinion, it is the most important problem in all theory of certainty, and he defines it like a first fundamental problem – a synthesis of the subject and predicate, i.e. the question on the status and cognitive value of different kinds of opinion. His effort in solution of this problem concerns mainly A general criteriology, Mercier’s main work in which a systematic theory of cognition is derived from Thomas Aquinas’s classical texts, confirming a Thomistic epistemology on the paths of a philosophical realism.
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William E. Carroll
William E. Carroll
Eppur si muove:
legenda „sprawy Galileusza”
Eppur si muove
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The legend of Galileo’s encounter with the Inquisition is one of the constitutive myths of modernity. That encounter is often seen as a prime example of the hostility between science and religion. This essay examines some of the events of the “Galileo Affair” in order to show how misunderstandings of what occurred in the 17th Century continue to have currency. In particular, Galileo did not demonstrate that the Earth moved; he did not think that his astronomical observations were sufficient to constitute such a proof. Both he and his opponents in the Inquisition accepted the prevailing Aristotelian conception of what a demonstration in science consisted. However misguided, the Inquisition’s actions were disciplinary not doctrinal. In ordering Galileo not to defend the view that the Earth moved, the Inquisition subordinated the interpretation of the Bible to geocentric astronomy. The “legend of Galileo” continues to be used as an ideological weapon in contemporary cultural debates, including discourse about the relationship between faith and reason, the Bible and science.
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Bożena Czernecka-Rej
Bożena Czernecka-Rej
O pewnym kryterium wyboru poprawnej logiki:
Na marginesie uwag Ananda J. Vaidyi
The Criterion of the Choice of a Correct Logic
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The purpose of this paper is to show the criterion of the choice of a correct logic. According to Vaidya such the criterion may be formulated only on the foundation of a philosophy of logic. The main elements of the laws of logic are logical constants. In fact logic is not the theory of variables, but the theory of logical constants. So, the goal of a correct logical system is to analyse in a proper way what logical constants are.
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Marek Lechniak
Marek Lechniak
Kilka uwag o Leona Koja koncepcji przekonań
Some Remarks on the Leon Koj’s Conception of Beliefs
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Professor Leon Koj presented his views on the nature of beliefs in some his papers. This article refers and discusses some main theses of Koj’s conception of belief. Koj treated beliefs as a kind of thinking and stressed a role of spontaneous beliefs a base of knowledge. This kind of belief does not require a justification until a change in belief is on offer.
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Marek Piwowarczyk
Marek Piwowarczyk
Charlesa Hartshorne’a teza o ontycznej nadrzędności zdarzenia nad substancją
Charles Hartshorne’s Thesis of Ontic Priority of Event over Substance
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In the article I reconstruct and analyse basic presuppositions of Hartshorne’s metaphysics leading to the thesis that events are more basic (in ontological sense of the word) entities than substances. Hartshorne defines the ontic priority in terms of determinateness and maintains that substances are less determinate that events and in fact they are universals. In the third part of the paper I give a short commentary of such a view from the standpoint of Roman Ingarden’s version of substantialism. I try to defend, among others, the following theses:1. Hartshorne wrongly recognizes the ontic structure of state of affairs and consequently of the event. He misunderstands the function of properties claiming that they complete the substance like an additional element with which it forms a more concrete compound object.2. He mistakenly interprets the potentiality of substance and suggests it depends on mysterious “places of indeterminateness” inherent in substance.3. Hartshorne wrongly holds that relations “substance — event” and “genus — species” are of the same type and have the same character. The reason of this mistake is Harsthorne’s belief that there are no accidental properties (ultraessentialism).
