In this paper I criticize what many economists recommend: namely, that land use regulations should simulate what markets would do were all resources fully owned and freely exchanged. I argue that this “efficiency” approach, even if balanced with equity considerations, will result in commercial sprawl, an environment that consumers pay for, but one that appalls ethical judgment and aesthetic taste. I showthat economic strategies intended to avoid this result are inadequate, and conclude that ethical and aesthetic as well as economic principles are needed to guide policies governing the use of land.

Courts and legal commentators have been notoriously unsuccessful in articulating a rule to differentiate between uncompensated police power regulations of land by govemment and situations in which the govemment can only interfere with property rights if it provides compensation to those owners who suffer losses. Noticeably absent from most discussions of this “takings” issue is any foundational underpinning in a theory of justice with respect to property holdings. Can two of the most influential contemporary theories ofjustice-that of John Rawls and Robert Nozick -provide such needed support for the analysis of the “takings” issue? By employing the vehicle of three hypothetical exampIes I investigate this question and reach some conclusions conceming the applicability of such abstract theories of justice to the real world.

The voice of Orpheus symbolizes the everlasting importance of music and poetry in the animus of man. According to the ancient legend, Orpheus by his very gift of music tills the radical sense of enjoyment in us all and enables entire nature to dance in delight. Music resonates the most primordial and invariant mood of man in his harmony with the universe (uni-verse) from time immemorial. On the basis of the image of “roundness” derived from the auditory model of space, an “ecotopia” or a new orientation of ecological ethics is projected. By affirming man as the responsible caretaker of the Earth, it rejects both speciesism and individualism -the antitheses of social principle.

If it is immoral to raise animals for the purpose of eating during a period of food scarcity because the process of changing grain protein to animal protein is wasteful, then it is surely immoral to waste animal protein which was not raised for the purpose of eating, but which could nevertheless be eaten during periods of food scarcity. Therefore, it is immoral not to eat human carrion during periods of food scarcity.

In formulating the concept of a “land ethic,” Aldo Leopold suggested that true conservation would begin when we enlarged our sense of community to include other organisms besides human beings. This cannot be done, I argue, until we begin viewing other beings in nature as worthy of existence on their own terms, rather than simply as means to human ends. I use Martin Buber’s philosophy of dialogue,as expounded in I and Thou, to shed light on the spiritual roots of our environmental crisis and show how we can appreciate beings in nature if we encounter them as persons rather than things. Applying Buber’s concepts to the experiences of backpackers suggests that wildemess travel can help individuals develop habits of mind conducive to I-You relations, thereby enhancing our life with other people as well as with our natural environment.

I present the foundational structure for a life-centered theory of environmental ethics. The structure consists of three interrelated components. First is the adopting of a certain ultimate moral attitude toward nature, which I call “respect for nature.” Second is a belief system that constitutes a way of conceiving of the natural world and of our place in it. This belief system underlies and supports the attitude in a way that makes it an appropriate attitude to take toward the Earth’s natural ecosystems and their life communities. Third is a system of moral rules and standards for guiding our treatment of those ecosystems and life communities, a set of normative principles which give concrete embodiment or expression to the attitude of respect for nature. The theory set forth and defended here is, I hold, structurally symmetrical with a theory of human ethics based on the principle of respect for persons.

Philosophers and ecologists have proposed that ecological principles such as cooperation and ecosystern stability serve as a basis for environmental ethics. Requisite to understanding whether a cooperation based environmental ethic can be taken as an unqualified good is knowledge of the role of cooperation in the context of other interactions between species (e.g., cornpetition), and the significance of such interactions to ecosystem stability. Further, since the key ecological concept of stability has been ambiguously defined, the various definitions need to be understood so that use of scientific information in philosophical discussion is accurate and consistent.