This paper presents the author’s vision of a computer game, called “The Game of Life,” which would function as a classroom exercise to assist in the teaching of philosophical concepts such as principles of individuation, supervenience, the phenomena/noumena distinction, the physical stance, design stance, and intentional stance (as described by Dennet), the argument from design, and even monads. Originally invented by the British mathematician John Conway, the author describes a computer game version which would aid in philosophical pedagogy by allowing students the ability to experiment interactively with concrete instantiations of the highly idealized concepts that philosophy works with. The author addresses the pedagogical value of such interactive experimentation and argues that all philosophy laboratories should be stocked with such a computational workbench.

This paper presents the idea, structure, history, goals, and accomplishments of mathematics and science laboratories as they have been organized and taught at Trinity College. The laboratories are designed to develop specific science and mathematics problem-solving skills, presenting them within the context of humanities-related inquiry (e.g. neural network theory within the context of philosophy of mind). These laboratories are especially valuable in providing humanities students with literacy in advanced science and mathematics materials that, since they are not requisite for humanities majors, humanities students would not be exposed to otherwise. Especially in the case of philosophy, laboratories bear the additional benefit of dissolving insularity, opening up study onto directly relevant fields and enriching and informing philosophical inquiry. The author concludes by considering philosophy’s relationship to science and mathematics, what these relationships imply for how a philosophy education should be structured, and the important role that science and mathematics laboratories play in that education.

While there are many significant ethical questions which can deliver the lessons of an introductory ethics course (e.g. global warming, world hunger, genetic engineering), students do not face these moral difficulties directly in their lives. The author argues that commonly-faced ethical questions are more effective for rendering the content of introductory ethics immediately relevant to students. This paper presents a general outline of an introductory ethics course structured around the theme of drunk driving. Not only is drunk driving something that college students are confronted with consistently, but the topic lends itself to discussions of moral subjectivism and moral skepticism, various moral theories’ framings of the problem, the assignment of culpability and conditions which mitigate it, secondary responsibility, intoxication and agency, punishment, deterrents, contrition, and forgiveness. The author details each of these discussions and concludes by considering further benefits of teaching a course built around this theme.

While the subject matter and conclusions of scholarly meta-ethical debate are of great import, it is quite difficult to convey this material to students in applied ethics courses where the principal teaching goals are an introduction to pressing moral dilemmas and to the critical thinking skills needed to approach them. After a brief discussion of common obstacles to teaching applied ethics, this paper presents two strategies for teaching applied ethics which remain faithful to the complexities of meta-ethical theory. Under the “advocate approach,” the instructor argues for one particular moral theory and teaches rival theories and moral issues with reference to the preferred theory. This allows for specific moral responses to moral questions studied and satisfies student desire for concreteness of answers in a philosophy course. Under the “outfitter approach,” the instructor refrains from committing to one ethical theory and spends more time addressing advantages and drawbacks of each position, thereby showing the limited scope of many moral theories and communicating to students the risk of taking up a moral position too hastily. The author relates both approaches to meta-ethical concerns such as the possibility of moral truths and moral certainty, the relationship between competing moral systems, and the status of a moral theory.

This paper presents and discusses the results of an email survey which asked participants to share their views on the efficacy of multiple choice, fill-in-the-blank, or matching questions as evaluation methods in philosophy courses. First, the structure of the survey and its contents are explained. Next, responses are broken down along the lines of student responses and teacher responses. In both cases, there was significant disagreement among respondents, though there were notable patterns emerged. Student arguments in favor of non-essay assessment emphasized the expedience; arguments against emphasized the inadequacy of such evaluation methods to the nuances of philosophical material. Teacher responses echoed student responses but included considerations of fairness, ambiguity in student answers, student motivation, and justifications for non-essay assessment in specific contexts. Finally, the author discusses respondents’ opinions on whether philosophy departments should ban non-essay questions. The author concludes by suggesting that the results of this survey merit attention as an indication of how widespread the difficulties of non-essay assessment are and as an indication of the diversity of views on the subject.