Mahatma Gandhi was deeply interested in the comparative study of religions since the days of his youth. His interest in religious matters was due to the background of India, which was saturated with religious ideas and spirituality. Religion, to Gandhi, was not a matter of individual experience: Gandhi found God within creation. The meaning of the word 'Dharma' is 'religion' in India. This is a comprehensive term which embraces all of humanity. Gandhi referred to "God" as "Truth," which has great significance. His mission was not only to humanize religion, but also to moralize it. Gandhi's interpretation of Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity made his religion a federation of different religious faiths. His views on proselytization are also included in the paper.

The 20th century may be considered the ultimate expression of Western ideals and philosophy: "civilized" humanity's attempt to dominate "uncivilized" peoples and nature. The 21st century soberingly proclaims the shortsightedness and ultimate unsustainability of this philosophy. This paper shows the limitations of a modern Western world-view, and the practical applicability of ideas to be found in Asian philosophies. In outline, the contrast may be portrayed by the following overgeneralizations: (1) From a linear to a cyclical world view; (2) from divine salvation to karmic necessity; (3) from human dominion over nature to human place within nature; (4) from the perfectibility of humanity and the world through science; (5) from atomistic mechanistic individualism to organic interdependence; (6) from competition to cooperation; (7) from glorification of wealth to respect for humanhood; (8) from absolute cultural values to necessary common values. Each of these attitudes is examined in light of what we now know about the world in the 21st century, as Asian philosophy is found applicable to address future problems.

Polanyi and Blaga are two centennial philosophers who could be compared. They both are philosophers who have abandoned the attempt to analyze science as the form of culture capable of complete objectivity and the language solely in terms of its referential force, to make representational knowledge impersonal and to split fact from value.

Phenomenology and logical positivism both subscribed to an empirical-verifiability criterion of mental or linguistic meaning. The acceptance of this criterion confronted them with the same problem: how to understand the Other as a subject with his own experience, if the existence and nature of the Other's experiences cannot be verified. Husserl tackled this problem in the Cartesian Meditations, but he could not reconcile the verifiability criterion with understanding the Other's feelings and sensations. Carnap's solution was to embrace behaviorism and eliminate the idea of private sensations, but behaviorism has well-known difficulties. Heidegger broke this impasse by suggesting that each person's being included being-with, an innate capacity for understanding the Other. To be human is to be "hardwired" to make sense of the Other without having to verify the Other's private sensations. I suggest that being-with emerged from an evolutionary imperative for conspecific animals to recognize each other and to coordinate their activities. Wittgenstein also rejected the verifiability criterion. He theorized that the meaning of a term is its usage and that terms about private sensations were meaningful because they have functions in our language-games. For example, "I'm in pain," like a cry of pain, functions to get the attention of others and motivate others to help. Wittgenstein's theory shows how Dasein's being-with includes "primitive" adaptive behavior such as cries, smiles, and threatening or playful gesture. As Dasein is acculturated, these behaviors are partially superseded by functionally equivalent linguistic expressions.

Traditional thinking has understood the world in its totality as including both chaos and harmony. Lovelock's hypothesis gives us a new resolution to this problem by expanding or even relocating creativity from the human intellect to the world. Postmodernism is the return to the mythological-aesthetic reflexion of the world concerning the idea of order and harmony.

Hume's analyses of human apprehension and of causality were the most penetrating up to his time and continue to have great influence. Contemporary Spanish philosopher Xavier Zubiri (1893-1983) has examined both and identified three underlying errors: (1) the failure to recognize that there are three stages of human intellection, and especially that the first, primordial apprehension, has quite unique characteristics; (2) the attempt to place an excessive burden on the content of impressions while ignoring what Zubiri terms their 'formality of reality'; and (3) the failure to recognize that functionality, not causality, is the basis for most of our knowledge. Causal chains in general cannot be adequately known, and therefore are not and cannot be the basis of our knowledge of the external world. Only in the area of persons and morality does causality play a critical role.

The contemporary Spanish philosopher Xavier Zubiri (1893-1983) developed his philosophy in constant dialogue with the past. Zubiri believed that there are fundamental flaws with classical philosophy that require a fresh approach. His critique of classical philosophy falls into three areas: conceptual, factual, and scope. The first is treated in this paper with respect to five subjects. Zubiri believed that the structure of human intellection is incorrect in classical philosophy. This error contributes in large part to two key errors which he termed "entification of reality" and "logification of intellection." Closely related are errors concerning essence and the relationship of truth and reality.

