Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:

Displaying: 1-10 of 10 documents

news and notes
1. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 2 > Issue: 4
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
from the editor and publishers:
2. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 2 > Issue: 4
Looking Ahead
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
3. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 2 > Issue: 4
L. Duane Willard On Preserving Nature’s Aesthetic Features
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
I consider and reject four possible arguments directed against the preservation of natural aesthetic conditions. (1) Beauty is not out there in nature, but is “in the eye ofthe beholder.” I argue that since ingredients ofnature cause aesthetic experiences, we cannot justifiably disregard and exploit nature. Preservation of aesthetic conditions is compatible with both objective and nonobjective theories of aesthetic value. (2) Frequent aesthetic disagreements bring about irresolvable disputes concerning which segments of nature to preserve. I claim that these disputes are not irresolvable. Not all disputes about nature’s aesthetic values are purely aesthetic disputes: ecological balance, community identity, historic continuity, and economics are relevant; aesthetic experts can help; and such disputes can be put to a vote. (3) Natural beauty is not important compared to nonaesthetic values of nature. I show that this is questionable. Current awareness of environmental problems includes a rapidly growing concern for natural aesthetics. Moreover, even if majority preference is for nonaesthetic uses of nature, this does not settle the question of whether we ought to preserve nature’s attractive features. (4) From neither a utilitarian nor a deontological viewpoint do we have an obligation to preserve natural aesthetic conditions for future generations. I argue that even if we do not have a strict obligation, it does not follow that it makes no moral difference whether we preserve. Not yet existing people may have no rights against us, but this does not mean that we do no wrong in polluting and destroying aesthetic conditions of the natural world in which future people will live.
4. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 2 > Issue: 4
J. Baird Callicott Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The ethical foundations of the “animal liberation” movement are compared with those of Aldo Leopold’s “land ethic,” which is taken as the paradigm for environmental ethics in general. Notwithstanding certain superficial similarities, more profound practical and theoretical differences are exposed. While only sentient animals are moraIly considerable according to the humane ethic, the land ethic includes within its purview plants as weIl as animals and even soils and waters. Nor does the land ethic prohibit the hunting, killing, and eating ofcertain animal species, in sharp contrast to the humane ethic. The humane ethic rests upon Benthamic foundations: pain is taken to be the ultimate evil and it is reductive or atomistic in its moral focus. The land ethic, on the other hand, is holistic in the sense that theintegrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community is its summum bonum. A classical antecedent of some of the formal characteristics of the land ethic is found in Plato’s moral philosophy. Special consideration is given to the differing moral status of domestic and wild animals in the humane and land ethics and to the question of moral vegetarianism.
discussion papers
5. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 2 > Issue: 4
Gene Spitler Sensible Environmental Principles for the Future
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The attitudes of the American public toward the environmental movement may be undergoing change as the economic crunch continues and energy shortages reoccur. The principles underlying the environmental movement need to be defined and examined carefully to determine what makes sense for our changing conditions. In this paper an attempt is made to express the two primary ethical principles which have evolved from environmental thinking and, in turn, have influenced the directions taken by the movement. It is argued that these principles must not be accepted uncritically, but rather must be analyzed and subsequently modified to become compatible with more traditional ethical thinking. Such a synthesis is attempted in the paper. The modified principles can provide valuable guidance as we make difficult decisions which can influence the future path of life on Earth.
6. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 2 > Issue: 4
Charles Y. Deknatel Questions about Environmental Ethics? Toward a Research Agenda with a Focus on Public Policy
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Despite common elements and antecedents of environmental ethics, their implied application to related policy or action is not always clear. This paper attempts to develop a set of questions and a preliminary framework for considering some of the issues raised by environmental ethics as they might appear in public policy.
7. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 2 > Issue: 4
Tom Regan On the Connection Between Environmental Science and Environmental Ethics
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
I critically assess Don Marietta’s thesis that obligations are not dictates of reason but rather are imbedded in a person’s “world view.” The notion of “a view of the world” is both vague and leads to consequences common to all forms of subjectivism in ethics, since world views can and sometimes do vary from person to person. Marietta cannot avoid these consequences by arguing that some views of the world are “more reasonable” than others, since counting rationality as an appropriate basis for choosing between world views is itself to favor a particular view of the world. Neither then can Marietta consistently argue for the preferability of a world view which grounds our obligations regarding the ecosystem in environnlental science. Given his general position, this can only tell us what he prefers, not whatis preferable.
8. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 2 > Issue: 4
Don E. Marietta, Jr. World Views and Moral Decisions: A Reply to Tom Regan
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Tom Regan (this issue) criticizes my thesis that obligation toward the environment is grounded in a world view and thereby has a moral overridingness which mere interests and desires do not have. He holds that my approach is too subjectivistic. I counter, first, by explaining that phenomenology, which I use in my analysis of moral obligation, is not subjectivistic in the way emotivism or prescriptivism inethics is subjectivistic. Second, I argue that world views are products of learning and experience of one shared world, that most world views share large areas of agreement, and that they can be argued for and criticized.
book reviews
9. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 2 > Issue: 4
Leslie Pickering Francis Ethics and Problems of the 21st Century
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
10. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 2 > Issue: 4
view |  rights & permissions | cited by