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The Journal of Philosophy:
Volume >
118 >
Issue: 8
Andrew M. Bailey, Peter van Elswyk
Generic Animalism
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The animalist says we are animals. This thesis is commonly understood as the universal generalization that all human persons are human animals. This article proposes an alternative: the thesis is a generic that admits of exceptions. We defend the resulting view, which we call ‘generic animalism’, and show its aptitude for diagnosing the limits of eight case-based objections to animalism.
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The Journal of Philosophy:
Volume >
118 >
Issue: 8
A. C. Paseau
Propositionalism
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Propositionalism is the claim that all logical relations can be captured by propositional logic. It is usually regarded as obviously false, because propositional logic seems too weak to capture the rich logical structure of language. I show that there is a clear sense in which propositional logic can match first-order logic, by producing formalizations that (i) are valid iff their first-order counterparts are, and (ii) also respect grammatical form as the propositionalist construes it. I explain the real reason propositionalism fails, which is more subtle and more interesting.
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