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the problem of future contingents
1. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 4
Marcin Tkaczyk Marcin Tkaczyk
The Antinomy of Future Contingent Events
Antynomia Przyszłych Zdarzeń Przygodnych

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The antinomy of future contingents is here understood as a trilemma whose horns are (a) the thesis of the closed past, (b) the thesis of the open future, and (c) the thesis that all events can be represented at any time. The latter thesis can take different forms, like the principle of bivalence or the thesis of divine foreknowledge. Different versions of (c) lead to different versions of the antinomy itself. The antinomy has been formalized. It hasbeen proven that the theses (a), (b), and (c) make up an inconsistent set but are consistent with each other. Possible solutions have been considered. It has been argued that there are only two global solutions to the antinomy: radical determinism (fatalism) and retroactive causality. The latter solution has been recommended and developed.
2. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 4
Ciro de Florio, Aldo Frigerio Ciro de Florio
Fragmented Future Contingents and Omniscience
Fragmentaryczne Przyszłe Zdarzenia Przygodne I Wszechwiedza

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In this paper, we have analyzed a number of solutions to the antinomy between divine foreknowledge and human freedom. If we assume that God is temporal, then a sort of backwards causation of past divine beliefs by future human acts must be acknowledged. Since this solution runs into difficulties, we consider the prospects of the view according to which God is outside time. A timeless and omniscient God seems to imply a B-theory of time and, at least at first glance, seems to jeopardize human freedom. Therefore, we have examined what happens when a non-standard A-theory of time like Fragmentalism is assumed. We demonstrate that in this case the prospects of a timeless view of God are much better: both human freedom and divine knowledge of the results of human choices are preserved if this metaphysics of time is adopted. The costs of this solution are, however, very high. From the logical point of view, it rejects bivalence; from the metaphysical point of view, the world is regarded as fragmentary and incoherent. However, if one is ready to accept these costs, this solution is one of the most successful in the search for a solution to the centuries-old problem of the conciliation between divine foreknowledge and human freedom.
3. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 4
Paweł Garbacz Paweł Garbacz
On the Representation if States of Affairs in the Antinomy of Future Contingents
O Reprezentacji Stanów Rzeczy W Antynomii Futura Contingentia

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The paper is a comment on the formalization of the antinomy of futura contigentia in the form of a (inconsistent) theory formulated by Marcin Tkaczyk in the language of classical predicate calculus. I argue that some features of the formalization in question are controversial from the viewpoint of formal semantics and ontology, and suggest two ways of removing some of those controversies.
4. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 4
Jacek J. Jadacki Jacek J. Jadacki
Causal and Functional Determination vs. Foreknowledge about the Future
Determinacja Kauzalna I Funkcjonalna vs. Przedwiedza O Przyszłości

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The author of the paper critically analyzes a quasi-theory of future contingents (PFC) given by Marcin Tkaczyk and proposes his own explication of its theses and terms. The author makes it by introducing operational definitions of temporal and modal concepts, distinguishing between the causal and functional determination, discussing the status of the principle of bivalence, and replacing Tkaczyk’s theses by their new formulations. As a result, the author states, among other things, that (contrary to Tkaczyk) there is no contradiction between the thesis about the opened future and the thesis about divine omniscience, because it requires the causal (but not functional as it is a case) determination between a true proposition and its determined fact. The author also shows that Tkaczyk’s examples of the retroactive causes are not an accurate solution of the antinomy because they are, at most, the examples of the factors which change the picture of the past but not the past itself.
5. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 4
Simo Knuuttila Simo Knuuttila
Medieval Approaches to Future Contingents
Średniowieczne Ujęcia Problemu Przyszłych Zdarzeń Przygodnych

