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articles
1. Hume Studies: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Aaron Zimmerman Hume’s Reasons
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Hume’s claim that reason is a slave to the passions involves both a causal thesis: reason cannot cause action without the aid of the passions, and an evaluative thesis: it is improper to evaluate our actions in terms of their reasonableness. On my reading, Hume motivates his causal thesis by arguing that accurate representation is the function of reason, where a faculty of this kind cannot produce action on its own. (The interpretation helps vindicate Hume of the common charge that he “begs the question” against his opponents.) But Hume’s causal thesis does not entail his evaluative thesis, and his commitment to the latter is incredibly thin. According to Hume’spositive theory, our evaluative judgments originate in reason integrated with sympathy or humanity. And, I argue, the resulting view depicts us as having substantive, non-instrumental reasons to fulfill our obligations to both prudence and morality.
2. Hume Studies: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Don Garrett The First Motive to Justice: Hume’s Circle Argument Squared
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3. Hume Studies: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Peter S. Fosl On the 2007 Clarendon Critical Edition of David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature
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4. Hume Studies: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
John Bricke The Clarendon Edition of Hume’s Treatise: Book 1
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5. Hume Studies: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Jacqueline Taylor Hume and the Nortons on the Passions and Morality in Hume’s Treatise
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6. Hume Studies: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
David Fate Norton, Mary J. Norton A Response to Our Colleagues
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book reviews
7. Hume Studies: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
James A. Harris David Hume’s Political Theory: Law, Commerce, and the Constitution of Government
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8. Hume Studies: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Catherine Kemp Thomas Reid’s Theory of Perception
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9. Hume Studies: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Scott Yenor Hume’s Social Philosophy: Human Nature and Commercial Sociability in A Treatise of Human Nature
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10. Hume Studies: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Angela Michelle Coventry New Essays on David Hume
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11. Hume Studies: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Dale Jacquette Hume’s Difficulty: Time and Identity in the Treatise
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12. Hume Studies: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Neil Mcarthur David Hume, Moral and Political Theorist
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bibliography
13. Hume Studies: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
James Fieser The Hume Literature, 2006 and 2007
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14. Hume Studies: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Index to Volume 33
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15. Hume Studies: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Hume Studies Referees, 2006–2007
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articles
16. Hume Studies: Volume > 33 > Issue: 1
Colin Heydt Relations of Literary Form and Philosophical Purpose in Hume’s Four Essays on Happiness
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This paper examines Hume’s four essays on happiness: the “Epicurean,” the “Stoic,” the “Platonist,” and the “Sceptic.” I argue, first, that careful attention to how these essays are written shows that they do not simply argue for one position over others. They also elicit affective and imaginative responses in order to modify the reader’s outlook and to improve the reader’s understanding in service to moral ends. The analysis offers an improved reading of the essays and highlights the intimate connections between the purposes of philosophical writing and its manner of presentation. Secondly, I contend that appreciating how Hume’s essays on happiness work on the reader demonstrates the insufficiency of Hume’s categories of “anatomist” and “painter.”
17. Hume Studies: Volume > 33 > Issue: 1
Steven Gamboa Hume on Resemblance, Relevance, and Representation
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I consider a class of argument implying that Hume’s position on general representation is irredeemably circular in that it presupposes what it is meant to explain. Arguments of this sort (the most famous being Sellars’ “myth of the given”) threaten to undermine any empiricist account of general representation by showing how they depend on the naïve assumption that the relevant resemblances required for the sorting of experience into concepts for use in reasoning are simply given in experience itself. My aim is to salvage Hume’s account from this objection. To that end, I argue first for a “Goodmanesque” interpretation of Humean resemblance, and second for an alternative reading of Hume’s account of general ideas offered at T 1.1.7 that avoids falling into “the given” trap.
18. Hume Studies: Volume > 33 > Issue: 1
Ira M. Schnall Hume on “Popular” and “Philosophical” Skeptical Arguments
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In section 12 of the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Hume presents several skeptical arguments, including “popular” and “philosophical”objections to inductive reasoning. I point out a puzzling aspect of Hume’s treatment of these two kinds of objection, and I suggest a way to deal with the puzzle. I then examine the roles of both kinds of objection in leading to “mitigated” skepticism. In particular, Hume claims that the philosophical objection can lead to limiting investigation to matters of common life; but several philosophers have noted that this objection, far from leading to this result, seems to be inconsistent with it. I examine attempts to establish consistency, and I suggest a way to understand how the philosophical objection, along with the popular objections, can indeed provide reasons for mitigated skepticism.
19. Hume Studies: Volume > 33 > Issue: 1
Stefanie Rocknak The Vulgar Conception of Objects in “Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses”
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In this paper, we see that contrary to most readings of T 1.4.2 in the Treatise (“Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses”), Hume does not think that objects are sense impressions. This means that Hume’s position on objects (whatever that may be) is not to be conflated with the vulgar perspective. Moreover, the vulgar perspective undergoes a marked transition in T 1.4.2, evolving from what we may call vulgar perspective I into vulgar perspective II. This paper presents the first detailed analysis of this evolution, which includes an explanation of T 1.4.2’s four-part system.
20. Hume Studies: Volume > 33 > Issue: 1
Christine Swanton Can Hume Be Read as a Virtue Ethicist?
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It is not unusual now for Hume to be read as part of a virtue ethical tradition. However there are a number of obstacles in the way of such a reading: subjectivist, irrationalist, hedonistic, and consequentialist interpretations of Hume. In this paper I support a virtue ethical reading by arguing against all these interpretations. In the course of these arguments I show how Hume should be understood as part of a virtue ethical tradition which is sentimentalist in a response-dependent sense, as opposed to Aristotelian.