I examine the role of Justice as it emerges in the early mythic and philosophical traditions of ancient Greece and India. Specifically, I focus on the Goddess Justice and her relationship to the Great Mother as the divine creator and final judge of all reality. I begin by tracing out the historical parallels in the development of ancient Greek and Indian conceptions of Justice and end by working out their philosophical similarities. After giving an historical account of the earlier Greek matriarchal religions, I show how Justice becomes transformed from a living force, alive and divine, to a philosophical concept and, finally, to a mere social function within the polis. I focus on the pre-Socratic notion of Justice as a cosmological and ontological necessity, inherent not simply within human affairs, but within the structure of the universe itself, as Nature. Here, I draw out further comparative points between the ancient Greek and Indian conceptions by discussing the Vedic and early Buddhist notion of Justice as dharma/karma, as a living-ethical Force inherent in the structure and creation of the universe. I also examine how in the Eastern schools of Non-dualism, Maya is understood as the "Mother of all Life energy." In all of this, special attention is given to the nature of Justice as the embodiment of the Great Mother manifested as creative energy and as the discerner and judge of all Being.

Neoplatonism strongly influenced the development of Sufism. Neoplatonism, as developed by Plotinus conceives God to be the source and goal of everything. Islam qua institution is closed to all critical and philosophical thought, but Sufism enjoys a more liberal and critical approach. It is probable that the translations of Plotinus have provided the necessary philosophical ground for Sufism. An examination of both Sufism and Neoplatonism reveals close similarities with regard to the nature of God, the soul, the body, concepts such as goodness, evil and beauty, death and life, and creation.

Among the Romanian forerunners of cybernetics (i.e., Daniel Danielopolu, Paul Postelnicu), Stefan Odobleja is, undoubtedly, the most important. European recognition of his contribution to the foundations of cybernetics took place twenty years ago when his paper, "Diversity and Unit in Cybernetics" (presented at the Fourth Congress of Cybernetics and Systems in Amsterdam, August, 1978), was received with great acclaim. His work has been used by other Romanian scientists and philosophers like Constantin Noica, Mihai Draganescu, Alexandru Surdu, Georghe M. Stefan, Constantin Balaceanu, Mihai Golu, Pantelimon Golu,Victor Sahleanu, etc. Meanwhile, another scientist-philosopher, Norbert Wiener, reached conclusions similar to Odobleja's. It is interesting to note that two individuals who worked in and came from such diverse backgrounds and media, reached such similar conclusions within the interval of a decade.

Cartesian philosophy presupposes the legitimacy of body-mind dualism, subject-object dualism, the principle of "clear and distinct ideas," and the human individual as an "autonomous agent." In contrast, the philosophical projects of James, Merleau-Ponty, and Nishida are all characterized by a critical stance taken toward these Cartesian presuppositions. That is, first, the "body" is established as the ground for our pre-reflexive yet active communion with the world. Second, the intertwining inseparability of "object-knowledge" and "self-knowledge" in our being in the world is acknowledged. Third, the phenomenon of "horizon" is thematized as an indispensable moment in the constitution of "experience." Finally, the "self" is understood as being embedded in and supported by the "field of experience." With this in mind, we can appreciate Whitehead's comparison of James' "Does Consciousness Exist?" with Descartes' Discourse on Method as the "inauguration of a new stage of philosophy." In this context the significance of Nishida's notion of "the world as the self's body" can be productively discussed.

Teaching philosophy and pedagogy at the University of Freiburg from 1897 to 1933, Jonas Cohn fought mainly against Friedrich Nietzsche and the influence of the ethics of Nietzsche on the youth of his time. A declaration made by Cohn in the Preface of his Science of Value (1932) shows this: "The title 'science of value' means polemics, too: I fight against all, who following Nietzsche deny the possibility of a science of value." But this opposition to Nietzsche and to his followers is not the only aspect of Cohn's relation to Nietzsche. On the other side, Cohn attempted to integrate some of the important traits of Nietzsche's ethic in his own conception of philosophy and pedagogics. The expression "self-transcendence" (Selbstüberschreitung) stands for this ambition of Cohn. This can be demonstrated by some biographical data and by the interpretation of Cohn's philosophy of value.

Through a comparative analysis of the Chinese language, this paper discusses how the structure and functions of a natural language would bear upon the ways in which some philosophical problems are posed and some ontological insights are shaped. By this case analysis, the aim of this paper is to contribute to the elucidation of the relation between language and philosophy in this regard.

This paper is a comparative study of Hartshorne's neoclassical reconsideration of the notion of the Absolute based on his Whiteheadian vision of the divine relativity, and Nishida's attempt at redefining the same notion against the background of what he calls the philosophy of "place" (Jpn., basho) of absolute Nothingness or Buddhist Emptiness. By reconsidering the notion of the Absolute, Hartshorne has come up with the standpoint of "Surrelativism," and Nishida's attempt has resulted in the standpoint of "absolute dialectic as guided by the principle of the self-identity of absolute contradictions."

Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962), another pole of the so-called Kyoto-School of Philosophy of modern Japan, attempts to construct a dialectical, triadic logic of genus, species and individual as a creative synthesis between Eastern and Western philosophy. Although the formal pattern of his method is influenced by the Hegelian dialectic, the way of his thinking is rather prevailed by Kantian dualism. This makes a sharp contrast to his mentor Nishida Kitaro, whose logic of Topos or Place qua Absolute Nothingness is criticized as all-embracing and static in character by him. The difference between them might be parallel to that of Greek and Latin theology concerning the Trinity. Tanabe never presupposes any preexistent entity as the primordial One in the eternal dimension, but rather maintains the individuality as the free subjective agent in the field of history. The dichotomy between the universal and the individual is overcome in and through the mediation of the third term— the species — as the negatively self-realized, specific form of the genus. The species, however, turns out to be the self-estrangement, when it loses the perpetually negative mediation of the free subjective activity of the individual.

Western philosophers still tend to think that philosophy, in a sense that they can take with professional interest, does not exist in non-Western traditions. To persuade them otherwise would require them to make an effort that they prefer to evade. I attempt to begin to persuade them by closely paraphrasing a few arguments by the early Chinese philosopher Chuang Tzu and a few by the Indian skeptic and mystic Shriharsha (about 1150 CE). One of Chuang Tzu's arguments has some resemblance to Plato's Third-Man argument, another with the impossibility of distinguishing between waking reality and dream, and a third with the impossibility of objective victories in debates. The skeptic Shriharsha, in a way that can be taken to parallel Wittgenstein's attack on conventional philosophy, shows that philosophical definitions cannot be rigorous enough to fulfill the task that philosophers set for them. The rest of this paper is devoted to the problem of commensurability. I contend that philosophies are either commensurable or incommensurable depending on the light in which one prefers to see them. Each way of seeing them involves a loss of a possibility that may be considered precious, but the Westerner who continues to insist on the full incommensurability of non-Western philosophies with his or her own is losing a great deal that might be intellectually helpful.

God, or in Nishida's case Buddha-nature, is frequently conceptualized as relating to the world by including it within the Infinite. Particular elements within the world are not seen as existing in absolute differentiation or total negation from Spirit, God, or Absolute Non-Being. The Many are not excluded but are, on the contrary, included within the One. The logic by which the One includes the Many is a logic of manifold unity, or, as Hegel quite confidently puts it, true infinity as opposed to spurious infinity. I will argue that such a logic of inclusive infinity is operative in Hartshorne, Hegel and Nishida. Each uses different terminology and writes with different systemic emphases, but as applied to God or the Ultimate, the function and consequences of the logic of inclusivity are strikingly similar for all three philosophers. Although infinite inclusivity provides a way of unifying the chaotic diversity of existence into a rational totality, there are central questions that have remained unanswered in the three metaphysicians. Primary among them is the question that sums up within itself many of the others: the problem of radical particularity. The particular elements of the world which are claimed to be included within the parameters of the Ultimate are just that: particular fragments of reality. I argue that their particular nature makes it impossible for the Infinite to incorporate them within its purview without raising serious difficulties.

In recent times, the American Philosophical Association has been exposed in a serious way to the issue of pluralism in philosophy curriculums in the departments of philosophy of American universities and colleges. This conversation brings to the fore the fact that what is at issue in the prospect of pluralizing American philosophy departments is not merely the matter of deciding the discipline's boundaries of intellectual formation relative to the current generation of students, but the unforeseeen consequences of pluralism which challenge both 'the American canon' and the profession's self-understanding vis-à-vis a 'Western' intellectual heritage that distinguishes the 'essential' from the 'marginal' by privileging essential figures, problems, and time-honored methodological commitments. Yet, to the degree that there is a quest for relation of differences, this need not presuppose the universality of philosophical discourse, comparative philosophy moving inevitably within a logic of opposition rather than a logic of mutuality. Our thinking is surely problematic if at this World Congress we find an occasion for a confrontation between 'the West' and 'the margin,' the latter construed negatively as a 'mute, growing and menacing pressure.'

Some moral philosophers in the West (e.g., Norman Daniels and Jane English) hold that adult children have no more moral obligation to support their elderly parents than does any other person in the society, no matter how much sacrifice their parents made for them or what misery their parents are presently suffering. This is because children do not ask to be brought into the world or to be adopted. Therefore, there is a "basic asymmetry between parental and the filial obligations." I argue against the Daniels/English thesis by employing the traditional Confucian view of the nature of filial obligation. On the basis of a distinction between 'moral duty' and 'moral responsibility' and the Confucian concept of justice, I argue that the filial obligation of adult children to care respectfully for their aged parents is not necessarily self-imposed. I conclude that due to the naturalistic character of the family, the nature of our familial obligations (such as parental caring for young children and adult children's respectful caring for aged parents) cannot be consensual, contractarian and voluntarist, but instead existential, communal and historical.