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This paper discusses the main lines of medieval Latin approaches to future contingents with some remarks on Marcin Tkaczyk’s paper “The antinomy of future contingent events.” Tkaczyk’s theory shows some similarity with the general frame of the views of Ockham and Scotus, the difference being that while medieval authors argued for the temporal necessity of the past, Tkaczyk is sceptical of the general validity of this necessity. Ockham’s theological view was that God eternally has an intuitive and immutable knowledge of all possibilities as well as whether they are ever actualized or not (PANACCIO & PICHÉ 2010). The content of God’s past knowledge attitude remains contingent before the free choice takes place because God’s knowledge could be different similarly as the truth-value of the proposition. While Ockham held that no past or present thing follows from future things as an effect follows from its cause, this causal link is defended by Tkaczyk. Later thinkers thought that the doctrine of the scientia media sheds light on this question; perhaps it is easier to understand than the retroactive model which is not contradictory but difficult to imagine, as Tkaczyk concludes his paper.
6. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 4
Dariusz Łukasiewicz Dariusz Łukasiewicz
Marcin Tkaczyk’s Ockhamism, or Whether the Theory of Contingentia Praeterita is the only Plausible Solution to the Problem of FuturaContingentia
Ockhamizm Marcina Tkaczyka, Czyli O Tym, Czy Teoria Contingentia Praeterita Jest Jedynym Możliwym Rozwiązaniem Problemu Futura Contingentia

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In the first part of this article, we point out and discuss these the contained in Marcin Tkaczyk’s book, Futura Contingentia, with which we agree completely or at least partially. In the second part of the paper, we seek to consider whether the solution of the futura contingentia problem, rooted in the basic intuitions of William of Ockham, is the only one possible and available for us. We argue that there is another possible approach to the problem of how to reconcile divine omniscience with contingent events rather than the Ockhamist solution. The alternative view, which we suggest, is “eternalism”, meaning that God is timeless, and that temporal necessity is compatible with contingent events and free decisions.
7. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 4
William E. Mann William E. Mann
Past, Present, or Future: What’s The Difference?
Przeszłość, Teraźniejszość, Przyszłość

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This essay examines Marcin Tkaczyk’s “The antinomy of future contingent events,” with an eye towards clarifying the roles played by philosophical notions of propositions, events, the present, the relativity of time, and Tkaczyk’s notion of a “sphere of culture.” The essay concludes by examining what support might be offered for Tkaczyk’s claim that people can to some degree change the past.
8. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 4
Timothy Pawl Timothy Pawl
A Reply to “The Antinomy of Future Contingent Events”
Odpowiedź Na Artykuł „The Antinomy Of Future Contingent Events”

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In this brief reply I discuss Fr. Marcin Tkaczyk’s excellent article, “The Antinomy of Future Contingent Events.” I first raise some concerns about his understanding of representation. I then raise three concerns about his preferred solution to the antinomy: first, that a part of his theory of representation itself motivates a rejection of proposition 1 of the antinomy; second, that one needn’t employ retroactive causal connections to weaken 1 as he does; and third, that it is difficult to make sense of the sort of backward efficient causation that Tkaczyk requires for his solution to work.
9. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 4
Jacek Wojtysiak Jacek Wojtysiak
Future Contingents, Ockhamism (Retroactivism) and Thomism (Eternalism)
Futura Contingentia, Ockhamizm (Retroaktywizm) I Tomizm (Eternalizm)

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In the current paper, I enter into debate with Marcin Tkaczyk and the chosen Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophers of religion to discuss the theological version of the problem of future contingents. I take into consideration some varieties of Ockhamism (retroactivism)—the position denying the temporal necessity (non-determination) of all past events and allowing some form of retroactivity. Strong Ockhamism postulates real retroactive causation, moderate Ockhamism limits it to the meanings of physical and psychical events, and weak Ockhamism replaces the notion of retroactive causation with that of retroactive dependence. I compare different forms of retroactivism with eternalism (of Boethius, St. Anselm of Canterbury, and St. Thomas Aquinas) to show that the latter has significant advantage. At the same time, I point out that eternalism in its presentist and relativist version (proposed by Brian Leftow) avoids the objections put forward against it, and that, within such eternalism, the problem of future contingents does not arise.
10. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 4
Jan Woleński Jan Woleński
Is the Past Determined (Necessary)?
Czy Przeszłość Jest Zdeterminowana (Konieczna)?

