Cover of Logos & Episteme
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Displaying: 1-11 of 11 documents

1. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Patrick Bondy How to Understand and Solve the Lottery Paradox
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It has been claimed that there is a lottery paradox for justification and an analogous paradox for knowledge, and that these two paradoxes should have a common solution. I argue that there is in fact no lottery paradox for knowledge, since that version of the paradox has a demonstrably false premise. The solution to the justification paradox is to deny closure of justification under conjunction. I present a principle which allows us to deny closure of justification under conjunction in certain kinds of cases, but which still allows that belief in a conjunction on the basis of justified belief in its conjuncts can often be justified.
2. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
William A. Brant Levelling the Analysis of Knowledge via Methodological Scepticism
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In this essay I provide one methodology that yields the level of analysis of an alleged knowledge-claim under investigation via its relations to varying gradations of scepticism. Each proposed knowledge-claim possesses a specified relationship with: (i) a globally sceptical argument; (ii) the least sceptical but successful argument that casts it into doubt; and (iii) the most sceptical yet unsuccessful argument, which is conceivably hypothesized to repudiate it but fails to do so. Yielding this specified set of relations, by means of proceeding from global scepticism to (ii) and (iii), increases the chances of identifying the highest evaluative relevancy of the levels of analysis and observation of an alleged knowledge-claim. I argue that the failure to analyse and derive a difference between (i) and (ii) with respect to an alleged knowledge-claim signifies that the claim is grounded within the theoretical framework itself, that the claim lacks specification with regard to content that is analysable via that framework, and the claim is dubious insofar as alternative theoretic frameworks may present greater relevancy to levels of observation.
3. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Caroline Alexandra Mathieu The Confrontation Between Qualitative and Quantitative Researchers: A Different Article, a Daring Publication
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After reading chapter two of Russell’s In Praise of Idleness , which discusses the history of the concept of knowledge, and the article by Ranjay Gulati whocommented the wars of tribes (“Tent poles, tribalism, and boundary spanning: The rigor-relevant debate in management research”), this inspired me an image of gladiator battles between different groups in the scientific world. Inspired by Feyerabend’s concept of fairy tales, I illustrate the struggle between quantitative and qualitative researchers that I witnessed in my research career...
4. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Peter Murphy Another Blow to Knowledge from Knowledge
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A novel argument is offered against the following popular condition on inferential knowledge: a person inferentially knows a conclusion only if they know each of the claims from which they essentially inferred that conclusion. The epistemology of conditional proof reveals that we sometimes come to know conditionals by inferring them from assumptions rather than beliefs. Since knowledge requires belief, cases of knowing via conditional proof refute the popular knowledge from knowledge condition. It also suggests more radical cases against the condition and it brings to light the underrecognized category of inferential basic knowledge.
5. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Anguel S. Stefanov Zeno’s Paradoxes Revisited
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My aim in this paper is to suggest a new outlook concerning the nature of Zeno’s paradoxes. The attention is directed towards the three famous paradoxes known as “Dichotomy,” “Achilles and the Tortoise,” and “The Arrow.” An analysis of the paradigmatic proposals for a solution shows that an adequate solution has not yet been reached. An answer is provided instead to the question “How Zeno’s paradoxes emerge in their quality of aporiae?,” that is to say in their quality of impasses, of problem situations without an exit, what is the original meaning of the Greek word “aporia.” It is my claim that this is the correct rational approach for solving these conceptual puzzles. In other words, I am not proposing formal solutions by criticizing and/or altering their premises assuming the continuous or discrete nature of space and time, but I try to draw the philosophical attention to the way we possess the phenomenon of motion as a result of the perception of space-time in human experience.
6. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Jimmy Alfonso Licon Dissecting the Suicide Machine Argument: Insights from the Hales – Licon Debate
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I assess the debate over the Suicide Machine Argument. There are several lessons to be learned from this debate. First, there is a fruitful distinction to be made,between tensed and tenseless versions of presentism, despite the temptation to suppose that presentism is a tensed theory of time. Second, once we’ve made the distinction between different kinds of presentism, it is clear that Licon’s objection protects the tenseless version of presentism from the Suicide Machine Argument; however, the argument is still effective against the tensed version. Finally, I argue that if the presentist wants to remain a card carrying presentist, in the face of the challenge posed by Hales, then she must abandon her commitment to tense.
7. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Clayton Littlejohn Are Epistemic Reasons Ever Reasons to Promote?
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In trying to distinguish the right kinds of reasons from the wrong, epistemologists often appeal to the connection to truth to explain why practical considerations cannot constitute reasons. The view they typically opt for is one on which only evidence can constitute a reason to believe. Brian Talbot has shown that these approaches don’t exclude the possibility that there are non-evidential reasons for belief that can justify a belief without being evidence for that belief. He thinks thatthere are indeed such reasons and that they are the right kind of reasons to justify belief. The existence of such truth promoting non-epistemic reasons is said to follow from the fact that we have an epistemic end that involves the attainment of true belief. I shall argue that there are no such reasons precisely because there is an epistemic end that has normative authority.
8. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Nicolás Lo Guercio Reply to Palmira
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In “Philosophical Peer Disagreement” I argued that in order to properly account for the phenomenon of philosophical peer disagreement it is necessary to dropthe ‘same evidence’ condition from the definition of epistemic peerage. The reason is the following: different philosophical perspectives might come with different commitments concerning the evidential role of the same piece of data, and it would be wrong to deny the status of epistemic peer to someone that is acquainted with the same data, even if he does not consider it plays an evidential role. However, on “On the Necessity of the Evidential Equality Condition For Epistemic Peerage,” Michele Palmira has developed some criticisms to these ideas. Here I defend my view from Palmira’s objections.
9. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Notes on the Contributors
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10. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Logos and Episteme: Aims and Scope
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11. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Notes to Contributors
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