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1. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
News and Notes
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features
2. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Nicole Marshall Toward Special Mobility Rights for Climate Migrants
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The conditions of climate change are increasingly shaping the modern era of international migration; yet the principles and norms that shape the international regime are struggling to keep pace with this reality. Because forced environmental migration is becoming more prominent, it is necessary to respond at the international level. Not only is it the ethical responsibility of the international community to recognize special mobility rights for envi­ronmentally displaced peoples, but further, these rights should be maximized with policy-oriented solutions that sacrifice neither feasibility nor ethical robustness. The mechanisms of dual, tiered, and deterritorialized citizenship are a way to bring special mobility rights for climate migrants into fruition.
3. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Shannon Brincat Global Climate Change Justice: From Rawls’ Law of Peoples to Honneth’s Conditions of Freedom
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The problem of global climate changes has raised fundamental questions of justice in world politics centered around the vast discrepancies between the causes and the effects of global warming and the uneven levels of consumption/enjoyment of fossil fuels. The overwhelming majority of approaches in environmental ethics have focused on either distributive justice or rights-based frameworks. Climate change justice, however, can be explored through an alternative framework, an approach based on the recognition theory of Axel Honneth that has not been systematically engaged with in this field. A critique of John Rawls’ The Law of Peoples as an exemplar of distributive approaches reveals a number of limitations inherent in Rawlsian models of climate-change justice. Honneth’s theory of recognition is an advance on distributive models toward a notion of climate justice in which the conditions necessary for the “functioning and flourishment” of human freedom includes climatic stability as a basic social condition. The ideal of mutual recognition provides a basis for environmental protections, including but not limited to the global atmosphere as a necessary condition for the realization of self-autonomy for all human kind.
discussion papers
4. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Christopher J. Preston The Multiple Anthropocenes: Toward Fracturing a Totalizing Discourse
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5. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Tom Greaves, Rupert Read Where Value Resides: Making Ecological Value Possible
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Distinguishing between the source and the locus of value enables environmental philosophers to consider not only what is of value, but also to try to develop a conception of valuation that is itself ecological. Such a conception must address difficulties caused by the original locational metaphors in which the distinction is framed. This is done by reassessing two frequently employed models of valuation, perception and desire, and going on to show that a more adequate ecological understanding of valuation emerges when these models are fully contextualized in the intersecting life worlds of the ecological community. Ecological evaluation takes place in ongoing encounters between these worlds and a crucial part in this process is assigned to living beings that are “open-endedly open,” that is, open not only to what the world affords them and others, but open to an indefinite field of possible valuational encounters between all kinds of beings. Ecological valuation overcomes some of the conceptual failings of contemporary attempts to evaluate nature: “The Economics of Ecology and Biodiversity” and “Valuing Nature.”
6. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Brendan Mackey, David Claudie Points of Contact: Integrating Traditional and Scientific Knowledge for Biocultural Conservation
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Every region of the world is confronted with ongoing ecosystem degradation, species extinctions, and the loss of cultural diversity and knowledge associated with indigenous peoples. We face a global biocultural extinction crisis. The proposition that traditional knowledge along with scientific understanding can inform approaches to solving practical conservation problems has been widely accepted in principle. Attempts to promote a more bilateral approach, however, are hampered by the lack of a common framework for integrating the two knowledge systems in a way that is coherent and useful. This problem can be addressed by drawing upon, as a case study, the principle elements of traditional knowledge and their practical application to governance as articulated by the Kuuku I’yu Northern Kaanju people of Cape York Peninsula, Australia. Four points of contact can help bridge traditional and scientific knowledge in addressing the biocultural crisis: (1) post-normal science; (2) conservation values and goals; (3) land management; and (4) sustainable development. Key insights that emerge from these considerations include the propositions that holders of traditional knowledge can be validly seen as members of the extended peer community needed to address post-normal science problems; that traditional knowledge provide guideposts to the positive values being lost from view by an increasingly urban-based society; that there are practical conservation benefits to be derived from adopting a “two-tool box” approach; and that traditional knowledge provides the basis for criteria to help discern for a given community and landscape the kinds of economic activities which are ecologically and culturally compatible. There are multiple benefits for society that arise from appropriate recognition of biocultural resources in legislation and decision making.
7. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Piers H. G. Stephens On the Nature of “Nature”: The Real Meanings and Significance of John Stuart Mill’s Misunderstood Essay
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John Stuart Mill is known as the first canonical Western philosopher to espouse a stationary state of economic growth, and as such he can be seen as an important totemic figure for reformist strategies in environmental ethics. However, his reputation among environmental thinkers has been rendered more ambiguous in recent years by increased attention to his essay “Nature.” The “Nature” essay has been much used lately by critics to oppose claims (1) that independent nature may properly be seen as important in any way as an ethical guide or inspiration, and (2) that Mill’s philosophy may feasibly be viewed as pro-environmentalist. This use of Mill’s essay is mistaken, and has undermined appreciation of the potential significance of Mill’s thought for environmental philosophy. When examining the most detailed of the critical treatments of the essay, reading “Nature” as an anti-environmentalist text badly distorts the essay’s meaning by ripping it from the context of Mill’s intentions as well as from the very specific and significant historical circumstances and biographical conditions of its production. Attending properly to these factors shows that the essay is unrepresentative of Mill’s general position and rather philosophically weaker than its reputation. Reading the text as a definitive statement of Mill’s supposed anti-naturalism is thus mistaken and fails to recognize different modes and significances in “following nature,” some of which Mill supported. The “Nature” essay is an aberrant outlier in the Mill canon, and one which should no longer be allowed to undermine Mill’s strong and important environmentalist credentials.
book reviews
8. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Matthew Calarco David Nibert. Animal Oppression and Human Violence: Domesecration, Capitalism, and Global Conflict
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9. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Louke van Wensveen Mark Coeckelbergh: Environmental Skill: Motivation, Knowledge, and the Possibility of a Non-Romantic Environmental Ethics
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10. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Joseph A. Tuminello III Rhuks Ako: Environmental Justice in Developing Countries: Perspectives from Africa and Asia-Pacific
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11. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Phillip Cafaro Getting Real on Reproductive Rights
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