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Displaying: 1-20 of 36 documents

1. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 3
Joel Michael Reynolds, Teresa Blankmeyer Burke Introduction to Volume 3
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2. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 3
Avram Hiller How Does Disability Affect Wellbeing? A Literature Review and Philosophical Analysis
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The question of how disability affects wellbeing has occupied a number of philosophers in recent years. However, this literature has proceeded without a careful examination of the fairly vast empirical research on the topic. In this paper, I review the scholarly literature and discuss some philosophically-relevant aspects of it. On average, those with disabilities have a significantly lower level of wellbeing than those without disabilities. Furthermore, there is strong evidence that this reduction in wellbeing is not due entirely to ableist factors. Hence, I argue that it shows that the Mere Difference View of disability is most likely false. However, the literature indeed shows that disabled people typically live good lives. Thus, despite its rejection of the Mere Difference View, it still upholds a disability-affirmative view. These findings allow for a measured critique of some of Peter Singer’s writings on disability.
3. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 3
Licia Carlson Intellectual Disability, Dehumanization, and the Fate of “the Human”
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Dehumanization Studies is a burgeoning field that has much to teach Critical Disability Studies and philosophers of disability. Conversely, a critical disability perspective can inform and challenge theoretical approaches to dehumanization. This paper attempts to forge a conversation between these interdisciplinary areas by exploring the phenomenon of dehumanization in relation to people with intellectual disabilities. It begins with a definition of disability dehumanization, and then explores the ways in which this form of dehumanization functions dynamically at multiple levels, drawing from the history of ID and contemporary examples in moral philosophy. Ultimately it argues that it is essential to recognize the moral relevance of being human in order to challenge and prevent forms of disability dehumanization and de­fends this idea in the face of two objections (speciesism and posthumanism).
4. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 3
Rhea Ienni Access Without the Demand for Explanation: Glissant, Disability, and the Right to Access Opacity
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Within Western approaches to disability, the expectation for disabled people to ‘prove our disability’ is not only central for receiving access supports, but also for being accepted by those around us. Disabled people must make themselves intelligible to the able-bodied world under the threat of not getting one’s needs met, exclusion, and violence. In this paper I argue that Édouard Glissant is important to bring into conversation with issues in disability studies for two reasons: First, Glissant’s account of compulsory transparency illuminates the underlying colonial values that inform the assumption that we need to understand someone’s disability in order to provide access and respect. Second, Glissant’s argument for the right to opacity creates a potential avenue to rethink an approach to access that is not predicated on being fully understood or rendered fully visible by means of reductive, able-bodied categories: the right to access opacity.
5. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 3
Amber Knight Gene Editing Technologies, Utopianism, and Disability Politics
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Scholars have long speculated about what a future affected by gene editing technologies might hold. This article enters current debates over the future of gene editing and the place of disability within it. Specifically, I evaluate contemporary utopian thinking about gene editing found in two different schools of thought: transhumanism and critical disability studies, ultimately judging the latter to be richer and more politically promising than the former. If we take it as our goal to protect and promote future people’s autonomy interests, I argue that current political efforts should be directed toward modifying ableist environments rather than employing genetic technologies to avoid disability or enhance capacity. The article concludes by drawing from disability justice scholarship to make the case that the “right to an open future” should be understood as the “right to an accessible future,” one wherein society is “open” to people with diverse genetic traits and capacities.
6. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 3
Christine Wieseler The Import of Critical Phenomenology for Theorizing Disability
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In this paper, I explore the claim that phenomenological accounts grounded in the lived experiences of those most tangibly impacted by social norms related to ability can provide crucial correctives and supplements to the existing philosophical literature on disability. After situating discussions of the body within disability theory and debates over the impairment/disability distinction in philosophy of disability more specifically, I argue that extant models are inadequate for theorizing subjective experiences of living as a disabled person. I then develop an account of the relationship between impairment/disability by drawing upon critical phenomenological approaches to embodiment. In conclusion, I turn to the methodological and metaphilosophical issue of how to conduct ethical inquiry concerning disability. I examine some of the ways that ableist assumptions can inform curiosity, provide examples of disabled people’s accounts of experiencing derivatizing curiosity, and offer suggestions for practices of curiosity that not only avoid epistemic harms, but are actively anti-ableist.
7. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 3
Jane Dryden Disability, Teleology, and Human Development in German Idealism: Exploring Disability in the History of Philosophy
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German idealist philosophers Kant and Hegel, who have had a significant influence on contemporary social and political theory, both insist on universal human freedom and dignity. However, they maintain teleological frameworks of human development which depend on distancing free and rational human agency from nature, leaving animality and “savageness” behind for a rational and spiritually developed future. This has implications for their implicit and explicit accounts of disability, which risk being reiterated today: insofar as disability is associated with being a static product of nature, these frameworks situate it at best as that which must be overcome, and at worst as something that bars someone from full humanity. Recognizing and understanding the place of disability within their work is vital if we want to avoid their exclusions in our inherited ideas.
8. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 3
George Estreich Tlön, Uqbar, ChatGPT
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This essay is based on a close reading of two poems written by ChatGPT. One is about preimplantation genetic testing; the other is about Down syndrome. Examining these AI-generated poems along with several human-composed texts, the author—the father of a young woman with Down syndrome—explores a number of related topics, including the difference between human- and machine-written poetry; ableist bias in large language models; the future of people with intellectual disabilities, in a world of machine intelligence; and the value of writing by people with disabilities. The author does not reject the use of ChatGPT or preimplantation genetic diagnosis, but argues that for them to be compatible with human flourishing, we need to consider the way they are sold to us, the need for regulation, and the assumptions they embed.
book reviews
9. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 3
David Peña-Guzmán Beasts of Burden: Animal and Disability Liberation, by Sunaura Taylor
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10. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 2
Table of Contents
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11. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 2
Joel Michael Reynolds, Teresa Blankmeyer Burke Editor’s Introduction
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12. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 2
Thomas Nadelhoffer Chronic Pain, Mere-Differences, and Disability Variantism
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While some philosophers believe disabilities constitute a “bad-difference,” others think they constitute a “mere-difference” (Barnes 2016). On this latter view, while disabilities may create certain hardships, having a disability is not bad in itself. I argue that chronic pain problematizes this disability-neutral view. In doing so, I first survey the literature on chronic pain (§1). Then, I argue that Barnes’s mere-difference view cannot adequately accommodate the lived experiences of many people who suffer from chronic pain (§2). Next, I consider two ways Barnes might respond and I explain why these responses are not workable (§3). Finally, I conclude with a brief discussion of disability variantism, the view that just as some disabilities can be neutral or even positive for some individuals, other disabilities like chronic pain can understandably make some people’s lives miserable not because society has failed them but simply because some conditions can openly conflict with well-being (§4).
13. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 2
Adi Goldiner Understanding “Disability” as a Cluster of Disability Models
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This article puts forth a novel framework for understanding conceptions of disability using six models of disability: the “Social,” “Medical,” “Tragedy,” “Affirmative,” “Minority” and “Universal” models. It analyzes these models as three opposed pairs, each pertaining to a distinct aspect of the multifaceted experience of disability: (1) the cause of disabled people’s social disadvantage and exclusion; (2) the effect of impairment on individuals’ quality of life and well-being; (3) the dichotomy or lack thereof between disabled and nondisabled people. The article argues that although each model is incompatible with its opposed pair, it is compatible with the remaining four models, in the sense that there is no contradiction in holding the views associated with these models at the same time. It therefore concludes that conceptions of disability are best understood as clusters of views on disability that are associated with compatible models.
14. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 2
Adam Cureton Gaming the System?: Justice, Fairness, and Disability Accommodations
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I am legally entitled to certain accommodations for my visual impairment that I do not always need. Affording me these rights is required by justice even on those rare occasions in which they are not necessary to give me an equal opportunity to fully participate in all aspects of society. I sometimes wonder whether I am nonetheless “gaming the system,” “exploiting a loophole,” or otherwise acting unjustly or unfairly by using disability accommodations in such circumstances. The essay aims to explore this apparent paradox by considering whether it is sometimes wrong, as a matter of justice, for disabled people to use accommodations we are justly owed. My conclusion is that, although it is not unjust for disabled people to use accommodations we are entitled to as a matter of justice, an ideally just person would sometimes forgo them for the sake of her commitment to justice itself.
15. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 2
Johnathan Flowers Against Philosophy, Against Disability
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This paper argues that the field of philosophy, and bioethics spe­cifically, engages in a series of speech acts that identify scholarship advocating for increased philosophical engagement with the experiences of disability as “activism.” In doing so, the field of philosophy treats these calls as not worthy of consideration, and therefore, to be ignored in “serious scholarship.” Further, this paper makes clear the ways that philosophy relies upon ableism through what Peter Railton calls the “culture of smartness,” which serves as a form of ableist apologia as defined by Jay Dolmage. The paper concludes by using the example of ADHD to indicate how the prevalence of this “culture of smartness” serves to exclude disabled philosophers within the field.
16. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 2
Ally Peabody Smith How Should (and Shouldn’t) We Think About Profound Intellectual Disability?
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Many accounts of the grounds for human moral standing rely on the possession of higher-order capacities of mind that serve as status-conferring attributes, to the exclusion of those with significant intellectual impairments. Interconnectedly, our relationships with those with profound intellectual disability (PID) remain beneath their potential. Taking as a starting point Peter Singer’s graduated account of moral status, its assumptions about PID, and its implications for what we owe those with PID, I argue that rather than conceptualizing PIDs as severe cognitive deficit, we should characterize them as disabilities marked by the impossibility of successful, mutual linguistic communication. Considering existing relationships between non-PID and PID pairs, I center the potential for atypical forms of communication. I close with the beginnings of a more extensionally adequate grounds for moral status, where moral standing is a product of one’s being able to participate in the shared activity of developing and deepening relationships.
17. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 2
Quill R. Kukla What Counts as a Disease, and Why Does It Matter?
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I argue that the concept of disease serves such radically different strategic purposes for different kinds of stakeholders that coming up with a unified philosophical definition of disease is hopeless. Instead, I defend a radically pluralist, pragmatist account of when it is appropriate to mobilize the concept of disease. I argue that it is appropriate to categorize a condition as a disease when it serves legitimate strategic goals to at least partially medicalize that condition, and when the condition is pathological from inside the epistemology and metaphysics of medicine. While some conditions, like pancreatic cancer, are legitimate diseases from all stakeholders’ points of view and in any context, and while other conditions, like homosexuality, are not diseases from any legitimate point of view, there is a range of interesting, messy cases—including Deafness, autism, pre-hypertension, infertility, and ADHD, for example—whose disease status is irreducibly context-dependent and under contest.
18. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 2
Kevin Timpe Cognitive Disabilities, Forms of Exclusion, and the Ethics of Social Interactions
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Cognitively disabled individuals have been marginalized by our larger culture; they’ve also been marginalized in philosophical discussions. This paper seeks to begin correcting this situation by examining how assumptions which shape our social interactions and expectations disadvantage individuals with a range of cognitive disabilities. After considering Rubella syndrome and autism in detail, I argue that we have a moral obligation to change how we approach social interactions with cognitively disabled individuals.
19. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 2
Frances Bottenberg Epistemic Arrogance, Moral Harm, and Dementia
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When it comes to supporting the well-being of a person living with dementia, remaining sensitive to that person’s interests can be challenging, given the impairments that typically define the condition particularly in its later stages. Epistemic arrogance, an attitude regularly adopted by people not living with dementia towards those who are, further impedes this task. In this case, epistemic arrogance amounts to the assumption that one sufficiently knows or can imagine what it is like to live with dementia to make decisions in matters concerning the care and well-being of someone with dementia, without appropriately consulting their views and preferences. Drawing on three fictional scenarios, I describe common pathways for epistemic arrogance in dementia-support contexts and the ways in which these cause moral harm, linking them to central issues in dementia studies and medical ethics, including person-centered care, the “best interests” principle and the prescriptive reach of advance directives.
20. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability: Volume > 2
John Vorhaus Profound Disability, Equality and the Boundaries of Inclusion
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The sub-title of a recent book on “belonging” for people with profound intellectual and multiple disabilities (PIMD) is “Pushing the boundaries of inclusion.” One aim of this paper is to establish where at least one of these boundaries lies. Enabling profoundly disabled people to be together with others is often inspired by the ideal that anybody and everybody can be fully included in their relationships with others. This inclusive ideal can take the form of relational equality—including people with PIMD as equals in our relationships with them. I explore the scope and limits of relational equality, and where, as with some profoundly disabled people, equality is out of reach, I look at two relational alternatives.