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Natasza Szutta
Natasza Szutta
W kierunku przezwyciężenia schizofreniczności nowożytnych teorii etycznych:
Etyka cnót versus aretologia
Towards Overcoming the Schizophrenia of the Modern Ethical Theories
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In his paper, Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories, Michael Stocker accuses modern ethical theories of affecting a moral agent with a kind of schizophrenia, where one of the agent’s „I” desires something while the other “I” of the very same agent commands to do one’s duty. The problem is that quite often one’s desires do not match with his or her duties, and the harmony of both – as Stocker says – is a sign, and therefore one of the goals of good life.Modern ethical theories mainly focus on the analysis of moral acts alone (as deontologies do) or on their external consequences (as utilitarianism does), Hus ignoring all that happens within a moral agent (his intentions, motives, moral dispositions and attitudes). In moral evaluation they concentrate merely on moral rightness of an act, leaving moral goodness, as it seems, out of the range of their interest.The aim of this paper is to show that one can overcome the schizophrenity of utilitarian and deontological approaches by resorting to the category of virtue. Currently, such a solution has been presented by the advocates of virtue ethics, recognized as a serious alternative to deontology and utilitarianism. A virtuous person is an agent who not only knows what one should do, but also desires to act so. Emotions and feelings are in harmony with moral judgments of practical reason; a moral agent acts as he or she should and finds satisfaction in acting so, even if it requires a change of one’s desires and the agent must properly work on shaping his or her own desires. One of the thesis of this paper is that one can solve the problem of schizophernity also within deontological or utilitarian theories by simply incorporating some aretology (theory of virtue).
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Anna Tomaszewska
Anna Tomaszewska
Kant a problem treści percepcji
Kant and the Content of Perceptual Experience
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The first part of the article discusses one of the more important issues in the contemporary philosophy of perception and mind, i.e. the problem of the relation between experience and concepts, and that against the background of the conceptualism vs. nonconceptualism debate. On the conceptualist account of empirical cognition, perceptual contents are (throughout) conceptual in the sense that concepts constitute (through and through) the contents of perceptual experience. It is a necessary condition of the ascription of an experience and an empirical belief to a subject that he or she possessed concepts figuring in the characteristic of his or her experience. The relation between experience and belief is described as rational (or logical) rather than causal. I suggest a critical approach towards the conceptualist view in that I spell out some of its inconsistencies. Further, I focus on some selected kinds of nonconceptualism supported by such theorists as Ch. Peacocke, F. Dretske and J. L. Bermúdez.In the second part of my paper, I criticize McDowell’s conceptualist reading of Kant, on which the author of the Critique of Pure Reason is considered as representing the originally conceptualist position. Some of the theses Kant argues for in the “Transcendental Aesthetic” and earlier on in his 1770 Inaugural Dissertation allow us to conclude that, on a certain interpretation of the forms of empirical cognition (space and time), perception, on Kant’s theory, could be regarded as an active but not a concept-involving cognitive process.
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tłumaczenia |
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Richard Swinburne, Krzysztof Hubaczek
Richard Swinburne
Problem zła
The Problem of Evil
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Eleonore Stump, Krzysztof Hubaczek
Eleonore Stump
Problem cierpienia:
perspektywa tomistyczna
The Problem of Suffering
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Peter van Inwagen
Peter van Inwagen
Zawsze, wszędzie i bez względu na osobę niesłusznie jest żywić przekonania oparte na niedostatecznym świadectwie
It is Wrong, Everywhere, Always, and for Anyone, to Believe Anything upon Insufficient Evidence
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recenzje |
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Anna Kozanecka-Dymek
Anna Kozanecka-Dymek
Logika temporalna. Wybrane zagadnienia
Temporal logic: Selected issues
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Marek Lechniak
Marek Lechniak
Od logiki klasycznej do niemonotonicznej
Bridges from Classical to Nonmonotonic Logic
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Maksymilian Roszyk
Maksymilian Roszyk
The Challenge of Relativism: Its Nature and Limits
The Challenge of Relativism: Its Nature and Limits
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sprawozdania |
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Piotr Pietras, Joanna Szydłowska
Piotr Pietras
V Zlot Filozoficzny:
Instytut Filozofii Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków, 29-31 maja 2009 roku
The 5th Philosophers’ Rally
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Maksymilian Roszyk
Maksymilian Roszyk
VII Ogólnopolskie Forum Filozoficzne Młodych. Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie, 16-17 maja 2009 roku
The 7th Polish National Youth Forum on Philosophy
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artykuły |
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Jakub Dziadkowiec
Jakub Dziadkowiec
Warunki emergencji biologicznej w świetle sporu emergentyzm–redukcjonizm
Conditions of the Biological Emergence in the Light Of Debate between the Reductionism and the Emergentism
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The relation of emergence allows to understand life as a key emergent quality for the biology. We find number of examples of emergent phenomena in the chemistry and in the biology. However, there is a lack of a clear explication of understanding both the emergence and its biological exemplification. Conditions of the biological emergence, which are formulated in the current literature, help to fill that gap and to provide a satisfying definition of that relation. At the same time it throws a new light on the debate for a research paradigma between the reductionism and the emergentism. After a time of underlying differences, today the main attention is given to their likeness and possibilities for cooperation of those two apprehensions.