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This paper is inspired by Marcin Tkaczyk’s works and discusses the problem of the necessity of the past (is the past determined?) and its role in the analysis of future contingents. The discussion centers on the statements (accepted by Tkaczyk, but slightly paraphrased)) firstly, that every past state of affairs is determined, and, secondly, that at least some some future states of affairs are contingent. The paper argues that because the first assertion is not justified, the antinomy of future contingents does not arise. The argument uses modal and metalogical devices.
11. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 4
Marcin Tkaczyk Marcin Tkaczyk
The Antinomy of Future Contingent Events — a Rebuttal
Antynomia Przyszłych Zdarzeń Przygodnych — Replika

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In this paper I account for some of the topics raised by the Authors of the papers included in the debate I focus mainly on the following topics: the concept of representation and reliability of my formal analysis of the future contingent antinomy, the concept of causation with an emphasis put on backword causation, the idea of timeless eternity and the position of religious beliefs in philosophical theories. Furthermore I shortly address topics of Ockhamism, Molinism, soft and hard facts, fragmentism and the concept of necessity.
articles
12. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 3
Marek Hetmański Marek Hetmański
Archaeology of Cognitive Science: Michel Foucault’s Model of the Cognitive Revolution
Archeologia Kognitywistyki

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The article presents an epistemological and partially methodological analysis of cognitive science as a scientific discipline, created as a result of the transformations that took place in the philosophical and psychological concepts of the mind and cognition, which were carried out with the aid of tools and methods of modelling as well as through simulating human cognitive processes and consciousness. In order to describe this interdisciplinary (transdisciplinary) science, and its positions, as well as the stages and directions of its development, it makes use of the epistemological model formulated by Michel Foucault, in which he draws attention to social, ideological and technological conditions of scientific knowledge (episteme). The opinions of the leading creators and critics of cognitive science, such as George A. Miller, Howard Gardner, Margaret Boden and José Luis Bermúdez are referenced to and analyzed with the use of this model. The article shows the epistemologically and methodologically divergent status of cognitive science, as well as its cognitive and institutional conditions and challenges, which stand before it after half a century of intensive development.
13. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 3
Arkadiusz Gut, Robert Mirski Arkadiusz Gut
Language as a Necessary Condition for Complex Mental Content: A Review of the Discussion on Spatial and Mathematical Thinking
Język Jako Warunek Konieczny Złożonej Treści Mentalnej

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In this article we review the discussion over the thesis that language serves as an integrator of contents coming from different cognitive modules. After presenting the theoretical considerations, we examine two strands of empirical research that tested the hypothesis — spatial cognition and mathematical cognition. The idea shared by both of them is that each is composed of two separate modules processing information of a specific kind. For spatial thinking these are geometric information about the location of the object and the information about the object’s properties such as color or size. For mathematical thinking, they are the absolute representation of small numbers and the approximate representation of numerosities. Language is said to integrate the two kinds of information within each of these domains, which the reviewed data demonstrates. In the final part of the paper, we offer some comments on the theoretical side of the discussion.
14. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 3
Marcin Miłkowski Marcin Miłkowski
Objections to Computationalism: A Survey
Zarzuty Wobec Komputacjonizmu

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In this paper, the Author reviewed the typical objections against the claim that brains are computers, or, to be more precise, information-processing mechanisms. By showing that practically all the popular objections are based on uncharitable (or simply incorrect) interpretations of the claim, he argues that the claim is likely to be true, relevant to contemporary cognitive (neuro) science, and non-trivial.
15. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 3
Marek Lechniak Marek Lechniak
Once More about Moore’s Paradox in Epistemic Logic and Belief Change Theory
Jeszcze Raz O Paradoksie Moore’a W Logice Epistemicznej I Teorii Zmian Przekonaniowych

