The aim of this essay is twofold. First, I examine the role of Alfred North Whitehead and process thinkers in bringing about and shaping the field of environmental ethics. As we will see, our job is not so much to develop the connections between Whitehead and environmental thought as to recover them. Second, given this genealogical work, I invite process scholars to reconsider their generally hostile reception of Aldo Leopold and his land ethic. I suggest that a version of the land ethic grounded in a process axiology could make a significant contribution to contemporary environmental thought.

In this paper I aim at questioning L. Buell’s politics of the environment, which relies on the assumption of unproblematic coexistence between man and nature. Analyzing Stanley Cavell’s reading of Henry D. Thoreau, I try to show that the natural is always already cultural and that a reengagement with nature in itself is the very process of becoming political. In this context, I will examine why Cavell’s Thoreau redirects us from biocentrism to humanism and provocatively turns political education away from anodyne aspirations for coexistence and towards a qualified isolation.

In this paper I develop a framework for environmental philosophy on the ground of what I call a radical relationalism based on Whitehead’s thought. Accordingly, relations are ontologically prior to and constitutive of entities rather than being conceived as external link(ing) between them. On this ground an alternative, relational axiology can be developed that challenges the current environmental ethics debate and its dichotomy between intrinsic and instrumental values. In the last section, I show how such an axiology can become an important ally for global environmental justice struggles and help support what the anthropologist Arturo Escobar calls a “decolonial view of nature.”

A number of recent environmental philosophers (Vogel, Morton, Latour) have proclaimed the end of nature. They oppose what they consider to be an outdated view of nature as a basis for environmental philosophy and political ecology. Instead of “thinking like a mountain” (Leopold), we should begin “thinking like a mall” (Vogel). These end-of-nature thinkers claim that the concept of nature in environmental discourses is bound to be something that is outside of us because man is understood as doing something to nature. Without putting forth a clearly defined concept of “nature,” we argue that proclaiming the end of nature is misguided. This proclamation means forgetting the body. If we really want to get beyond understanding nature as something outside of us, and truly sense and understand ourselves as natural or environmental beings who are a part of the earth’s ecosystem, we should direct our attention to how nature as the biotic, inner/outer environment is experienced and sensed in and through our bodies. We thus suggest that environmental philosophy should encourage sensing like embodied beings before introducing notions like thinking like a mountain, mall, water, or a plant for that matter. This approach is among other things based on the phenomemology of the body (Merleau-Ponty) and phenomenology of the real (Conrad-Martius).”

Cassirer’s philosophy of symbols is applied to Uexküll’s concept of “Umwelt” (meaningful environment). I argue that the vast domain of human symbolism extends the human Umwelt far beyond the Umwelts of animal species. We humans live and act in many intersecting symbolic worlds, one of the most important of which is our ethical Umwelt. I claim that against the background of ecological disaster and the uncontrolled accelerating incursion of our financial institutions and biotechnological industry into planetary ecology, the term “Umwelt” can no longer simply mean the part of our surroundings that is meaningful to us. Given the current severe ecological crisis, Cassirer’s idea of an “ethical Umwelt” must also be expanded, and an ethical imperative must be integrated into our understanding of “environment.” In other words, for us today the meaning of the term “Umwelt” or “meaningful environment” should be synonymous with “the living world to be saved” or “sacred environment.”

Environmental ethics is based on the extension of the morality sphere as a consequence of an enlarged moral community beyond the limits of human community. I argue in this paper that the turning point in this extension is the notion of intrinsic value. But the process of extension produces some theoretical puzzles. One of them is the essential tension between the aim to include more and more entities into the moral community and the need for a hierarchy in order to preserve the interests of a good life for more complex living beings. My suggestion is that if the suppositions of traditional anthropocentrism are dislodged, the theoretical conflict is balanced or even dissolved at a managerial level. Biocentrism is the theory that could assume this task.

The article discusses the genealogy of 20th-century Norwegian ecophilosophies as deriving from a specific philosophy of climbing, one which is irreducible to philosophy of alpinism so far as it is based on the principle of cooperation and on the intrinsic value of interacting with the mountain rather than on competition, which makes the mountain an arena for sport activities. In this context, the expression to think like a mountain will be analyzed as something more than an impressive metaphor, and examined as a new way of thinking that avoids the extremes of both radical anthropocentrism and biocentrism.

The protection and improvement of the environment represents the most essential field of engagement among all the issues of international policy. An ecological paradigm in the traditional and postmodern context refers to a strategic approach to solving the outstanding controversies of human society in different stages of its existence. Globalization of the environment is the oldest example of this process, which in the contemporary world has gained a special significance. Negative trends in addressing ecological problems at all levels of organization of the planetary community oblige the international participants to apply more adequate measures to preserve the ecological safety of humankind.

The immediate history of relations between man and nature is marked by mutual conflict. Until recently, nature had supremacy over man through the force of its natural power. During this period, the encounter with nature for man was a conflict with wholly implacable forces. Advances in science and technology have in some cases tamed the forces of nature, and now man can carry out planned and systematic violence against it. In so doing, he came to a privileged, but also sinful relationship with nature. The end result proved devastating for both nature and for man. Man's quality of life has increased, but at an unacceptable cost for the environment, especially considering that both man and nature will be in dire straits in the not-so-distant future. It is urgent that man, as a reasonable officer of nature, finds ways to reconcile his relationship with nature.

The first obstacle experimental ethics faces when it comes to its normative account is Hume’s guillotine, also known as the naturalistic fallacy. My objective is to show how experimental ethics can answer to naturalistic fallacy with the help of normative projections.In order to arrive at my objective, I will first explain what experimental philosophy (xphi) is, and how it is perceived as a movement against “armchair philosophy.” In the second section, I explain why experimental moral philosophy or experimental ethics is immune to many of the arguments that are raised against xphi, and why it is not necessary to be against armchair philosophers. After this, I argue that discussing the meta-ethical grounding of experimental ethics will not help us to answer to the naturalistic fallacy. The last section contains my own proposal for seeing people’s intuitions and decisions as normative projections that have an impact on normative ethics. In this way, Hume’s guillotine is no longer an obstacle for a normative account of experimental ethics.