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The Monist

Volume 92, Issue 1, January 2009
Singular Causation

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Displaying: 1-9 of 9 documents


articles
1. The Monist: Volume > 92 > Issue: 1
Michael Moore Introduction: The Nature of Singularist Theories of Causation
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2. The Monist: Volume > 92 > Issue: 1
Phil Dowe Absences, Possible Causation, and the Problem of Non-Locality
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I argue that so-called ‘absence causation’must be treated in terms of counterfactuals about causation such as ‘had a occurred, a would have caused b’. First, I argue that some theories of causation that accept absence causation are unattractive because they undermine the idea of possible causation. And second, I argue that accepting absence causation violates a principle commonly associated with relativity.
3. The Monist: Volume > 92 > Issue: 1
Douglas Ehring Abstracting Away from Preemption
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4. The Monist: Volume > 92 > Issue: 1
Christopher Hitchcock Problems for the Conserved Quantity Theory: Counterexamples, Circularity, and Redundancy
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The conserved quantity theory of causation aims to analyze causal processes and interactions in terms of conserved quantities. In order to be successful, the theory must correctly distinguish between causal processes and interactions, on the one hand, and pseudoprocesses and mere intersections on the other.Moreover, it must do this while satisfying two further criteria: it must avoid circularity; and the appeal to conserved quantities must not be redundant. I argue that the theory is not successful in meeting these criteria.
5. The Monist: Volume > 92 > Issue: 1
Stephen Mumford Passing Powers Around
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6. The Monist: Volume > 92 > Issue: 1
Bence Nanay The Properties of Singular Causation
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Theories of singular causation have a genuine problem with properties. In virtue of what property do events (or facts) cause other events? One possible answer to this question, Davidson’s, is that causal relations hold between particulars and properties play no role in the way a particular causes another. According to another, recently fashionable answer, in contrast, events cause other events in virtue of having a trope (as opposed to a property-type). Both views face serious objections. My aim in this paper is to combine these two very different solutions to the problem of the properties of singular causation and to argue that this combined view can avoid objections against both of them.
7. The Monist: Volume > 92 > Issue: 1
Michael Rota An Anti-Reductionist Account of Singular Causation
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8. The Monist: Volume > 92 > Issue: 1
Jessica Wilson Resemblance-based Resources for Reductive Singularism
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books received
9. The Monist: Volume > 92 > Issue: 1
Books Received
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