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Croatian Journal of Philosophy

Volume 8, Issue 1, 2008
Philosophy of Linguistics

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Displaying: 1-11 of 11 documents


philosophy of linguistics
1. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
Dunja Jutronić Introduction
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2. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
John Collins Knowledge of Language Redux
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The article takes up a range of issues concerning knowledge of language in response to recent work of Rey, Smith, Matthews and Devitt. I am broadly sympathetic with the direction of Rey, Smith, and Matthews. While all three are happy with the locution ‘knowledge of language’, in their different ways they all reject the apparent role for a substantive linguistic epistemology in linguistic explanation. I concur but raise some friendly concerns over even a deflationary notion of knowledge of language. Against Devitt I have more serious worries. The latter half of the paper seeks further clarification of Devitt’s realism and raises concerns over its ability to reflect the shape and content of linguistics.
3. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
Robert J. Matthews Epistemic Heresies: Reply to John Collins’ Redux
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Elaborating on views I have expressed elsewhere, I argue that the common-sense notion of linguistic competence as a kind of knowledge is both required by common-sense explanatory and justificatory practice and furthermore fully compatible with the non-intentional characterization of linguistic competence provided by current linguistic theory, which is itself non-intentional.
4. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
Barry C. Smith What Remains of Our Knowledge of Language?: Reply to Collins
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The new Chomskian orthodoxy denies that our linguistic competence gives us knowledge of a language, and that the representations in the language faculty are representations af anything. In reply, I have argued that through their intuitions speaker / hearers, (but not their language faculties) have knowledge of language, though not of any externally existing language. In order to count as knowledge, these intuitions must track linguistic facts represented in the language faculty. I defend this idea against the objections Collins has raised to such an account.
5. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
Brian Epstein The Internal and the External in Linguistic Explanation
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Chomsky and others have denied the relevance of external linguistic entities, such as E-languages, to linguistic explanation, and have questioned their coherence altogether. I discuss a new approach to understanding the nature of linguistic entities, focusing in particular on making sense of the varieties of kinds of “words” that are employed in linguistic theorizing. This treatment of linguistic entities in general is applied to constructing an understanding of external linguistic entities.
articles
6. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
C. S. Jenkins Boghossian and Epistemic Analyticity
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Boghossian claims that we can acquire a priori knowledge by means of a certain form of argument, our grasp of whose premises relies on the existence of implicit definitions. I discuss an objection to his ‘analytic theory of the a priori’. The worry is that in order to employ this kind of argument we must already know its conclusion. Boghossian has responded to this type of objection in recent work, but I argue that his responses are unconvincing. Along the way, I resist Ebert’s reasons for thinking that Boghossian’s argument fails to transmit warrant from its premises to its conclusion.
7. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
Mladen Domazet Feeling in Private: Rationality of Emotions and Social Conditioning
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It can be assumed that if any part of our mental life is innate it could in principle be developed in private, i.e. is not of necessity a social product. According to the argument in de Sousa (1980), emotions can be subjected to rationality assessments, making them a part, albeit special (borderline), of our ‘rational life’. Contribution of emotions to the conduct of ‘rational life’ is important, as the characteristics of belief and action most commonly associated with rationality do not provide sufficient grounds to guide an organism towards any particular course of action. By asking whether emotions (such that are still subjectable to minimal rationality assessments) can be developed in private (in a sense of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations) we are asking whether there can be any part of our ‘rational life’ that could be innate, and thus not a result of social conditioning. A brief survey of the related issue of interpretation of Wittgenstein’s arguments against private language and rule-following reveals that the issue is not whether socially non-conditioned emotions could be experienced (exist), but whether we would ever, given the absence of ‘investigation independent standards of correctness’, be able to know that they are or are not.
book discussion
8. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
Nataša Rogina Aspects of Personal Identity Under a Magnifying Glass
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9. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
Joško Žanić The Way Things Are
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book reviews
10. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
Snježana Prijic-Samaržija The Epistemology of Testimony
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11. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
Iris Vidmar Knowledge and Practical Interests
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