Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:

Displaying: 1-11 of 11 documents

news and notes
1. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
2. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
Julie Cook The Philosophical Colonization of Ecofeminism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
There is general agreement among ecofeminists regarding the desirability of a variety of expressions of ecofeminism, but this pluralism is under threat with the emergence of an approach that emphasizes the primacy of a philosophical ecofeminism which claims the authority to prescribe what ecofeminism should be. The recent anthology Ecological Feminism is symptomatic of this trend, with contributors who affirm the philosophical significance of ecological feminism by privileging philosophers’ voices over those of other ecofeminists, rather than by engaging in critical dialogue with, and exploring connections between, different ecofeminist discourses. This colonizing strategy actively excludes many women’s voices from the creation of an environmental ethic, including those of activist, spiritual, and “Third World” ecofeminists, but fails to offer any adequate philosophical grounds for doing so.
3. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
Chris Crittenden Subordinate and Oppressive Conceptual Frameworks: A Defense of Ecofeminist Perspectives
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this essay, I first demonstrate that Beth Dixon’s central arguments challenging Karen Warren’s “logic of domination” do not succeed. Second, I argue that the logic of domination not only connects the oppression of women and animals—a possibility that Dixon disputes—but it in fact plays a significant role in connecting these oppressions, and many others besides, in its capacity as a component of a larger oppressive conceptual framework. My negative arguments against Dixon provide a foundation for the positive arguments in the second half of the paper, wherein, in contravention of her project, I establish that humans and animals clearly share emotions in a philosophically interesting sense, that this affective similarity allows us to draw conclusions about the oppression of animals from situations oppressive to humans, and, the main thesis, that the suffering of women, animals, and other oppressed groups is the symptom of a ubiquitous mindset morally untenable, psychologically dysfunctional, and characterized by an ideology of superior/inferior-dominator/dominated thinking.
discussion papers
4. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
Jim Cheney Universal Consideration: An Epistemological Map of the Terrain
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
I offer an epistemologically grounded revisioning of Tom Birch’s ethical principle of universal consideration, suggesting that epistemologies have ethical dimensions and hence that universal moral consideration is intrinsic to the epistemological enterprise. I contrast epistemologies of domination with epistemologies in part constituted by the generosity of spirit that is the hallmark of Birch’s notion of universal consideration.
5. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
Anthony Weston Universal Consideration as an Originary Practice
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Tom Birch has decisively transformed the so-called “considerability” question by arguing that all things must be “considerable” from the start in “the root sense” if we are to determine what further kinds of value they may have. Spelling out this kind of “root” or “deep” consideration proves to be difficult, however, especially in light of post-Kantian conceptions of mind. Such consideration may also ask of the world too ready a kind of self-revelation. This paper proposes another, complementary version of universal consideration: as a kind of practical invitation, as a way of creating the space within which a response can emerge or an exchange coevolve. I conclude by locating this vision within a picture of ethics as a whole that brings what I call its “originary” stage, rather than its formal stage, into focus.
6. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
Stan Godlovitch Things Change: So Whither Sustainability?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Two broad metaphysical perspectives deriving from Parmenides and Heraclitus have implications for our notion of sustainability. The Parmenidian defends a deepseated orderliness and permanence in things, while the Heraclitian finds only chance and change. Two further outlooks, the nomic (or the big-picture scientific) and the prudential, present differing accounts of our place in the world. While the nomic outlook accepts nothing privileged about the human perspective or even life itself, the prudential outlook is obviously welfare-centered. It is argued that nomic views, whether Parmenidian or Heraclitian, fail to provide any rationale for sustainability measures or concerns. The only such rationale comes from Parmenidian prudentialism, which, I argue, can operate only if it disowns at its peril the nomic point of view and couches sustainability entirely under the rubric of maximizing certain preferred opportunities drawn from collective self-love. But doing so merely evades rather than answers the tension imposed by the nomic Heraclitian for whom nothing lasts and nothing human counts specially in the measure. The liabilities of Parmenidian prudentialism are examined and found to be too great for any consistent notion of sustainability to bear.
7. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
Claudia Drucker Hanna Arendt on the Need for a Public Debate on Science
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
I discuss Arendt’s claim that science and its uses should become a matter of political discussion. The suggestion that science can be discussed and monitored by lay people is based on her interpretation of modern science. Modern science results from a flight from the human condition, which in her view should be reversed by means of the public debate. I conclude that Arendt’s political approach should in fact be called a moral approach. Arendt’s arguments can be reduced to a traditional humanistic critique of science, interpreted as a version of Kant’s antinomy between the cognitive and the moral interests of reason, according to which scientists must be prevented from treating human beings as a natural species like any other.
8. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
Alan McQuillan Passion and Instrumentality
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Although J. Baird Callicott and Bryan G. Norton define the word intrinsic quite differently, both are against any “essentialist” position which posits “an objectivist theory of value in nature.” Viewed in this context, their differences emerge in terms of instrumentality and anthropocentrism. While a nonanthropocentrist position is tenable, it cannot be divorced from the centrality of human passion and desire. From the Humean perspective, assumed by both authors, however, desire does not reduce to instrumental value alone. As a result, Callicott’s position emerges as the stronger argument: that the moral consideration of nature requires more than instrumental value, no matter how broadly instrumentality is construed.
book reviews
9. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
Eldon Kenworthy A Conservation Assessment of the Terrestrial Ecoregions of Latin America and the Caribbean
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
10. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
Pete A. Y. Gunter Les philosophies de l’environnement
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
11. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
Annie Booth Earthly Goods, Environmental Change, and Social Justice
view |  rights & permissions | cited by