The expression “ecological threat” refers to a dynamic of double intrusion: the intrusion of geological history in human history (the intrusion of Gaia) and the intrusion of human history in geological history (the Anthropocene). This double intrusion is founded on a series of major partitions (culture/nature; society/environment) that do not allow for the possibility of communication between the terms of these dichotomies unless it is in the form of reciprocal violation. In the article, the ontology of the flesh is used in order to think the intrusion in a different way compared to the great partitions. Within a chiasmatic logic, the terms of each dichotomy are understood as inseparable moments of the same flesh which institutes a difference – inside/outside – through an infinite movement of folding and torsion. By thinking this common element, Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the flesh enters in dialogue with Amerindian mythocosmologies of the “first Anthropocene.” In these mythocosmologies, a humanity-flesh – understood as a transformative, pre-individual, and metastable potential – gives birth, through differentiation, to the multiple points of view that populate the cosmos. This dialogue allows us to think about the socialization of Gaia and to trace the contours of a general ecology understood as a thought that operates between – or beyond – major partitions.

The article examines the main features of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of nature and, more specifically, the reasons that led it to some consonance with that of the young Simondon. At the center of this recognition, the question of processuality and the pre-Socratic suggestions about a philosophy of the elements. The aim is to derive a need, which, if it remained unfulfilled in Merleau-Ponty, was instead expressed in Simondon and in many contemporary philosophies of nature, e.g. that of Bruno Latour, to whom some space is devoted. That is, the need to bring into focus that substantial indiscernibility between nature and technique, which becomes an evidence if one enters into the idea of process. It is to the ethical and political consequences of this indiscernibility that the article’s conclusions are dedicated. More precisely, these conclusions suggest that only a thought of the indiscernibility between nature and technology has ethical and political consequences, i.e. allows the design of a system of regulations capable of concretely and sustainably modulating the human impact on the planet.

In recent years, the concept of the Anthropocene has summoned such an archipelago of senses that the academic debate related to this term, which initially emerged in the natural sciences, has since penetrated the fields of philosophy, economy, history, and sociology. To draw a possible cartography of the Anthropocene, we wish before anything else to emphasize the intrinsic connection between the debate on the Anthropocene and the theme of climate change, and, more generally, of the environmental crisis. We will attempt to show, also, how a Merleau-Pontyan philosophy that is constitutively dedicated to overcoming dichotomies – philosophy and non-philosophy, nature and culture, subject and object – can provide a valuable methodological and ontological support for the study of the environmental question and the ecological crisis. This philosophy belongs, in its own right, among the non-sad philosophies for thinking climate change.

The aim of this essay is to connect the notion of the Anthropocene with Merleau-Pontyan thought by drawing on two aspects of the author’s ontological reflection. First, I consider “the event of the Anthropocene” as an event that is part of an instituting dynamic, in reference to the ontological dimension of “Institution” that Merleau-Ponty borrows from Husserl and develops in an original way in his 1954-1955 lectures at the Collège de France. I then underline the difficulties that arise when multiple names are employed to designate our “current geological era” in debates on the Anthropocene, a complex global event with political, ethical, and social dimensions. To conclude, I show that this multiplication of names is constitutive of the event of the Anthropocene. The Merleau-Pontyan idea of “a theme that constitutes itself through its variations,” introduced by Mauro Carbone in his work on sensible ideas and the “arche-screen” and closely linked to the element of “Institution,” can help us find philosophical advancements at the heart of this contemporary naming debate.

This essay proposes interdisciplinary work converging around a concept (the Anthropocene), a philosophical tradition (phenomenology), and an author (Merleau-Ponty) in order to overcome the limits of intelligibility to which can be confronted approaches that favor a single perspective on these themes, or a single theme approached from different perspectives. The first section of the essay develops a triple return to the foundations of the problem which interests us by treating in a synthetic manner the following three questions: what is the Anthropocene? What does the idea of human autonomy truly mean? Can phenomenology help us think their encounter? The second section briefly introduces the reflective context in which Merleau-Ponty developed his thinking on Nature, on the human being as it emerges from Nature, and on technique in its relation both to the human being and to Nature. By adopting Merleau-Pontyan thought as a critical framework, the third section examines the current paradigm for the co-production of scientific knowledge and its implication for the inclusion of non-human nature.

Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s hypothesis about transcendental geology in the final phase of his work, this article examines the debate about the Anthropocene from the perspective of philosophy of history. Firstly, we follow the author through the preliminary materials for The Visible and The Invisible by situating transcendental geology within the book’s complex theoretical architecture, and by foregrounding the necessity of rethinking the notion of Earth through the reading that the French philosopher offers of Husserl’s phenomenology. We will thus focus on the theme of the overturning of the Copernican doctrine in an ethico-practical perspective, showing that Merleau-Ponty’s ecology can be considered a philosophical ecology ante litteram. Finally, drawing on the hypothesis proposed by historians Bonneuil and Fressoz, the essay will attempt to highlight the relevance of Merleau-Ponty’s practical thought for the debate about the Anthropocene.

The goal of this article is to introduce a Merleau-Pontyan reading of the Four Theses of Dipesh Chakrabarty. In the first part of this article, we identify the theoretical problems that undergird Chakrabarty’s claims by connecting them to an attempt to rethink the concept of history in a non-historicist manner in light of the questions raised by the Anthropocene and by anthropogenic climate change. Our hypothesis, which we explore in the second part of the article, is that the idea of history developed by Merleau-Ponty, which finds in the concepts of “institution” and “transcendental geology” its fundamental theoretical articulations, can provide the framework for a rereading of the Four Theses. In the last section, we attempt to provide an interpretation of Chakrabarty’s proposition by reading the problem of the relationship between geological history, life history, and human history as a relationship of institution. In conclusion, we indicate some potential developments for this proposition that move in the direction of a narrower intersection between philosophy and earth system science.

In this article, I examine the debate about the Anthropocene through the lens of two images that animate this debate like presuppositions: that of the Globe and that of the Earth. After analyzing the characteristics of the former, I attempt to define the status of the concept of Earth in Merleau-Ponty’s works in relation to the concepts of Nature, life, and background. In a final section, I attempt to valorize the main theoretical objectives achieved by reading Merleau-Ponty in the direction of a new reflection on the notion of the Anthropocene, beyond the Promethean discourse on the Anthropocene (which originates in a vision of the planet as a Globe). For this, we will read together some recent works by Dipesh Chakrabarty and Jeremy Devies that focus precisely on the attempt to rethink the Anthropocene beyond the image of the Globe.

Although the Anthropocene is a problematic concept in both its popular reception and its scientific deployment, it nevertheless makes salient the challenge of understanding the relation between human time and “deep” geological time. For postcolonial historian Dipesh Chakrabarty, the Anthropocene marks the breaching of these two distinct temporal registers: “The geologic now of the Anthropocene has become entangled with the now of human history.” Following the lead of speculative realism, Chakrabarty denies that phenomenology can offer any insights into deep time or grant the human species its place within the evolutionary history of life. I challenge these claims by drawing on insights from Merleau-Ponty’s final course notes. I argue that Chakrabarty’s binarism of chronologies fails to capture the plexity of our embodied temporal experience. Making sense of our entanglement in planetary and evolutionary temporal scales requires both a phenomenology of deep time and, in parallel, an appreciation of the ontological memory of the world. In the context of evolution, this opens onto a richly diacritical understanding of life. A phenomenology of deep time reopens the question of the relation between the planet, as one cosmic body among many, and the earth as the archive of elemental and evolutionary memory.

In the essay “Cézanne’s Doubt”, Merleau-Ponty explores the relationship between Paul Cézanne’s art and his embodiment. The doubt in question is ultimately about the meaning of Cézanne’s art in light of his disabilities. Should his disabilities or impairments shape how we interpret his art or should they instead be treated as incidental, as mere biographical data? Although Merleau-Ponty’s essay isn’t intended to be phenomenological, its line of questioning is as much about lived experience as it is about art, art history, and aesthetics. I here offer a reading of “Cézanne’s Doubt” as an exploration of one of the more fundamental issues for phenomenological methodology: the relationship between normality and the normate. I first defend this phenomenological and disability-centric or crip reading of the essay. I then argue that insofar as one takes oneself to be “normal” and insofar as doing so underwrites phenomenological inquiry, the problematic of the normate, not just that of normality, is central to phenomenology.

This article advances a critical phenomenology of the meaning of aging embodiment. Its broad aim is to profoundly challenge an idealized view of aging as foremost and fundamentally a natural or normative procession of “ready-made” stages pre-set “in” time (i.e., infancy, childhood, adolescence, adulthood, and “old age”) or pre-given units of time that unfurl along a timeline (i.e., chronological age), from past to present to future. Combining, defending, and adapting resources from Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception with a reading of the concept of institution (Stiftung) via the phenomenon of puberty in Institution and Passivity: Course Notes from the Collège de France (1954-1955) as well as insights from critical gerontology, I argue that the phenomenon of aging embodiment demands to be understood in terms of transitions, that is, as an intensive reorientation in relationality, sociality, and the style in which one has a past rather than as changes along a timeline.