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Displaying: 1-20 of 43 documents

research articles
1. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Hamid Alaeinejad, Morteza Hajihosseini The Collapse Argument Reconsidered
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According to Beall and Restall’s logical pluralism, classical logic, relevant logic, and intuitionistic logic are all correct. On this version of logical pluralism, logic is considered to be normative, in the sense that someone who accepts the truth of the premises of a valid argument, is bound to accept the conclusion. So-called collapse arguments are designed to show the incompatibility of the simultaneous acceptance of logical pluralism and the normativity of logic. Caret, however, by proposing logical contextualism, and Blake-Turner and Russell by proposing telic pluralism, have sought to nullify the collapse problem. In the present article, after setting out these two approaches to the collapse problem, we argue that by using the concept of the ‘rationality of beliefs’ in order to frame the canonical purpose of logic, it can be demonstrated that if logical contextualism and telic pluralism are considered as philosophically significant logical pluralisms, a refined version of the collapse argument is still a threat for both of these kinds of logical pluralism.
2. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Nicholas Danne Inferential Internalism and the Causal Status Effect
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To justify inductive inference and vanquish classical skepticisms about human memory, external world realism, etc., Richard Fumerton proposes his “inferential internalism,” an epistemology whereby humans ‘see’ by Russellian acquaintance Keynesian probable relations (PRs) between propositions. PRs are a priori necessary relations of logical probability, akin to but not reducible to logical entailments, such that perceiving a PR between one’s evidence E and proposition P of unknown truth value justifies rational belief in P to an objective degree. A recent critic of inferential internalism is Alan Rhoda, who questions its psychological plausibility. Rhoda argues that in order to see necessary relations between propositions E and P, one would need acquaintance with too many propositions at once, since our evidence E is often complex. In this paper, I criticize Rhoda’s implausibility objection as too quick. Referencing the causal status effect (CSE) from psychology, I argue that some of the complex features of evidence E contribute to our type-categorizing it as E-type, and thus we do not need to ‘see’ all of the complex features when we see the PR between E and P. My argument leaves unchanged Fumerton’s justificatory role for the PR, but enhances its psychological plausibility.
3. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Jonathan Egeland The Problem with Trusting Unfamiliar Faculties: Accessibilism Defended
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According to accessibilism, there is an accessibility condition on justification. More specifically, accessibilism claims that facts about justification are a priori accessible—where a priori is used in the traditional sense that a condition is a priori just in case it doesn’t depend on any of the sense modalities. The most prominent argument for accessibilism draws on BonJour and Lehrer's unfamiliar faculty scenarios. Recently, however, several objections have been raised against it. In this article, I defend the argument against three prominent objections from the recent literature.
discussion notes/debate
4. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
John Turri A Non-puzzle about Assertion and Truth
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It was recently argued that non-factive accounts of assertoric norms gain an advantage from “a puzzle about assertion and truth.” In this paper, I show that this is a puzzle in name only. The puzzle is based on allegedly inconsistent linguistic data that are not actually inconsistent. The demonstration’s key points are that something can be (a) improper yet permissible, and (b) reproachable yet un-reproached. Assertion still has a factive norm.
book symposium
5. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Nuno Venturinha Context-Sensitive Objectivism: Going Deeper into Description of Situations
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This paper outlines the major topics addressed in my book Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology (Springer, 2018), anticipates some possible misunderstandings and discusses issues that warrant further investigation.
6. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Modesto Gómez-Alonso Original Facticity and the Incompleteness of Knowledge
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This article critically explores Nuno Venturinha’s project of capturing how we are situated in reality, a project grounded in the conviction that the closure of knowledge and the openness of experience are compatible. To this end, I will explore how an approach complementary to Venturinha’s method—one which regards the passive and the active in knowledge as rooted in a single, underlying original form of consciousness—would deal with the issue of justifying contingency without falling into either scepticism or empiricism.
7. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Anna Boncompagni On Contexts, Hinges, and Impossible Mistakes
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In this commentary on Nuno Venturinha’s Description of Situations, after highlighting what in my view are the most significant and innovative features of his work, I focus on Venturinha’s infallibilist approach to knowledge. This topic allows for a wider discussion concerning the pragmatist aspects of the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy. I discuss this in three steps: first, by describing the general similarity between Wittgenstein and the pragmatists with respect to the emphasis on contexts; second, by focusing on the kind of fallibilism endorsed by the pragmatists and its compatibility with Charles S. Peirce’s concept of the “indubitables,” which I take as a precursor of Wittgenstein’s concept of hinges; and, finally, by advancing the hypothesis that it is possible to find a form of fallibilism in the later Wittgenstein too, notwithstanding his insistence on the impossibility of mistakes. My conclusion is that while Venturinha’s contextualism finds support in the later Wittgenstein’s writings, his infallibilism does not.
8. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Marcin Lewiński Social Situations and Which Descriptions: On Venturinha’s Description of Situations
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In this paper, I approach Venturinha’s ideas on contextual epistemology from the perspective of linguistic practices of argumentation. I point to the “thick” descriptions of social situations as a common context in which our epistemic language-games take place. In this way, I explore promising connections of Venturinha’s work to key concepts in recent speech act theory, social ontology and social epistemology.
9. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Nuno Venturinha Replies to Critics
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This text brings together replies to three commentaries on my Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology (Springer, 2018) written by Modesto Gómez-Alonso, Anna Boncompagni and Marcin Lewiński.
10. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Notes on the Contributors
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11. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Logos and Episteme. Aims and Scope
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12. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Notes to Contributors
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research articles
13. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Robb Dunphy Agrippan Problems
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In this article I consider Sextus’ account of the Five Modes and of the Two Modes in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism. I suggest that from these we can derive the basic form of a number of different problems which I refer to as “Agrippan problems,” where this category includes both the epistemic regress problem and the problem of the criterion. Finally, I suggest that there is a distinctive Agrippan problem present at the beginning of Hegel’s Science of Logic.
14. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Domingos Faria Group Testimony: Defending a Reductionist View
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Our aim in this paper is to defend the reductionist (or deflationist) view on group testimony from the attacks of divergence arguments. We will begin by presenting how divergence arguments can challenge the reductionist view. However, we will argue that these arguments are not decisive to rule out the reductionist view; for, these arguments have false premises, assuming dubious epistemic principles that testimony cannot generate knowledge and understanding. The final part of this paper will be devoted to presenting the advantages of the reductionist approach to explaining the phenomenon of group testimony.
15. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Thomas Grundmann Moral Realism and the Problem of Moral Aliens
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In this paper, I discuss a new problem for moral realism, the problem of moral aliens. In the first section, I introduce this problem. Moral aliens are people who radically disagree with us concerning moral matters. Moral aliens are neither obviously incoherent nor do they seem to lack rational support from their own perspective. On the one hand, moral realists claim that we should stick to our guns when we encounter moral aliens. On the other hand, moral realists, in contrast to anti-realists, seem to be committed to an epistemic symmetry between us and our moral aliens that forces us into rational suspension of our moral beliefs. Unless one disputes the very possibility of moral aliens, this poses a severe challenge to the moral realist. In the second section, I will address this problem. It will turn out that, on closer scrutiny, we cannot make any sense of the idea that moral aliens should be taken as our epistemic peers. Consequently, there is no way to argue that encountering moral aliens gives us any reason to revise our moral beliefs. If my argument is correct, the possibility of encountering moral aliens poses no real threat to moral realism.
16. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Perry Hendricks The Subject’s Perspective Objection to Externalism and Why it Fails
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The subject’s perspective objection (SPO) is an objection against externalist theories of justification, warrant, and knowledge. In this article, I show that externalists can accommodate the SPO while remaining externalist. So, even if the SPO is successful, it does not motivate internalism, and the primary motivation for internalism has been lost. After this, I provide an explanation for why so many people find cases that motivate the SPO convincing.
17. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Robert Michels Husserlian Eidetic Variation and Objectual Understanding as a Basis for an Epistemology of Essence
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Vaidya has recently argued that while Husserl’s method for acquiring knowledge of essence through use of our imagination is subject to a vicious epistemic circle, we can still use the method to successfully attain objectual understanding of essence. In this paper, I argue that the Husserlian objectual understanding-based epistemology envisaged by Vaidya suffers from a similar epistemic circularity as its knowledge-based foil. I argue that there is a straight-forward solution to this problem, but then raise three serious problems for an amended version of Vaidya’s proposal and any similar Husserlian epistemology of essence. The paper closes with some general reflections on applying the Husserlian method to the contemporary notion of essence and on the idea of refocusing the epistemology of essence on understanding instead of knowledge.
18. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Diana Sofronieva Empathy as a Tool for Learning about Evaluative Features of Objects
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It is generally agreed that empathy can give us knowledge about others. However, the potential use of empathy as a tool to learn about features of objects in the world more generally, as opposed to learning only about others’ internal states, has not been discussed in the literature. In this paper I make the claim that empathy can help us learn about evaluative features of objects in the world. I further defend this claim by comparing empathy to testimony. Then I present and respond to two possible objections to this analogy.
19. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Billy Wheeler Truth Tracking and Knowledge from Virtual Reality
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Is it possible to gain knowledge about the real world based solely on experiences in virtual reality? According to one influential theory of knowledge, you cannot. Robert Nozick's truth-tracking theory requires that, in addition to a belief being true, it must also be sensitive to the truth. Yet beliefs formed in virtual reality are not sensitive: in the nearest possible world where P is false, you would have continued to believe that P. This is problematic because there is increasing awareness from philosophers and technologists that virtual reality is an important way in which we can arrive at beliefs and knowledge about the world. Here I argue that a suitably modified version of Nozick's sensitivity condition is able to account for knowledge from virtual reality.
discussion notes/debate
20. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Scott Aikin Does Metaphilosophically Pragmatist Anti-Skepticism Work?
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Michael Hannon has recently given “a new apraxia” argument against skepticism. Hannon’s case is that skepticism depends on a theory of knowledge that makes the concept “useless and uninteresting.” Three arguments rebutting Hannon’s metaphilosophical pragmatism are given that show that the concept of knowledge that makes skepticism plausible is both interesting and useful.