To overcome the traditional opposition between the methodological and the ontological naturalism, in the paper the notion of supervenience is proposed as an explanatory category which facilitates developing a version of nonreductionist emergentism. This category helps to understand the so called teleonomy (resp. quasi-finality) studied in modern biology and eliminates the traditional opposition between the causal and the teleological interpretation of nature. Analytical distinctions, dependent on supervenient aspects of nature, facilitate new interpretive patterns for biological evolution and make groundless many simplified patterns accepted in philosophical interpretation of evolutionism.

Naturalism is a philosophical doctrine assuming that all that exists is natural, that is, that there are no spiritual realities, no purely spiritual substances, no supernatural beings, transcendent in relation to the world. In epistemology it is said that no correct and convincing arguments can be formulated for existence of this kind of objects. The general thesis of naturalism is concerned with a discussion on theism and atheism, a discussion on the ontological status of the human mind, a discussion coming from the area of philosophy of biology, from the area of ethics and axiology, and even a discussion of the issue of how the objects of formal sciences exist. Naturalism is rather a conclusion from accumulation of arguments from various branches of knowledge than a self-dependent philosophical conviction. In the course of the considerations the following issues will be dealt with: historical background of naturalism, ontological and methodological naturalism, naturalism in axiology, epistemology, in social sciences and philosophy of the mind, relations between naturalism and physicalism, materialism, emergentism and functionalism.Opponents of naturalism usually try to show that within one or another branch of knowledge naturalism cannot be maintained, and on this basis they assume that naturalism as a whole is false. In the present considerations a different method of anti-naturalist argumentation has been used, namely, a fictitious thesis has been accepted, that as result of future development of scientific knowledge naturalism in all the branches will be considered as a convincing point of view and will be generally accepted. The phrase „puzzle of naturalism” used in the title is supposed to suggest that even in such a situation the general thesis of naturalism will not result from acceptance of particular naturalisms in all branches of knowledge. In other words, conceivable complete explanative successes achieved in particular branches of knowledge will not give the right to draw a general naturalistic conclusion. Hence the thesis of a universal naturalism will remain puzzling.

The moment a notion becomes fashionable its meaning becomes unclear. This also concerns the notion of ‘naturalism’. After reminding briefly of the evolution of the notion, some of the sources are discussed of contemporary naturalistic tendencies in philosophy of science and current interpretations of scientific theories. One of the characteristic features of contemporary naturalism is a strong tendency to monistic interpretations. This seems to be in drastic opposition to metaphysical and theological dualism connected with the Christian view of the world. But does this view really force this kind of dualism on it followers? The article presents various contemporary views of this problem with a particular stress on the discussion that has been going on around the question of “God’s action in the world”. During these polemics the notions of bottom-up causality and top-down causality have been broadly discussed. The author of the article suggests a certain philosophical hypothesis that allows overcoming the controversy between monism and dualism making by that very fact contemporary naturalistic tendencies not objectionable for followers of the Christian view of the world.

1. Given the God of creation and providence, as described in the classical theistic metaphysics, miracles (unusual events that are result of direct divine modification of the natural order) are possible. But given the God of deism or process theism, one might deny that such a being can produce miraculous events.2. Contemporary theologians, using concepts of hermeneutical or existentialistical philosophies, prefer the definition of miracle that is quite near to that one of Augustine: when God acts in exceptional manner, for our instruction and admonition, we call it a miracle. There are two aspects to miracles as conceived in accordance with this definition: that of the „sign” (it is a divine means of instruction or assistance) and that of „wonder” (it is an exception to the normal course of events).3. From D. Hume onwards philosophers have been discussing a number of questions related to our ability to recognize miraculous events. The most significant question of that sort seems to be: are there imaginable conditions under which all rational persons would be compelled to recognize that God has directly intervened? For many philosophers the answer must be negative. Some of them (e.g. R. A. H. Larmer, R. Swinburne), however, believe that an affirmative response is required. There are cases, they argue, at which those who already believe in God would have strong evidence supporting supernatural causation of a given event, and no evidence for purely natural causation.

Interest in the idea of supervenience, that still gives a lot of hope to contemporary philosophy, is manifested in introducing more and more precise definitions of it and in introducing formal models of supervenience relations. However, at the same time it is remarked that the philosophical expectations connected with supervenience may not be met. Owing to the use of supervenience correlations resisting naturalisation that earlier were explained with the notion of emergence, found explanations taking into consideration the current state of knowledge. Despite this positive function – borrowed from philosophy, and not being a scientific product – the notion of supervenience, used among others in meta-ethics or in physicalist definitions of mentality, may prove to be an indirect solution.

