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news and notes
1. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 22 > Issue: 4
NEWS AND NOTES
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features
2. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 22 > Issue: 4
David W. Kidner Fabricating Nature: A Critique of the Social Construction of Nature
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Models of nature have usually referred to ecological, or more generally, scientific understandings, and have seldom included cultural factors. Recently, however, there has been a trend toward defining nature as a “social construction,” that is, as an artifact of human social and linguistic capability. I argue that constructionism attempts to assimilate nature to an exclusively anthropocentric “reality,” and that it should be seen as expressing long-term industrialist tendencies to separate the “human” and the “natural” realms and to assimilate the latter to the former. Consequently, the constructionist approach, rather than offering us a fertile means of incorporating cultural influences within environmental theorizing, is better viewed as a cognitive counterpart to industrialism’s physical assimilation of the natural world.
3. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 22 > Issue: 4
Simon P. James “Thing-Centered” Holism in Buddhism, Heidegger, and Deep Ecology
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I address the problem of reconciling environmental holism with the intrinsic value of individual beings. Drawing upon Madhyamaka (“middle way”) Buddhism, the later philosophy of Martin Heidegger, and deep ecology, I present a distinctly holistic conception of nature that, nevertheless, retains a commitment to the intrinsic worth of individual beings. I conclude with an examination of the practical implications of this “thing-centered holism” for environmental ethics.
discussion papers
4. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 22 > Issue: 4
George S. Levit, Wolfgang E. Krumbein, Reiner Grübel Space and Time in the Works of V. I. Vernadsky
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The main objective of this paper is to introduce the space-time concept of V. I. Vernadsky and to show the importance of this concept for understanding the biosphere theory of Vernadsky. A central issue is the principle of dissymmetry, which was proposed by Louis Pasteur and further developed by Pierre Curie and Vernadsky. The dissymmetry principle, applied both to the spatial and temporal properties of living matter, makes it possible to demonstrate the unified nature of space and time. At the same time, this principle shows the difference between the spatial-temporal properties of living matter and those of the inert environment. Living matter as opposed to the inert environment is an important part of the Weltanschauung of Vernadsky and is connected with all basic statements of his theoretical system
5. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 22 > Issue: 4
David Schmidtz Natural Enemies: An Anatomy of Environmental Conflict
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Sometimes people act contrary to environmentalist values because they reject those values. This is one kind of conflict: conflict in values. There is another kind of conflict in which people act contrary to environmentalist values even though they embrace those values: because they cannot afford to act in accordance with them. Conflict in priorities occurs not because people’s values are in conflict, but rather because people’s immediate needs are in conflict. Conflict in priorities is not only an environmental conflict, but also often an economic conflict—a conflict rooted in differing economic circumstance. Such a conflict cannot be resolved as an environmental conflict unless it is also resolved as an economic one.
6. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 22 > Issue: 4
Bill McCormick The Island of Dr. Haraway
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Donna Haraway’s cyberfeminism has shown considerable appeal on an interdisciplinary level. Her basic premise is that by the end of the twentieth century the boundary between humans and machines has become increasingly porous, and, whether we acknowledge it or not, we are already cyborgs. She also posits this cyborg identity as an acceptable emblem for progressive politics. I disagree, and cite such writers as Susan Bordo, Sharona Ben-Tov, and Jhan Hochman to highlight some of the weaknesses of her position. I argue that we have had repeated warnings about implications of yoking the human to the machine, and that Haraway’s “promising monsters” are anything but promising.
book reviews
7. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 22 > Issue: 4
Thomas Heyd Sacred Ecology: Traditional Knowledge and Resource Management
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8. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 22 > Issue: 4
Alan F. Zundel Who Owns America?: Social Conflict over Property Rights
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9. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 22 > Issue: 4
David Rothenberg The Ecological Indian: Myth and History
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10. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 22 > Issue: 4
George W. Matthews The Struggle for Nature: A Critique of Radical Ecology
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11. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 22 > Issue: 4
Avner de-Shalit Fairness and Futurity: Essays on Environmental Sustainability and Social Justice
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12. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 22 > Issue: 4
Melissa Clarke The Good-Natured Feminist: Ecofeminism and the Quest for Democracy
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comment
13. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 22 > Issue: 4
Peter S. Wenz Peacemaking in Practice: A Response to Jim Sterba
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news and notes
14. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 22 > Issue: 3
NEWS AND NOTES
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features
15. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 22 > Issue: 3
Christopher J. Preston Conversing with Nature in a Postmodern Epistemological Framework
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In a recent contribution to this journal, Jim Cheney argues for a postmodern epistemological framework that supports a conception of inquiry as a kind of “conversation” with nature. I examine how Cheney arrives at this metaphor and consider why it might be an appealing one for environmental philosophers. I note how, in the absence of an animistic account of nature, this metaphor turns out to be problematic. A closer examination of the postmodern insights that Cheney employs reveals that it is possible to stress the agency of nature in epistemology without having to draw on the metaphor of conversation. I conclude that this alternative account is not only more plausible, but can probably do the same ethical work as the problematic metaphor of inquiry as conversation.
16. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 22 > Issue: 3
Janna Thompson Environment as Heritage
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Arguments for the preservation of natural objects and environments sometimes appeal to the value of those objects as cultural heritage. Can something be valuable because of its relation to the historical past? I examine and assess arguments for preservation based upon heritage value and defend the thesis that we have an obligation to appreciate what our predecessors valued and to value those thingsthat have played an important role in our history. I show how this conception of our obligations can be used to defend the preservation of natural objects and environments including wilderness areas.
discussion papers
17. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 22 > Issue: 3
Frank Schalow Who Speaks for the Animals?: Heidegger and the Question of Animal Welfare
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I address the ethical treatment of animals from a Heideggerian perspective. My argument proceeds in two stages. First, it is necessary to develop a nonanthropocentric concept of freedom which extends beyond the sphere of human interests. Second, it is essential to show that our capacity to speak must serve the diverse ends of “dwelling,” and hence can be properly exercised only by balancing the interests of animals with those of our own. Rather than point to naturalistic similarities between humans and animals (e.g., the capacity to feel pain), or even ontological ones (e.g., the shared dimension of “care” [Sorge]), the better strategy lies in expanding the scope of moral agency in a way which allows the differences between humans and animals to suggest guidelines as to why the former should exhibit benevolence toward the latter. In this way, I show that the basic percepts of Heidegger’s philosophy support an ethic which can attend to, and speak in behalf of, the welfare of animals.
18. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 22 > Issue: 3
Lee Hester, Dennis McPherson, Annie Booth Indigenous Worlds and Callicott’s Land Ethic
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We assess J. Baird Callicott’s attempt in Earth’s Insights to reconcile his land ethic with the “environmental ethics” of indigenous peoples. We critique the rejection of ethical pluralism that informs this attempted rapprochement. We also assess Callicott’s strategy of grounding his land ethic in a postmodern scientific world view by contrasting it with the roles of “respect” and narrative in indigenous “ethics.”
19. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 22 > Issue: 3
J. Baird Callicott The Indigenous World or Many Indigenous Worlds?
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Earth’s Insights is about more than indigenous North American environmental attitudes and values. The conclusions of Hester, McPherson, Booth, and Cheney about universal indigenous environmental attitudes and values, although pronounced with papal infallibility, are based on no evidence. The unstated authority of their pronouncements seems to be the indigenous identity of two of the authors. Two other self-identified indigenous authors, V. F. Cordova and Sandy Marie Anglás Grande, argue explicitly that indigenous identity is sufficient authority for declaring what pre-Columbian indigenous environmental attitudes and values were. Exclusive knowledge claims based on essentialist racial-cultural identity, though politically motivated, are politically risky. They may inadvertently legitimate more noxious and dangerous racial-cultural identity politics and exclusion of those who identify themselves (or are identified by others) in oppositional racialcultural terms from full and equal participation in the political and economic arenas of the prevailing culture. Biologically, racial differences are entirely superficial; Homo sapiens is a single, homogeneous species. Contrary to Hester et al., ethnic conflict was common among pre-Columbian indigenous North American peoples. Other indigenous authors, among them McPherson, have found my comparison of pre-Columbian indigenous North American attitudes and values with the Aldo Leopold land ethic to be illuminating. I wish I had not said that pre-Columbian indigenous North American attitudes and values are “validated” by ecology, but rather that they and ecology are “mutually validating.”
book reviews
20. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 22 > Issue: 3
Peter S. Wenz Justice for Here and Now
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