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presidential address
1. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 75
James F. Ross Together with the Body I Love
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Philosophical difficulties with Augustine’s dualism, and with the scholastic “separated souls” account of the gap between personal death and supernatural resurrection, suggest that we consider two other options, each with its own attractions: (i) that the General Resurrection is immediate upon one’s death, despite initial awkwardness with common piety, and (ii) that there is a “natural metamorphosis” of bodily continuity after death and before resurrection.
presentation of the aquinas medal
2. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 75
Dominic J. Balestra Presentation of the Aquinas Medal
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aquinas medalist's address
3. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 75
Richard J. Blackwell The Human Genome and the Mind-Body Problem
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plenary sessions
4. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 75
Edwin M. Curley The Immortality of the Soul in Descartes and Spinoza
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In this paper, I examine the thought of Descartes and Spinoza regarding the immortality of the soul. I conclude that Descartes’s argument(s) for the immortality of the soul—or at least the argument(s) that one can construct based on Descartes’s texts—are disappointing, and that Spinoza’s thought on the soul and its relation to the body leaves little room for the traditional doctrine of personal immortality.
5. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 75
Marilyn McCord Adams Ockham on the Soul: Elusive Proof, Dialectical Persuasions
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In this paper, I argue that Ockham’s seemingly pessimistic epistemological assessments of what we can know about the human soul and its relation to the body reflect a sound appreciation of what is involved in the theoretical development of philosophy and natural science. In order to make my argument, I first undermine the idea that demonstration was a norm that scholastic disputation regularly expected to achieve; and second, I examine Ockham’s treatment of three major topics in psychology (thus illustrating how alternative intellectual standards were in play in scholastic disputation).
6. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 75
Alfred J. Freddoso Good News, Your Soul Hasn’t Died Quite Yet
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In this paper, I observe that Hobbesian physicalism on the one side, and Cartesian dualism on the other, have had a widespread cultural influence on the way we regard ourselves and on the way we behave toward one another. I argue that what we now need is a conceptual space within which we might forge a metaphysical alternative, an alternative that will give us some hope of overcoming the deleterious intellectual, moral, and social consequences of both physicalism and dualism.
session 1
7. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 75
Mark Amorose Aristotle’s Immortal Intellect
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Recent scholarship understands Aristotle to hold that the human intellect is in part corruptible and in part immortal. The main textual support claimed for this understanding is De Anima III.5, where Aristotle, it is said, presents his doctrine of an immortal active intellect and a mortal passive intellect. In this paper I show that Aristotle distinguishes at III.5 not an active and a passive intellect, but an agent and a potential intellect, both immortal. I further show that the mortal passive intellect mentioned at the end of III.5 is an analogous use of the term intellect, and refers to imagination, the act of a corruptible bodily organ, here called intellect only because it supplies the images from which intellect abstracts concepts.
8. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 75
Carl N. Still Do We Know All after Death? Thomas Aquinas on the Disembodied Soul’s Knowledge
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This paper examines Aquinas’s epistemological treatment of the disembodied soul in order to reveal (1) its relationship to the person it once was, and (2) the nature and extent of its self-knowledge. I argue first that disembodiment entails not only loss of personhood, but severe restriction of one’s concept of self. Consequently, individual self-consciousness is minimized. By contrast, I argue that the soul’s knowledge of its nature is likely to be realized more perfectly in the separated state, not so much because of freedom from the body as the infusion of pure intelligibles. Thus, the roles of these two types of self-knowledge (particular and universal) are reversed from the case of the embodied soul, where self-consciousness is an effortless concomitant to thought and self-knowledge requires a painstaking labor. I conclude by wondering whether the cognition enjoyed in the separated state has some utility for the soul’s future, re-embodied existence.
session 2
9. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 75
Bernardo J. Cantens A Solution to the Problem of Personal Identity in the Metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas
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This paper presents a solution to the problem of personal identity over time in Thomas’s metaphysics. I argue that Professor Gracia’s solution to the problem of personal identity, existence, and Professor Stump’s solution, form or the human soul, are not only compatible but also necessarily interdependent on one another. This argument rests on (1) the special nature of the human soul, and (2) the metaphysical claim that for Thomas the human soul and existence are inseparable. First, I refine the problem of personal identity and briefly clarify some important distinctions. Second, I present Gracia’s arguments for the principle of existence (esse) being the criterion of personal identity over time in Thomas’s metaphysics. Third, I explain Stump’s arguments for form being the principle of personal identity over time in Thomas’s metaphysics, and show how Stump’s solution can answer some of the objections that Gracia presents. Finally, I argue that, according to Thomas, the soul of an individual human person and that person’s existence embrace one another with the strength of self-identity, and that it is correct and not inconsistent to say that both the human soul and existence are the cause and principle of personal identity over time in the metaphysics of Thomas.
10. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 75
Silas Langley Aquinas, Resurrection, and Material Continuity
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Aquinas’s understanding of bodily resurrection can take two different directions. Either continuity of the soul alone is sufficient to reconstitute the same body as the pre-mortem body at the resurrection, or continuity of the matter of the pre-mortem body is also required. After arguing that Aquinas’s account of personal identity over time requires sameness of soul and sameness of body, I suggest that Aquinas’s two possible views on bodily resurrection are consistent with this account of personal identity and are both plausible views for Aquinas to take. I then defend the possibility of the view that requires material continuity against certain objections which come from within Aquinas’s own philosophies of form, matter, and the elements. But the result is that Aquinas cannot consistently hold that material continuity hinges on the preservation of numerically the same material elements as the pre-mortem body.
session 3
11. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 75
Mark Van Hollebeke To Thine Own Self Be True: Tensions in Bernard Lonergan’s Conception of Self-Appropriation
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This paper explores the centrality of self-affirmation in Bernard Lonergan’s Insight and is specifically concerned with the role of bias in relation to self-appropriation and genuineness. I begin with an explication of the process of self-affirmation and the model of knowledge it involves. I then discuss the nature of bias and its relation to genuineness in Insight. My analysis concludes that bias is never “overcome,” in the sense of being eliminated. Thus, genuine self-appropriation is never complete. Rather, being true to oneself is the struggle to recognize one’s biases while still affirming what is reasonable and choosing responsible action. I also conclude that total resistance to self-affirmation is a disingenuous refusal to engage one’s biases; it is an act of evasion, or a fear of genuineness and its accompanying responsibilities. I end by briefly addressing some of these tensions in relation to Catholicism, specifically raising questions concerning our thinking and acting from within a Catholic faith.
12. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 75
Gregory B. Sadler Blondel’s Conception of the Option between Egoism and Charity and Its Consequences for Intellectual Life and Culture
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In Maurice Blondel’s work, the problem of immortality is dealt with in terms of one’s resolution of the problem of human destiny articulated in the form of a self-determinative option. Although this option can take many determinate forms, it is ultimately one between egoism and selfishness or mortification and charity. In the course of this paper, I outline this opposition and indicate in particular how it bears on intellectual life and culture. For Blondel, the theoretical and the practical could not be neatly separated; thinking and expression are forms of action, and action requires structuring for its intelligibility and fruition. One commits oneself and forms the elements of one’s ultimate judgment, not only by what one does, but also by what one says or thinks, what doctrines and institutions one commits oneself to.
session 4
13. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 75
Daniel Collins-Cavanaugh The Augustinian Impact on the History of Time
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In Being and Time, Heidegger claims that the history of the concept of time bears an Aristotelian stamp. In this paper, I dispute that claim. Instead, I argue that the history of the concept of time is primarily Augustinian. To support this claim, I demonstrate that Augustine’s theory of time is a quantitative theory of time, while Aristotle’s theory of time is a qualitative theory of time. Since most theories of time in the tradition are quantitative, it seems unlikely that they derived any significant influence from Aristotle’s theory, as Heidegger claims. But there are significant parallels to Augustine’s theory. This is true for both of the major theories of time: those found in Classical Mechanics and those found in Kant. I close with some speculation as to why Heidegger makes the claim he does concerning the history of the concept of time.
14. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 75
John F. Crosby Is All Evil Really Only Privation?
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It is proposed to test the privation theory of evil by examining three kinds of evil: (1) the evil of the complete destruction of some good (as distinct from the wounding of that good); (2) the evil of physical pain; and (3) certain forms of moral evil in which the evildoer is hostile to some good. It is shown that in none of these cases does evil seem to fit the privation scheme, and that in the second and third case evil seems to be in some way “more” than privation. In conclusion it is argued that to entertain such doubts about the privation theory has nothing to do with restoring a Manichean view of evil. In fact, one can entertain these doubts and still affirm that evil is parasitic on good.
session 5
15. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 75
Michael Winter An Axiomatic Approach to Aristotle’s Ethics
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More attention has been paid in recent years to the relationship between Aristotle’s science and his ethics, but little effort has been directed toward constructing a concrete model of a science of Aristotle’s ethics. I offer a proposal about how we might go about constructing a science of Aristotle’s ethics. I argue that constructing an axiomatic model for a portion of Aristotle’s ethics is not only possible, but helpful in making explicit relationships among concepts at the core of Aristotle’s theory. The model of an axiomatic approach to Aristotle’s ethics, which I propose in this paper, is only a small first step in constructing a full-blown science of Aristotle’s ethics, but taking this first step goes a long way toward showing that this project is promising.
16. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 75
W. Matthews Grant Aquinas among Libertarians and Compatibilists: Breaking the Logic of Theological Determinism
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Aquinas teaches that human acts are caused by God. Assuming that such causation entails theological determinism, philosophers with libertarian intuitions tend either to read around Aquinas’s teaching on the relation of divine causality and human action, or to reject that teaching altogether. Unfortunately, the arguments most often used by Aquinas and his contemporary defenders to show that his teaching is compatible with human freedom fail to address thelibertarian’s main concerns. In part one of this essay, I consider these arguments and show why they fail. In part two, I attempt to address the libertarian’s concerns more directly by arguing that Aquinas should not be thought of as a theological determinist. I will show that theological determinism presupposes acertain logic or explanatory scheme, which Aquinas’s understanding of God, and in particular of divine simplicity, will not accommodate. Hence, the kinds ofinferences needed to make theological determinism intelligible do not apply in Aquinas’s case.
session 6
17. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 75
Christopher M. Brown Aquinas on the Individuation of Non-Living Substances
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One important part of Aquinas’s theory of the nature of corruptible corporeal substances is his account of the individuation of such entities. In this paper, I examine an aspect of Aquinas’s account of individuation that has not received as much attention as some others, namely, how Aquinas applies his account of individuation specifically to cases involving non-living corporeal substances. I first offer an interpretation of a key passage in Aquinas’s corpus where he explains his theory of individuation. Second, I examine a text where Aquinas applies his account of individuation to a case involving non-living substances. Finally, I raise a possible objection to what Aquinas says about the individuation of non-living substances and in answering the objection suggest that Aquinas holds the view that non-living substances enjoy a less perfect mode of individuality when compared to living substances.
18. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 75
John White Max Scheler’s Tripartite Anthropology
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A central but somewhat obscure concept in Scheler’s philosophy is that of person. I suggest that one aid to understanding Scheler’s notion of person is interpreting it in terms of what I call a tripartite anthropology. This term is meant to suggest that the human being can be conceived as comprising three distinct though characteristically cooperating sources of conscious activity. Once we understand Scheler’s anthropology in these terms, his concept of person becomes clearer. In this paper, I develop the notion of a tripartite anthropology, including some discussion of its roots in the tradition. Second, I offer an overview of Scheler’s own anthropology, offering some account of the three-fold sources of activity in the human being and how they function together. Finally, I discuss Scheler’s anthropology in comparison to a section of Aquinas’s On Spiritual Creatures. I show that Scheler is not as far from Aquinas as it might seem and can actually help us to understand Aquinas’s intentions.
session 7
19. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 75
Justin Skirry A Hylomorphic Interpretation of Descartes’s Theory of Mind-Body Union
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I contend that Descartes’s view of mind-body union is not a Platonic view in which the soul uses the body as its vehicle, but hylomorphic in that mind and body form a single unit. I argue that Descartes’s view is most like Ockham’s, and therefore Descartes is entitled to maintain a hylomorphic theory to the same extent that Ockham is. I argue further that the soul is the substantial form of human being, and that mind and body are incomplete substances that are substantially united to form the human substance. Finally, I address Descartes’s claim that the whole soul has its principle seat in the pineal gland, and conclude that this does not imply a Platonic view as one might suspect. This hylomorphic interpretation avoids the problem of mind-body interaction, which might be seen as preventing the possibility of the soul’s immortality, because an explanation of the behavior of one entity is required instead of an explanation of the interaction between two, apparently incompatible, entities.
20. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 75
Gordon Barnes Should Property-Dualists Be Substance-Hylomorphists?
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In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in property dualism—the view that some mental properties are neither identical with, nor strongly supervenient on, physical properties. One of the principal objections to this view is that, according to natural science, the physical world is a causally closed system. So if mental properties are really distinct from physical properties, then it would seem that mental properties never really cause anything that happens in the physical world. Thus, dualism threatens to lead inexorably to epiphenomenalism. In this paper, I will argue that the only way for a property dualist to avoid epiphenomenalism is to deny that the human body is strictly identical with the sum of its microphysical parts. I will go on to argue that the only way to sustain such anti-reductionism about the human body is to embrace some sort of substance-hylomorphism.