The hard core of a theory is understood here as a set of those of its claims, which if contradicted by facts, lead to complete abandoning of the theory (in other cases scientists rather modify theoretical statements of minor importance). I argue therefore that it is an illusion that a set of statements about variation and natural selection is such a hard core of Darwinistic theory. In real practice these statements are compatible with almost all imaginable facts, therefore they have non-empirical character. They are only a camouflage for deeper and more fundamental claims, philosophical ones, and more exactly: materialistic, naturalistic and antireligious ones. In this paper the I analyze a number of citations proving that leading evolutionists, from Darwin onwards, openly accepted this philosophical beliefs which are the true hard core of evolution.

The work is a critique of F. Dyson’s book Imagined Worlds. The author of the book, a well-known American physicist, discusses in it, among others, the future of mankind, considered in a wide range of time: from ten to ten million years. Science dominates in his vision of future. In his opinion it will be the main factor of changes occurring on Earth, and then also beyond it, when people spread in the outer space. I do not like this vision of future, as Dyson treats people merely as biological objects that will be transformed as far as the progress of science will allow. His approach is illustrated by a discussion of three issues that constitute significant motifs of the book: genetic engineering, radiotelepathy and the problem of immortality of human individuals. Foreseeing a great development of natural sciences and of technology Dyson does not expect in future any mental or moral progress in people. For this reason I define his approach to people as dangerous naturalism.

The article is dealing with the problem of scientific realism and its defense in the contemporary philosophy of science. Of the main interest for the analysis are naturalistic attempts proposed recently by Richard Boyd and Stathis Psillos. After having introduced the notion of abduction and the inference to the best explanation Boyd’s and Psillos’s naturalistic argument is presented and analyzed. The analysis tries to show how this argument works in the broader context of the naturalistic epistemology and the naturalistic semantics. The relationship of this argument with the reliable-process theory of justifiedness, proposed by Alvin I. Goldman, and with the causal theory of reference is presented. In the light of these presentations, as well as those of Larry Laudan and Hilary Putnam, the limits of the naturalistic approach to the problem of scientific realism is discussed, the main objections being those of the empirical inadequacy of the premisses of the argument, and the limitations of the pure causal approach to the epistemology.

Mathematics of the first historical civilizations was conspicuously practical. Crucial turn has been initiated by ancient Greeks who chose mathematics (alongside of philosophy) as a way of describing the world. Efficiency of that way gave their mathematics an anti-empirical flavor, in turn of which it became idle soon. The change has come only in modern times, when mathematics has been recognized, without loosing its abstract character, as a „language of Nature”. Since that time mathematics keeps a nice balance between ratio and praxis, and its growing significance for exact and natural sciences seems to be an argument against extremism of either naturalism or idealism.

The aim of the paper is to answer the question of how to understand causality in the account of mental events. In my approach, which is many-dimensional, an event plays a role of a cause in the set of causal circumstances (where a cause is treated physically, not conceptually, and is realized in different causal chains).From my many-dimensional point of view, I propose three groups of definitions for different kinds of determinations: (1) for causal determinations, (2) for causal determinations which are enriched by non-causal ones, and (3) for non-causal determinations.These definitions should be applicable to diferent kinds of systems, including artificial ones, as well as to various philosophical approaches to the mind. My strategy of inquires seems to be similar to Fodor’s taxonomy of research, but in contrary to Fodor, my hierarchy of levels is not only purely structural, but also depends on the place of a given state in the system. My key question is here, whether a description (and explanation) given at the higher level (here: a psychological desciption) is in some way compatible with a description (and explanation) from the lower level (which belongs to neuroscience). My many-dimensional approach, in spite of some objections, should be fruitful because it is able to establish common ground between cognitive scientists and those philosophers who still defend their traditional domains of research and who don’t want to allow for its particularization. In this way I try to defend a theory of the mind against the radical naturalization.

Naturalism that I deal with is an approach towards the world, the man and the possibilities and methods of learning about the world. It maintains that there is an existential continuity of reality and this is a continuity of nature and not of other spheres of existence.A view formulated in this way silently accepts the assumptions of ontological realism and epistemological realism. Hence it becomes part of the ontological paradigm of philosophy. After Kant, that is after mentalistic (transcendentalistic) paradigm in philosophy came into being, the legitimacy of the ontological way of philosophising cannot be maintained. Is then naturalism – that at present experiences another revival – only a misunderstanding? Well, no. The limits of its validity – but not legitimacy – are set by science. Within its area it is obvious and useful, perhaps even indispensable. It is a type of unrealised research attitude by whose virtue a scientist treats the object of his studies as autonomously existing and one that can be objectively cognised. However, here he is supported not by theoretical arguments, but first of all by pragmatic and psychological-social ones.

