Cover of Logos & Episteme
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research articles
1. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Youssef Aguisoul Group Belief: Summativism in Non-summativist Cases
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The summativists generally analyze group belief in terms of belief of the majority. The non-summativists counterargue that it is possible for a group to believe that p even if “none” of its members believes that p. In doing so, they usually appeal to hypothetical cases in which groups are “structured” groups like committees, research groups, governments, as opposed to “collective” groups like Finns, America, Catholic Church. In this paper, I raise the objection that non-summativist cases involve summativism. While most contemporary objections to non-summativism tend to be rejectionists , i.e., showing that non-summativist cases involve group acceptance rather than group belief, my objection is newfangled in that it grants non-summativist cases group belief but shows that group belief in such cases is majority belief.
2. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Elliott R. Crozat Education and Knowledge
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In this paper, I challenge a traditional assumption concerning the nature and aims of education. According to epistemic infallibilism, propositional knowledge requires epistemic certainty. Though some philosophers accept infallibilism, others consider it implausible because it does not recognize ordinary cases of supposed knowledge. On this objection, we possess many items of propositional knowledge, notwithstanding the fallibleness of these items. Infallibilism is inconsistent with such items and thus considered unwarranted. I articulate this kind of objection to infallibilism as it concerns education. I then offer a cumulative case defense of infallibilism and evaluate that defense. This examination suggests that much of what we commonly consider as education does not provide knowledge, and therefore that the traditional assumption is incorrect. My paper has interdisciplinary interests with respect to epistemology, philosophy of education, philosophy of science, and pedagogical practice.
3. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Jumbly Grindrod Epistemic Standards and Value: A Puzzle
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In this paper, I present a puzzle that arises if we accept i) that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief and ii) that whether a person counts as knowing is dependent upon a context-sensitive epistemic standard. Roughly, the puzzle is that if both claims are true, then we should always seek to keep the epistemic standard as low as possible, contrary to what seems like appropriate epistemic behaviour. I consider and reject a number of different ways of avoiding this consequence before presenting my own solution to the puzzle: that any view that posits a context-sensitive epistemic standard must relativize epistemic value as well.
4. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
M. Hosein M.A. Khalaj Gettier Cases, Mimicking, and Virtue Reliabilism
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It has been argued that virtue reliabilism faces difficulties in explaining why the “because-of” relation between true belief and the relevant competence is absent in Gettier cases. However, prominent proponents of this view such as Sosa and Turri suggest that these difficulties can be overcome by invoking the manifestation relation. In his Judgment and Agency, Sosa supports this claim based on an analogy between Gettier cases and what in the literature on dispositions is called mimic cases. While there are initial motivations for the alleged analogy, I claim there are at least two arguments against it: 1. there is an asymmetry in the nature of context-sensitivity between the problem of mimicking and the Gettier problem; 2. while causal deviance and double luck can be found in both the mimic case and the Gettier case, their causal processes are different in important respects, making it challenging to see them as both falling under the same category. If these arguments are on the right track, the upshot is that virtue reliablists such as Sosa and Turri who describe the “because-of” relation in terms of the manifestation relation still owe us an account of why the manifestation relation is absent in Gettier cases.
5. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Basil Müller Epistemic Dependence, Cognitive Irrationality, and Epistemic Conflicts of Interests: Why There Is a Need for Social Epistemic Norms
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When an agent A depends on an agent B to promote one of A's epistemic goals, this will often involve B's forming and sharing of true beliefs. However, as is well documented in research on cognitive irrationality, agents are disposed to form and share false-but-useful beliefs in a lot of circumstances. The dependence relation is thus at risk of becoming negative: A might adopt false beliefs from B and thus be unable to promote their epistemic goal. I propose that we can employ the notion of an epistemic conflict of interest [ECOI] to capture the kinds of problems that epistemically interdependent agents face. Much like familiar cases of conflict of interests—e.g., related to government officials—in ECOI an agent is subject to a normatively primary interest—roughly to form and share true beliefs—that stands in conflict with normatively secondary interests. I focus on secondary interests documented in the aforementioned research on cognitive irrationality. The resulting framework addresses an explanatory gap in the literature on social epistemic norms by making explicit why there’s a need for these norms to regulate our epistemic lives. Lastly, I show how the ECOI-framework furthermore allows us to make sense of and amend norm regulation failures.
discussion notes/debate
6. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
John C. Duff Gettier Unscathed for Now
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Moti Mizrahi (2016) argues that Gettier cases are unsuccessful counterexamples to the traditional analysis of knowledge (TAK) because such cases inadequately reveal epistemic failures of justified true belief (JTB); and because Gettier cases merely demonstrate semantic inadequacy, the apparent epistemic force of Gettier cases is misleading. Although Mizrahi claims to have deflated the epistemic force of Gettier cases, I will argue that the presence of semantic deficiency in Gettier cases neither requires nor indicates the denial of the epistemic force of those cases. I will provide an extracted version of Mizrahi’s argument, which I believe to be most charitable to his motivation. Then I will offer a counterexample to a pivotal premise in Mizrahi’s argument, ultimately rendering the argument unsound. Finally, upon the examination of a plausible objection, I conclude that Gettier cases are epistemically sustained.
7. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Heinrich Wansing, Hitoshi Omori A Note on “A Connexive Conditional”
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In a recent article, Mario Günther presented a conditional that is claimed to be connexive. The aim of this short discussion note is to show that Günther’s claim is not without problems.
8. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Notes on the Contributors
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9. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Notes to Contributors
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10. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Logos and Episteme. Aims and Scope
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