introduction |
1.
|
Quaestiones Disputatae:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 2
Joseph Almeida, Sarah Klitenic Wear
Ancient and Medieval Interpretations of Aristotle’s Categories
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
prolegomena to the study of aristotle’s categories |
2.
|
Quaestiones Disputatae:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 2
Lloyd P. Gerson
The Aristotelian Commentaries and Platonism
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
ancient commentary |
3.
|
Quaestiones Disputatae:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 2
Michael Griffin
What is an aisthêton? “Ordinary things” among the Neoplatonist commentators on the Categories
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
4.
|
Quaestiones Disputatae:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 2
Charlene Elsby
Plotinus on the Reality of the Category of Relation
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
5.
|
Quaestiones Disputatae:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 2
Sarah Klitenic Wear
Syrianus the Platonist on Aristotle’s Categories 8a13–b24: The Ontological Place of Skhesis in Later Platonic Metaphysics
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
6.
|
Quaestiones Disputatae:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 2
Joseph Almeida
Simplicius on Categories 1a16–17 and 1b25–27: An Examination of the Interests of Ancient and Modern Commentary on the Categories
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
7.
|
Quaestiones Disputatae:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 2
Gary Gabor
The Justification and Derivation of Aristotle’s Categories in Ammonius and Simplicius
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
medieval commentary |
8.
|
Quaestiones Disputatae:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 2
Lloyd A. Newton
Platonic Elements in Albert the Great’s Commentary on the Categories
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
9.
|
Quaestiones Disputatae:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 2
Gregory T. Doolan
Aquinas on the Metaphysician’s vs. the Logician’s Categories
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
10.
|
Quaestiones Disputatae:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 2
Mark Roberts
The Second Sense of Being
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
11.
|
Quaestiones Disputatae:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 2
Mark Gossiaux
James of Viterbo on the Nature and Division of the Categories
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
12.
|
Quaestiones Disputatae:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 2
Andrew LaZella
The Simplicity of Being in Duns Scotus’s Quaestiones Super Praedicamenta Aristotelis and Later Works
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
introduction |
13.
|
Quaestiones Disputatae:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 1
Sarah Borden Sharkey
Introduction to The Legacy of Edith Stein’s Finite and Eternal Being
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
articles |
14.
|
Quaestiones Disputatae:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 1
William Tullius
Faith, Reason, and the Place of ‘Christian Philosophy’ in Edith Stein
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
Paul Ricoeur claims that the tradition of philosophy is Greek by birth and, as such, encounters the Hebrew and the Christian always as an ‘other.’ The contemporary philosopher approaching issues of faith in the Judeo-Christian tradition, true to his or her Greek philosophical origins, can only approach the content of faith and the experience of the believer in a neutralized form and not in the mode of positive belief, rendering the idea of an explicitly ‘Christian philosophy’ impossible. In contrast, the philosopher Edith Stein argues for a strikingly different conclusion. Faith, entering into the framework of philosophical discussion, does not require a neutralization but stands as an authentic source of knowledge and phenomenological experience of God without which philosophy remains fundamentally impoverished on a variety of fronts. ‘Christian philosophy,’ for Stein, is not only a possibility, but is a philosophical necessity for the ultimate success of the philosophical project as a whole. This paper explores the nature of Christian philosophy, as articulated by Stein in Finite and Eternal Being and her essay, “Ways to Know God,” in its relation to Greek thought; in particular, the way in which philosophy is naturally dependent upon faith, and the way in which faith forms the positive basis for a fulfilled intention of God that can be worked into philosophical analysis without violating the nature of philosophy.
|
|
|
15.
|
Quaestiones Disputatae:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 1
Karl Schudt
Edith Stein, Apophatic Theology, and Freedom
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
In Finite and Eternal Being, Edith Stein attempts an ascent to the fullest understanding of being. She starts with the personal being of the I and rises to the uncreated divine being, which is the formal, efficient, and exemplary cause of all that is. This divine being is also simple, and in this divine simplicity Stein pauses, remarking that one cannot properly make judgments about God since the very form of the judgment implies composition. God is, in the end, knowable only through what he is not—using the apophatic way of negation. God reveals himself as a person, and one who has created humans in his image and likeness. I will show the unique way in which Stein describes this image relationship: the ultimately unknowable individual being or haeccitas of each human person is a mirror of the unknowable being of God. Unknowability becomes, paradoxically, a way to know.
|
|
|
16.