At first glance naturalism seems to be an integral part of contemporary science. For science there exist only those phenomena which can be examined with scientific methods (an ontological thesis), and any explanation of those phenomena must appeal only to natural causes, i.e. to structures, processes and regularities underlying those phenomena, and not to any supernatural forces (a methodological thesis). If we look at naturalism as a paradigm of doing science, a pattern that determines what and how should be investigated, some limits of this paradigm show itself.When doing experiments, scientists sometimes meet moral prohibitions of treating certain obviously natural objects in certain ways. This fact may be interpreted as a product of social evolution which science is entitled to ignore, for it can change in the process of further evolution, or as an external factor which science should not ignore under the peril of losing social support. None of these interpretation does justice to some basic facts about science (including the fact that social support was never withdrawn regardless of well known cases of immoral scientific practices). The prohibition of treating certain natural objects in certain ways may also be interpreted as a consequence of discovering the moral dimension of nature understood as the essence of things. Yet, the normative dimension of nature cannot be investigated with scientific methods. Thus, for a consistent naturalist it does not exist; and even more − following moral prohibitions could be seen as detrimental for science in cases where morality prohibits applying the most effective scientific methods. It seems however that no scientist defends the reduction of scientific ethics to scientific methodology. In this sense the natureessence of things practically limits naturalism seen as a paradigm of doing science.The paper argues for the above thesis in three steps: (1) various meanings of the terms “nature”, “natural”, and “naturalism” are presented; (2) it is shown in what sense contemporary science is unnatural but naturalistic; (3) a case where science “meets” moral prohibitions concerning natural beings − producing transgenic animals − is discussed. It is then shown that any interpretation of these prohibitions consistent with the naturalistic paradigm cannot be maintained, whereas the interpretation which recognizes the moral dimension of nature-essence does justice to facts and intuitions concerning this case.

For hundreds of years the theory of creationism according to which people were created purposely by omnipotent and omniscient God caring for his creatures were the primary and fundamental idea of Western civilization.According to the contemporary scientific view all creatures appeared on earth as a result of purposeless process of random mutations and natural selection. Only Nature exists, and if we are going to say the same about God, we deny at the same time that He influences the way the world goes in any way. According to Johnson it is this metaphysical naturalism and not the empirical data, that is the main tenet of Darwinism. Johnson claims that that the incompatibility of the naturalistic and biblical stories is fundamental and there is no possibility of any compromise between them.Naturalistic methodology of science limits the kinds of explanation of the world that can be regarded as acceptable. But according to Johnson the lack of any serious alternative methodology is very disadvantageous for contemporary science, which should search for truth and not just for the best naturalistic explanations of the phenomena.

The paper demonstrates the actual in critical rationalism naturalism – antinaturalism opposition. It is aimed at showing diagnoses of the recent discussion and critique of some classical conceptions of this opposition and possible application especially to social sciences philosophy. Current work on consolidation of the disciplinary synthesis of internalist history and philosophy of science as a response to criticisms of logical reconstructivism may take philosophy of science including philosophy of social sciences in new directions.

This article points at some (strictly) mathematical methods, which often tend to display not fully conscious treatment of mathematical reality as given, existing and already-present-there. This attitude is prequisite for mathematical research (including set theory), and not merely a psychological add-on, and the methods can be best described as „platonism as method of enquiry in mathematics” (pl.Metod.) and „platonism as mode of existence of infinity” (pl.Niesk.). Thus, platonism becomes one of the problems internal to mathematics. Identifying pl.Metod. and pl.Niesk. as such, being described here with respect to set theory, is only a starting point in the process of grasping and explaining platonism. This requires phenomenological hermeneutics of mathematics to be conceived (cf. [Z. K.]).

Die moderne Methodologie der Mathematik verbietet in mathematischen Beweisen irgendwelche Berufung auf irgendeine Anschaulichkeit. Kant, der angenommen hat, daß mathematische Urteile synthetische und apriorische Urteile sind, hat in der Konsequenz behauptet, daß in mathematischen Beweisen eine Berufung auf apriorische Anschauungen notwendig ist. Die Kantsche Behauptung stimmte mit der faktischen Lage der Mathematik des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts überein. Damals hat man sich in der Analyse sehr häufig auf geometrische und mechanische Anschaulichkeiten berufen. In diesem Artikel wurde die Hypothese gestellt, daß Kant angenommen hat, daß die mathematischen Urteile synthetische Urteile a priori sind (die Kosequenz dessen war, daß in mathematischen Beweisen eine Berufung auf apriorische Anschauungen notwendig ist), um die faktische Lage der Mathematik des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts theoretisch aufzuklären.