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Andrzej Jastrzębski
Andrzej Jastrzębski
Osoba a osobowość:
Psychologiczne koncepcje osobowości w świetle klasycznej antropologii filozoficznej
Person and Personality
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In the modern human sciences, there is a lot of confusion with regard to the understanding of basic terms. Each author tries to develop his own terminology and thus makes any discussion of his ideas very difficult from the very beginning. This is, for instance, the case with theories of personality.Is it possible that the psychologists may use the tools that have for centuries been successfully used in philosophical anthropology?If we had at least one point of reference, we could probably do so. Is the classical concept of the human person a possible point of reference for a psychologist? This paper is an attempt to answer the question.
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Stanisław Judycki
Stanisław Judycki
„Twardy” problem realizmu metafizycznego i współczesny antyrealizm
The “Hard” Problem of Metaphysical Realism and Contemporary Anti-Realism
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The aim of the article is to consider the problem of metaphysical realism that is defined as the thesis that there are objects that are independent of human consciousness. The problem was not solved by I. Kant, since he assumed, without a justification, that there are objects (“things in themselves”) that are the causes of human mental states. The author interprets the problem of metaphysical realism in the context of the so-called principle of immanence (“principle of consciousness”), according to which every entity (object) may be treated exclusively as a correlate of consciousness. The principle of immanence is the cause why even causal relations have to be treated as only certain data for the consciousness, and hence they may not be referred to by asserting that there is a factor that is the cause of states of human consciousness. Contemporary anti-realism, as the so-called conceptual realism, does not consider the problem of metaphysical realism in the context of the principle of immanence, and hence it is not a part of the traditional dispute on the existence of the (external) world. The author sees the solution to the problem of metaphysical realism in combining two arguments: in the reference to the ontological proof, which – via God’s veracity – is to “lead outside” the immanence of consciousness, and in the reference to the concept of participation in such a way that the human mind participates in God and it is Him that is the real entity (ens realissimum) that is referred to by the dispute about the existence of the world and the problem of metaphysical realism.
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Anna Kozanecka-Dymek
Anna Kozanecka-Dymek
Geneza niektórych systemów logiki temporalnej
The Origin of Some Systems of Temporal Logic
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The article is devoted to the question of the origin of temporal logic. The aim of it is to answer to the question concerning the group of conditions and reasons of constructing such kinds of systems (especially of tense logic and G. H. von Wright’s temporal logic). As a result of conducted considerations, there is stated that there exist two reasons of arising some temporal systems. The first of them was the rebirth of interests of issues involving time in aspect of logic, the second (more essential) – insufficiency of the language of the classical logical calculus to give the formalization of tense clauses. In connection with this there was begun constructing temporal systems providing the linguistic and inferencional apparatus needed to control expressions and inferences containing such clauses. In the article there is also shown how there was led to formalize expressions including various tense clauses, and what follows, to introduce new functors to the language of logic.
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Łukasz Kukier, Marek Szydłowki, Paweł Tambor
Łukasz Kukier
Kryterium Akaike:
prostota w języku statystyki
Akaike Criterion
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Many authors have pointed out that notion of simplicity is unclear. For deeper understanding of this term, we investigate it in the conceptual framework of Akaike Informative Criterion (AIC). Advantages as well as troubles of such formulation are presented in the paper. We also discuss a role which plays the simplicity notion formulated in statistical framework within Sober’s philosophy of science conception.
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