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editor's introduction
1. Hume Studies: Volume > 48 > Issue: 2
Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, Mark G. Spencer Editors' Introduction
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annual hume studies essay prize winner
2. Hume Studies: Volume > 48 > Issue: 2
Taro Okamura Hume’s Passion-Based Account of Moral Responsibility
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Many scholars have claimed that the psychology of the indirect passions in the Treatise is meant to capture how we come to regard persons as morally responsible agents. My question is exactly how the indirect passions relate to responsibility. In elucidating Hume’s account of responsibility, scholars have often focused not on the passionate re­sponses themselves, but on their structural features. In this paper, I argue that locating responsibility in the structural features is insufficient to make sense of Hume’s account of responsibility. I argue this on the grounds that without reference to the passions, Hume does not have the resources to distinguish between responsible and non-responsible entities. Instead, I attribute to Hume a distinctive, sympathy-based response-dependent conception of responsibility.
articles
3. Hume Studies: Volume > 48 > Issue: 2
Julia Wolf Internal Inconsistency and Secondary Ideas: Hume’s Problem in the Appendix with His Account of Personal Identity
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In the Appendix to the Treatise, Hume argues that there is a significant problem with his earlier account of personal identity. There has been considerable debate about what this problem actually is. I develop a new version of an internal inconsistency reading, where I argue that Hume realised that his original account of the connexion between perceptions in terms of an association of the ideas of the perceptions was not a viable means of explaining the connexion between perceptions as it leads to an infinite regress of ideas of perceptions. This is only stopped by accepting that the mind perceives a connexion between perceptions. This, however, is something Hume cannot accept. As a result, Hume is left without a positive account of the self, as he has no account of the connexion between perceptions.
4. Hume Studies: Volume > 48 > Issue: 2
Rico Vitz Enriching Humean Sympathy: Reading Hume’s Moral Philosophy in Light of African-American Philosophical Thought
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In this paper, I show how reading Hume’s moral philosophy in light of seminal works by nineteenth- and twentieth-century African-American authors can provide resources for developing a richer and more intentionally relational conception of sympathy. I begin by identifying two phenomena to which African-American intellectuals like Booker T. Washington, W. E. B. DuBois, and Anna Julia Cooper refer with the term “sympathy.” For ease of reference, I label these phenomena “sympathetic commitment” and “sympathetic understanding,” respectively. I then show that there are concepts in Hume’s moral philosophy that pick out similar phenomena and suggest that Hume scholars can draw on these concepts to develop an enriched and distinctively Humean sense of sympathy.
5. Hume Studies: Volume > 48 > Issue: 2
Alexander P. Bozzo Hume, Substance, and Causation: A Solution to a Nasty Problem
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Louis Loeb has identified a “nasty problem” in connection with Hume’s theory of meaning. The problem is that Hume seemingly claims we lack ideas corresponding to key metaphysical terms, such as “substance” and “necessary connection,” but he then proceeds to explain why philosophers believe in the existence of entities denoted by such terms. In short, Hume seems motivated to explain belief in the existence of certain entities, despite his claiming we have no idea of them. In this paper, I strive to solve the problem by noting the important role of clear and distinct perception in his thought. In particular, I argue Hume only wishes to deny we have a clear and distinct idea of substance and necessary connection, and not that we altogether lack an idea of substance and necessary connection, traditionally conceived.
6. Hume Studies: Volume > 48 > Issue: 2
Frederic L. van Holthoon Hume's Essays, Completing the Treatise
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In this piece, I argue that Hume wrote his Essays to continue writing on political issues after he rather abruptly ended his Treatise, Book 3. Initially he wrote some essays in the vein of Addison and Steele, but he rejected these essays as “frivolous.” In writing on political issues, he became a master essayist and his essays withstood the test of time. “Political” should here be taken in the wider sense as topical issues which readers could immediately recognize as being relevant.
book discussion
7. Hume Studies: Volume > 48 > Issue: 2
Lorne Falkenstein The Clarendon Edition of Hume's Essays
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symposium: anik waldow, experience embodied: early modern accounts of the human place in nature
8. Hume Studies: Volume > 48 > Issue: 2
Hynek Janoušek Meanings of “Embodied Experience”: A Response to Anik Waldow’s Book
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9. Hume Studies: Volume > 48 > Issue: 2
Dario Perinetti Experience, Embodiment, and History: Remarks on Waldow’s Experience Embodied
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10. Hume Studies: Volume > 48 > Issue: 2
Anik Waldow Reply to My Critics: Experience Embodied: Early Modern Accounts of the Human Place in Nature
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book reviews
11. Hume Studies: Volume > 48 > Issue: 2
Tina Baceski Reading David Hume’s “Of the Standard of Taste” by Babette Babich
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12. Hume Studies: Volume > 48 > Issue: 2
Zuzana Parusniková Academic Skepticism in Hume and Kant: A Ciceronian Critique of Metaphysics by Catalina González Quintero
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13. Hume Studies: Volume > 48 > Issue: 2
Index to Volume 48
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14. Hume Studies: Volume > 48 > Issue: 2
Referees for July 2022- June 2023
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15. Hume Studies: Volume > 48 > Issue: 2
Call for Entries: 50th Anniversary Issue of Hume Studies
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16. Hume Studies: Volume > 48 > Issue: 2
Call for Papers: Fourth Hume Studies Essay Prize
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17. Hume Studies: Volume > 48 > Issue: 1
Second Hume Studies Essay Prize Winner
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18. Hume Studies: Volume > 48 > Issue: 1
Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, Mark G. Spencer Editors' Introduction
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articles
19. Hume Studies: Volume > 48 > Issue: 1
Mark Windsor Not Circular: Hume's "Of the Standard of Taste"
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One of the gravest charges that has been brought against Hume’s essay “Of the Standard of Taste” is that of circularity. Hume is accused of defining good art in terms of “true judges,” and of defining true judges in terms of their ability to judge good art. First, I argue that Hume avoids circularity since he offers a way of identifying good art that is logically independent of the verdict of true judges. Second, I argue that this clarifies an enduring puzzle in the scholarship on Hume’s essay: why he appears to offer not one, but two standards of taste. Hume’s standard does not consist of general rules; however, Hume needs general rules to establish that some individuals’ tastes are more “delicate” than others’.
20. Hume Studies: Volume > 48 > Issue: 1
Sardar Hosseini Hume's Functionalism
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This paper claims that Hume is committed to a rather sophisticated form of functionalism. This claim is based upon the following arguments: first, Hume’s charac­terization of objects such as vegetables and animal bodies in terms of their functional identity, and their underlying analogy with the identity we ascribe to persons or selves, implies that an absolute constancy is not part of the essential nature of persons. Rather, what corresponds to this assumed metaphysical constancy is functional identity. Second, Hume’s distinction between the question concerning the substance of the mind on the one hand, and the questions concerning the local conjunction and cause of our perceptions, on the other, has much in common with, and anticipates, the much-celebrated functionalist distinction between the ontology and metaphysics of the mind.