Cover of Logos & Episteme
Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Displaying: 1-11 of 11 documents

research articles
1. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Christopher T. Buford Stranded Runners: On Trying to Bring Justification Home
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Those who endorse a knowledge-first program in epistemology claim that rather than attempting to understand knowledge in terms of more fundamental notions or relations such as belief and justification, we should instead understand knowledge as being in some sense prior to such concepts and/or relations. If we suppose that this is the correct approach to theorizing about knowledge, we are left with a residual question about the nature of those concepts or relations, such as justification, that were thought to be first but are now second. Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa has recently proposed that we understand justification in terms of potential knowledge. Ichikawa combines his view of knowledge and justification with what initially seems to be a natural complement, epistemological disjunctivism. While Ichikawa focuses on hallucination, I shift the focus to illusion. I argue that the combination of justification as potential knowledge and epistemological disjunctivism entails that perceptual beliefs that arise from illusions are not justified.
2. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Filip Čukljević Why Rip Matters?: Reexamining the Problem of Cognitive Dynamics
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The aim of this paper is to reexamine the importance of Rip van Winkle’s case for the problem of cognitive dynamics. First I shall present the main problem of cognitive dynamics. Then I shall explain the relevance of Rip’s case to this problem. After that I shall provide a short presentation of the main solutions to this problem. I shall explicate the problem concerning the manner in which philosophers who propose those solutions defend their response to the question of Rip’s case. My argument shall be that they defend their response either in overly dogmatic or in circular way. Finally, I shall suggest a way out of that problem.
3. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Jonas Karge A Modified Supervaluationist Framework for Decision-Making
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
How strongly an agent beliefs in a proposition can be represented by her degree of belief in that proposition. According to the orthodox Bayesian picture, an agent's degree of belief is best represented by a single probability function. On an alternative account, an agent’s beliefs are modeled based on a set of probability functions, called imprecise probabilities. Recently, however, imprecise probabilities have come under attack. Adam Elga claims that there is no adequate account of the way they can be manifested in decision-making. In response to Elga, more elaborate accounts of the imprecise framework have been developed. One of them is based on supervaluationism, originally, a semantic approach to vague predicates. Still, Seamus Bradley shows that some of those accounts that solve Elga’s problem, have a more severe defect: they undermine a central motivation for introducing imprecise probabilities in the first place. In this paper, I modify the supervaluationist approach in such a way that it accounts for both Elga’s and Bradley’s challenges to the imprecise framework.
4. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
B.J.C. Madison Reliabilists Should Still Fear the Demon
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In its most basic form, Simple Reliabilism states that: a belief is justified iff it is formed as the result of a reliable belief-forming process. But so-called New Evil Demon (NED) cases have been given as counterexamples. A common response has been to complicate reliabilism from its simplest form to accommodate the basic reliabilist position, while at the same time granting the force of NED intuitions. But what if despite initial appearances, Simple Reliabilism, without qualification, is compatible with the NED intuition? What we can call the Dispositionalist Response to the New Evil Demon problem is fascinating because it contends just that: Simple Reliabilism is fully compatible with the NED intuition. It is claimed that all we need to do to recognize their compatibility is appreciate that reliability is a dispositional property. In this paper I shall critically evaluate the Dispositionalist proposal.
5. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Ryan Ross Alleged Counterexamples to Uniqueness
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Kopec and Titelbaum collect five alleged counterexamples to Uniqueness, the thesis that it is impossible for agents who have the same total evidence to be ideally rational in having different doxastic attitudes toward the same proposition. I argue that four of the alleged counterexamples fail and that Uniqueness should be slightly modified to accommodate the fifth example.
6. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Michael J. Shaffer Can Knowledge Really be Non-factive?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper contains a critical examination of the prospects for analyses of knowledge that weaken the factivity condition so that knowledge implies only approximate truth.
7. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Joby Varghese A Functional Approach to Characterize Values in the Context of ‘Values in Science’ Debates
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper proposes a functional approach to characterize epistemic and nonepistemic values. The paper argues that epistemic values are functionally homogeneous since (i) they act as criteria to evaluate the epistemic virtues a hypothesis ought to possess, and (ii) they validate scientific knowledge claims objectively. Conversely, non-epistemic values are functionally heterogeneous since they may promote multiple and sometimes conflicting aims in different research contexts. An incentive of espousing the functional approach is that it helps us understand how values can operate in appropriate and inappropriate ways in scientific research and inappropriate influences can eventually be prevented. The idea is to argue that since non-epistemic values are functionally heterogeneous, they cannot provide objective reasons for the acceptance of a hypothesis. However, their involvement is necessary in certain research contexts and the problem is the involvement of these need not be always legitimate. By analyzing a case from chemical research, I demonstrate that how non-epistemic values might influence scientific research and, then, I go on to demonstrate that how a proper understanding of the functions of different kinds of values might promote the attainment of multiple goals of a particular research in a legitimate and socially relevant way.
8. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Erratum Notice
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
9. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Notes on the Contributors
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
10. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Logos and Episteme. Aims and Scope
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
11. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Notes to Contributors
view |  rights & permissions | cited by