Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:



Displaying: 1-17 of 17 documents


articles
1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 2
Nick Zangwill Daydreams and Anarchy: A Defense of Anomalous Mental Causation
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Must mental properties figure in psychological causal laws if they are causally efficacious? And do those psychological causal laws give the essence of mental properties? Contrary to the prevailing consensus, I argue that, on the usual conception of laws that is in play in these debates, there are in fact lawless causally efficacious properties both in and out of the philosophy of mind. I argue that this makes a great difference to the philosophical relevance of empirical psychology. I begin by making the case that revolutions and hurricanes are lawless phenomena, before arguing for a similar thesis about creativity, love, courage, dreams, daydreams, and musings. Furthermore, the empirical research on thesc phenomena suggests that the philosophical issues may be independent of what empirical psychology can tell us.
2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 2
Jason Bridges Davidson’s Transcendental Externalism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
One of the chief aims of Donald Davidson' s later work was to show that participation in a certain causal nexus involving two creatures and a shared environment-Davidson calls this nexus "triangulation"-is a metaphysically necessary condition for the acquisition of thought. This doctrine, I suggest, is aptly regarded as a form of what I call transcendental externalism. I extract two arguments for the transcendental-extemalist doctrine from Davidson's writings, and argue that neither succeeds. A central interpretive claim is that the arguments are primarily funded by a particular conception of the nature of non-human animal life. This conception turns out to be insupportable. The failure of Davidson's arguments presses the question of whether we could ever hope to arrive atfar-reaching claims about the conditions for thought if we deny, as does Davidson, the legitimacy of the naturalistic project in the philosophy of mind.
3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 2
Keith Derose “Bamboozled by Our Own Words”: Semantic Blindness and Some Arguments Against Contextualism
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 2
Scott Campbell The Conception of a Person as a Series of Mental Events
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
It is argued that those who accept the psychological criterion of personal identity, such as Parfit and Shoemaker, should accept what I call the 'series' view of a person, according to which a person is a unified aggregate of mental events and states. As well as defending this view against objections, I argue that it allows the psychological theorist to avoid the two lives objection which the 'animalist' theorists have raised against it, an objection which causes great difficulties for the conception of a person that most psychological theorists favour, the constitution view. It is also argued that the series view allows that people can body swap and teleport, which the constitution view-which takes a person to be a physical object (but a distinct physical object from the human being)-has great trouble with.
5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 2
Risto Vilkko, Jaakko Hintikka Existence and Predication from Aristotle to Frege
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
One of the characteristic features of contemporary logic is that it incorporates the Frege-Russell thesis according to which verbs for being are multiply ambiguous. This thesis was not accepted before the nineteenth century. In Aristotle existence could not serve alone as a predicate term. However, it could be a part of the force of the predicate term, depending on the context. For Kant existence could not even be a part of the force of the predicate term. Hence, after Kant, existence was left homeless. It found a home in the algebra of logic in which the operators corresponding to universal and particular judgments were treated as duals, and universal Judgments were taken to be relative to some universe of discourse. Because of the duality, existential quantifier expressions came to express existence. The orphaned notion of existence thus found a new home in the existential quantifier.
symposium
6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 2
Susanna Siegel Direct Realism and Perceptual Consciousness
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 2
A.D. Smith In Defence of Direct Realism
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
book symposium
8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 2
Herman Cappelen, Ernie Lepore Précis of Insensitive Semantics
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 2
Kent Bach The Excluded Middle: Semantic Minimalism without Minimal Propositions
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 2
John Hawthorne Testing for Context-Dependence
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
11. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 2
Kepa Korta Varieties of Minimalist Semantics
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
12. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 2
Robert J. Stainton Terminological Reflections of an Enlightened Contextualist
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
13. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 2
Herman Cappelen, Ernie Lepore Replies
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
critical notices
14. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 2
Robert Merrihew Adams Divine Motivation Theory
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
15. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 2
William Bechtel The Mind Incarnate
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
16. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 2
Eric T. Olson Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
17. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 2
Recent Publications
view |  rights & permissions | cited by