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1. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 63 > Issue: 1
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2. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 63 > Issue: 1
Brian Marrin Painting as Metaphor in Plato's Republic
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This paper examines the use of the painting metaphor in the Republic, showing that earlier mentions of painting suggest an understanding of mimesis at odds with the critique of book X, and argues that this disagreement can only be understood in the dialogical context of the work as a whole. Early on, painters are said to be able to produce images truer and more beautiful than any existing object, and both the depiction of the city in speech itself and its realization in practice are compared to the act of painting. Read in this context, the critique of mimesis in book X can be seen as a challenge to one of the central arguments of the Republic. But in critiquing images as representation of reality it leaves untouched the metaphorical use of images, and so allows the city in speech to fulfill its original purpose as an analogy for the soul.
3. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 63 > Issue: 1
Jonathan Fuqua Proper Functionalism, Perfectionism, and the Epistemic Value Problem
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The epistemic value problem—that of explaining why knowledge is valuable, and in particular why it is more valuable than lesser epistemic standings, such as true belief—remains unsolved. Here, I argue that this problem can be solved by combining proper functionalism about knowledge with perfectionism about goodness. I begin by laying out the epistemic value problem and the extant challenges to solving it. I then proceed to begin solving the problem by explicating a broad and ecumenical form of proper functionalism. I finish solving the problem by introducing the perfectionist theory of value and then showing how that theory of goodness, in tandem with proper functionalism, solves the epistemic value problem.
4. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 63 > Issue: 1
Seyyed Jaaber Mousavirad Coherence of Substance Dualism
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Many contemporary philosophers of mind disagree with substance dualism, saying that despite the failure of physical theories of mind, substance dualism cannot be advocated, because it faces more serious problems than physical theories, lacking compatibility with philosophical arguments and scientific evidence. Regardless of the validity of the arguments in support of substance dualism, it is demonstrated in this article that this theory is coherent, with no philosophical or scientific problems. The main arguments of opponents of substance dualism are explained and criticized in this respect. Based on this, it becomes clear that the interaction of soul and body has a reasonable philosophical explanation, the problem of the pairing of soul and body, although it may not have a scientific explanation, it has a philosophical and theological solution, the principle of the physical causal closure lacks conclusive reasons and cannot reject the existence of the soul, the existence of the soul does not contradict the theory of evolution, the dependence of the soul on the brain is compatible with its independence, and finally, the principle of simplicity does not make any problem for accepting the substance dualism.
5. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 63 > Issue: 1
David Foster Fides et ratio's Lessons for Philosophers
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On its twenty-fifth anniversary, Fides et ratio remains relevant for its bold defense of reason and the complementarity of faith and reason. It describes a philosophy that is not the preserve of academics but the duty of every person. It asserts that philosophy is never contained in one system but is always open to new questions and further insights. St. John Paul defends a philosophy that welcomes pluralism based on the richness of being but rejects a pluralism based on the impossibility of knowing the truth. Reflecting on Fides et ratio, this article describes six ways that theology uses philosophy and offers five lessons for philosophers, i.e., the universal character of philosophy, the complementarity of faith and reason, the necessity and limits of pluralism, the requirements for a philosophy to be consonant with theology, and the current reinvigoration of philosophy in seminaries.
6. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 63 > Issue: 1
Mansi Rathour Autonomous Weapons and Just War Theory
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As wars today involve the use of sophisticated weapons such as autonomous ones, this paper aims to address the moral permissibility of using autonomous weapons systems (AWS) in wars. In the debate on autonomous weapons, advocates argue based on AWS’s precision of targets (Arkin 2018) and it not being clouded by emotional judgments (Marchant, 2011) and prohibitors who comment on the ethical and legal implications of autonomous weapons (A. Sharkey 2019; Blanchard 2022). However, there has been relatively little development of compliance of the autonomous weapons with all the principles of jus in bello, amongst the scholarship as well as its engagement with the just war framework broadly. To assess the moral compliance of AWS, the paper focuses on just conduct or the jus in bello principles. It closely examines all the three principles of necessity, discrimination, and proportionality that makeup just conduct as well as the legal body of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Through a close analysis of all the principles of jus in bello against the use of autonomous weapons, this paper will result in the incompatibility of such weapons with the ethical framework of just war theory that gives out the norms for just and fair conduct during wars. It will thereby lead to a further reflection on the compliance of autonomous weapons as per jus in bello and the IHL to have greater restrain and ethical conduct during wars.
7. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 63 > Issue: 1
Joshua Taccolini Why Ought We Be Good?: A Hildebrandian Challenge to Thomistic Normativity Theory
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In this paper, I argue for the necessity of including what I call “categorical norms” in Thomas Aquinas’s account of the ground of obligation (normativity theory) by drawing on the value phenomenology of Dietrich von Hildebrand. A categorical norm is one conceptually irreducible to any non-normative concept and which obligates us irrespective of pre-existing aims, goals, or desires. I show that Thomistic normativity theory on any plausible reading of Aquinas lacks categorical norms and then raise two serious objections which constitute master arguments against it. The upshot is that this theory requires reform. I end by proposing work remaining for such reform, namely, an expansion of the Thomistic metaphysic and anthropology.
8. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 63 > Issue: 1
Stephen R. Munzer Temptation, Sinlessness, and Impeccability
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Hebrews 4:15 says that Jesus was tempted like other human beings yet never sinned. Sinlessness is not the same as impeccability. Chalcedonian Christology or some variant of it seems necessary to show that Jesus was metaphysically unable to sin. Metaphysical impossibility to sin, though, appears to rule out temptation as experienced by ordinary human beings. This paper argues that Oliver D. Crisp, T. A. Hart, Brian Leftow, and Gerald O’Collins all fall short in trying to show how Jesus was both impeccable and tempted as we are.
9. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 63 > Issue: 1
D. Goldstick Towards a Defensible Nominalism
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Only concreta are causative, though other things can play a passive part in enabling them to do the causing that they do. Nonconcreta—platonic universals included—are just the instrumental and ethical values of concreta. There is no sense of the word in which both concreta and nonconcreta “exist”; but, coining one, we can say nothing “exists,” in that coined sense, over and above concreta, their vicissitudes and their values. That is nominalism.