|
Quaestiones Disputatae:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 1
Glenn Chicoine
Present Potential in Edith Stein’s Finite and Eternal Being, Chapter Two
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
This paper follows the analysis from self to God in chapter two of Edith Stein’s Finite and Eternal Being. It proposes and brings further to light the role she implies therein for the ‘real potential’ of the present moment and thereby uncovers key aspects of her analysis. The key aspects of Stein’s analysis, which elucidate the ‘real potential’ of the present moment, are (a) the potential attributable to the immediate self, (b) the potential in the world, or creaturely potential, which includes the potential attributable to the self-in-the-world, and (c) the pure potential that enables an ego-pole over against a world to exist whatsoever. This last potential correlates with “absolute being” in Stein’s sense, which includes essential being, and ultimately bridges temporality and Eternal Being. As Stein’s exposition suggests, only Divine Pure Act can actualize pure potential for there at all to be a self and world.
|
|
|
17.
|
Quaestiones Disputatae:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 1
Sarah Borden Sharkey
Eternal Rest: The Beauty and Challenge of Essential Being
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
Stein develops a tri-partite account of being, distinguishing three types of being: actual being, mental being, and essential being. The third—essential being—is particularly significant for Stein’s project of bringing together phenomenology and medieval metaphysics; it provides a response to a weakness Stein sees in the classic account of potency; it accounts for the deep intelligibility of all that is; and it plays a role in Stein’s understanding of artistic truth. In this piece, I lay out Stein’s understanding of essential being and a few of the reasons she posits this notion of being. I then contrast her account of essential being with at least one interpretation (a ‘thin-essence’ existential reading) of Thomas Aquinas on essence. Although Stein’s account of essential being offers many advantages and answers certain difficult questions, I end with challenges that her view faces, including what I see as a problematic reliance on an overly spatial metaphor for being.
|
|
|
18.
|
Quaestiones Disputatae:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 1
Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray
The Wesen of Things, According to Reinach
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
In Edith Stein’s pinnacle work Finite and Eternal Being, she describes in a footnote that the act of bracketing (reduction) that Husserl committed to starting in Ideas—an act that separates fact from nature where only the aspect of essential being is considered—was the philosophic knife that severed phenomenology into idealist and realist factions. In opposition to Husserl’s approach, she writes, Adolf Reinach, Alexander Pfänder, Jean Hering, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, and others were instead “guided by the full meaning of the term nature, [and] became ever more confirmed in their realistic ways.” In this paper, I will describe what this full meaning of wesen is held by some of Husserl’s contemporaries and students and what it entails, specifically looking to how Reinach conceived it. This will include a discussion of phenomenological method, his views on the a priori, essences, and the laws that govern them, as well as an investigation into why Reinach felt reductions were dangerous and unnecessary for the intuition of essences and essential being.
|
|
|
19.
|
Quaestiones Disputatae:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 1
David M. Cudnik
How did Homer know Achilles? The Artist as Friend and Parent in Edith Stein’s Finite and Eternal Being
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
A central distinction which guides Edith Stein’s aesthetics is the distinction between Urbild, or pure form, which is the source of artistic inspiration and Abbild, which is the completed work of art whose source is the Urbild. The exemplary work of art is one which is a clear communication of the Urbild that it copies. The work of art therefore springs from the artist’s knowledge of the Urbild. However, it is not knowledge of a conceptual kind but rather of an essential kind. The human relationship that manifests this distinct kind of knowledge is friendship. In the execution of the work of art, the artist painstakingly constructs a manifestation of the Urbild. In this, the artist resembles a parent who assists the child in calling forth the underlying essence of the child. Thus the knowledge and activity of the artist, as Stein describes it, have analogues in the human relationships of friendship and parenthood, respectively. In the following paper, I will describe how the artist resembles both friend and parent in more detail.
|
|
|
20.
|
Quaestiones Disputatae:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 1
Christopher T. Haley
Manifesting Meaning: Art, Truth, and Community in St. Edith Stein
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
In this paper I investigate the peculiarities of artistic truth in relation to God, the artist, the work of art, and the artwork’s audience in the context of Stein’s thought. In doing so, I attempt to fashion from Stein’s unsystematic statements about art the rudiments of an aesthetic theory. The core of this theory is the role of beauty in the manifestation of truth and meaning in the world of finite being. This manifestation, I argue, affords art a unique possibility of creating a fuller harmony between finite and infinite being, and so a fuller harmony with God.
|
|
|