Allgemein sagt man, daß semantische Modelle erst in der Mathematik des XIX Jahrhunderts (Modelle der algebraischen Strukturen, Modelle der nichteuklidischen Geometrien) und die Theorie der Modelle erst im XX Jahrhundert auf (Tarski) aufgetreten sind. Diese Behauptung ist eine Vereinfachung. Man kann beweisen, daß Descartes sich geometrischer und arithmetischer Modelle seiner Algebra schon im XVII Jahrhundert bedient hat. Für Eudoxos’s axiomatische Größenlehre konnte man schon im IV Jahrhundert vor Christi Geburt mathematische Modelle zeigen. Seit dem Anfang der Wissenschaftslehre und der Philosophie der Mathematik (Aristoteles) wurden auch manche Behauptungen aus dem Bereich der Theorie der Modelle ausgedrückt.

L’article se compose de six parties: (L’introduction), 1. La notion de référentiel, 2. Le role de référentiel dans le processus de connaissance, 3. Le référentiel comme le système de référence, 4. La stratégie d’ouverture de référentiel, 5. Les considérations finals.Pour Ferdinand Gonseth, un référentiel est l’ensemble des préalables faute desquels telle ou telle activité systématique ne pourrait avoir lieu. Le référentiel peut s’offrir comme un cadre où cette activité prednra place. Référentiel est le cadre de connaissances par rapport auquel nous jugeons et nous situons le gens, les choses et les événements. Ce cadre ait été acquis dans une culture, dans un enseignement ou sur la base de l’expérience individuelle. Le référentiel n’est ni complètement objectif, ni entiérement subjectif. C’est un mixte sur lequel ce qui est du sujet et ce qui est du monde cherchent à s’accorder. Une mutation de référentiel peut s’accompagner d’un progrès dans l’objectivité du jugement et dans la justesse des comportements.

The status of prions’ attachment to the biotic or abiotic sphere is not established. In consideration of structure prions are infections proteins – in case of animals and human being – constructs from the specifically protein calls PrPc, which PrPSc form is a prion. The prions were indicating also at fungi ([PSI] and [URE]) and yeast ([het-s]). There are big probability occurrences of prions at some another organisms, too.According to cybernetic approach to the life organism, prions positively fulfil conditions: semi-opennesness (half-openness), complexity, hierarchicalness and structure. There are formulates some of doubts about possibility of fulfils by prion conditions of program and cybernetic system. In addition the phenomenon of self-multiplication of prion has not unequivocally estimation.In the formulation of Tibor Gánti’s life system, prion positively realises some requirements: coherent whole, coherent stability, control, and mortality. In my opinion prions negative fulfils condition: metabolism and phenomenon of adjustment. We also not observe at prions: system, which takes information, phenomenon of growth, reproduction, and heredity of changes and evolution. Final inference: it is a lack today some of precise conclusions about biotic or abiotic nature of prions.

1. The incarnation of Christ is the deep root, the sound foundation and the ultimate apex of Christian humanism. God was made man. In the fact of the Incarnation is the supreme and universal reason for new humanity, for what humanity is, what humanity wants to be in its noblest wishes and what it will be. The single truth about man revealed by Jesus Christ, ‘the way, the truth and the life’ (Jn 14:6), and the ‘eldest – born among many brethren’ (Rm 8:29) – makes the dignity of the human being, created in the image and likeness of God (por. Gen 1:26), shine forth in its fullness.2. The Holy Father John Paul II, often recognised as Defensor hominis, has appreciated and developed in a forceful way the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas in the spirit of Vatican Council II (OT 16, GE 10). He himself gave the Angelic Doctor the new title of Doctor Humanitatis, a title added to Doctor Divinitatis and Doctor Communis Ecclesiae. As a philosopher of the person, the Pope had already drawn up his philosophical approach which was deeply rooted in Thomistic metaphisics and anthropology, from which arises the need for ethics and aesthetics. In the encyclical letter Fides et Ratio (43-45), the perennial newness of the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas is offered at the dawn of the third millennium as a proven path of Catholic philosophy and theology.3. St. Thomas Aquinas demonstrated humanism to us as a philosopher and even more as a theologian; as a man, as a Christian, and as a religious. The concept of the ‘person’ in Thomistic doctrine reflected one of the fundamental new features of Christian thought. In addition, by specifying the relations that exist between philosophy and teology, St. Thomas also provided the principle for the solution to the problem of Christian humanism. Basing the mystery of man in the actus essendi, and recognising his natural capacity to know truth, he embraced the mystery of integral humanity in its opening to transcendence and the absolute, in its theological being, capax Dei.4. At the dawn of the third millennium the need urgently presents itself for the promotion of genuine Thomism, open to dialogue with the world and able to engage in a discussion with today’s various philosophical currents; a Thomism that in its recta ratio is directly nourished by the gospel spirit of the Holy Angelic Doctor. The spirit of Thomistic balance should be promoted, on a pilgrimage amongst the peoples of the earth and participating in the new evangelisation.