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In this article, it was first presented Moore’s paradox per se and after the author focused on the logical perspective — at first he analyzed these considerations in the field of so-called standard epistemic logic and after on the formal theory of belief change.
16. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 3
Anna Dutkowska, Zbigniew Wróblewski Anna Dutkowska
Mindreading in the Animal Kingdom: Philosophical Controversies
Czytanie Umysłu W Królestwie Zwierząt

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The central issue in the debate on animal minds is the issue of mindreading. This complicated cognitive ability belongs to the key elements of social cognition — as a form of adapting to specific circumstances connected with living in groups, it enables the reading of the mental states of other individuals, e.g. intentions, desires, and beliefs as well as the adaptation of one’s own behavior to this information. The primary purpose of the article is to present the main philosophical controversies which arise in the discussion of whether this ability can be attributed to animals; if so, then to what extent. Philosophical discussions concentrate on methodological issues: alternative interpretational models of animal behavior (mindreading vs reading behavior), anthropomorphism, experimental protocols, and gradeability of mindreading as well as the nature of the mind (thinking).
17. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 3
Robert Poczobut Robert Poczobut
Contextual Emergence and Its Applications in Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science
Emergencja Kontekstowa I Jej Zastosowania W Filozofii Umysłu I Kognitywistyce

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The purpose of the article is to analyze the concept of contextual emergence as well as its selected applications in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In the first section the author presents the general assumptions of the emergentist model of reality. He stresses that the concept of emergence can be applied to the description of various levels of organization of nature: one of these levels is that of mental-cognitive processes, analyzed within the fields of philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In the subsequent sections, he introduces the definitions of contextual emergence and systemic causation and he points to their selected applications to mentalcognitive systems. In the concluding part, he presents the ideas of Gerald Edelman and Michael Gazzaniga on the role of contextual explanations as well as the concepts of emergence in the philosophy of biology and cognitive neuroscience. He also indicates the possibility of incorporating the concept of contextual emergence into active externalism and the extended cognition theory.
18. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 3
Adriana Schetz Adriana Schetz
Consciousness and Perception from Biological Externalism Point of View
Świadomość I Postrzeganie Z Punktu Widzenia Biologicznego Eksternalizmu

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The aim of the analyzes carried out in this paper is to show that within the multitude of theories of perception which center their main presuppositions around the idea of action and embodiment, we can distinguish a body of approaches, which characteristically emphasize the following claims: that it is the living organism that should serve as perceiving subject; that perceptual states are not only a form of action but primarily a form of consciousness; that perceptual information is obtained by perceiving subjects from the environment by means of so-called perceptual invariants (i.e. structural indicators, which allow organisms to recognize such perceptual properties as color, shape, size, intensity of sound, type and direction of smell, tactilely given texture, etc.).
19. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 3
Marcin Tkaczyk Marcin Tkaczyk
Distribution Laws in Weak Positional Logics
Prawa Dystrybucyjne W Słabych Logikach Pozycyjnych

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A formal language is positional if it involves a positional connecitve, i.e. a connective of realization to relate formulas to points of a kind, like points of realization or points of relativization. The connective in focus in this paper is the connective “R” , first introduced by Jerzy Łoś. Formulas [Rαφ] involve a singular name α and a formula φ to the effect that φ is satisfied (true) relative to the position designated by α. In weak positional calculi no nested occurences of the connective “R” are allowed. The distribution problem in weak positional logics is actually the problem of distributivity of the connective “R” over classical connectives, viz. the problem of relation between the occurences of classical connectives inside and outside the scope of the positional connective “R”.
20. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 3
Corrigendum
Corrigendum

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