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1. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 26 > Issue: 2
Anna Varga-Jani Editorial Note
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2. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 26 > Issue: 2
Frank Darwiche Heidegger and the Thorny Issue of (Re)configuring Facticity
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The purpose of this article is twofold. It first seeks to prove that the notion of facticity in Heidegger’s work saw a major change after Being and Time. While several studies did deal with facticity as it appeared before the magnus opus and show the influence it had on the latter’s development, hardly any have dealt with what happens to facticity after Sein und Zeit. This is mostly because facticity, as it imploded, took on different names which fall under the heading of ground-attunements. Secondly, I will show the ambivalent character of this new facticity, where many essential notions, such as thrownness, truth, attunement and guilt, shifted meanings, sometimes almost imperceptibly or surreptitiously. I will show that this ambivalence comes from the fact that the shift in question allowed for an opening of facticity while at the same time bringing in restrictive limits, and thus a closing-off of certain essential issues. This has left several adumbrated questions, such as responsibility, in abeyance.
3. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 26 > Issue: 2
Gert-Jan van der Heiden The Christian Experience of Life and the Task of Phenomenology: Heidegger on Saint Paul, Saint Augustine, and Descartes
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It is well-known that the early Heidegger offers important reflec­tions on the Christian experience of life in his accounts of Saint Paul and Saint Augustine. Yet, what is the systematic meaning of Heidegger’s phenomenology of religion? This essay aims to discuss this question by connecting themes from Die Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens to Heidegger’s attempt to provide his own version of phenomenology in Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung. Heidegger’s position with respect to Husserl’s phenomenology becomes clearer, I argue, when his problematization of the onto-theological structures he discerns at the heart of the philosophers he discusses, such as Descartes and Augustine, is taken into account and when it is shown how the phenomenology of religion exceeds the boundaries of a phenomenology that studies consciousness alone. In fact, the explication of the (purified) Christian experience of life and the concep­tion of God at stake in this experience allows Heidegger to articulate a form of phenomenology purified from onto-theological tendencies.
4. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 26 > Issue: 2
Andrzej Serafin Barely visible: Heidegger’s Platonic Theology
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Heidegger’s thinking, according to his own testimony, is rooted in two traditions of philosophy: Platonic-Aristotelian ontology and Husserl’s phe­nomenology. Heidegger’s claim that the original understanding of Being is lost and has to be rediscovered conjoins the phenomenological claim that there is a certain mode of seeing that enables a revelatory philosophical insight. I would like to show how Heidegger combines both these claims in his supposition that the original philosophical conceptuality, as developed by Plato and Aristotle, was lost but can be retrieved by means of applying the phenomenological method to the interpretation of texts. Furthermore, I would like to interpret this retrieval in the context of Heidegger’s project of “overcoming metaphysics” and Nietzsche’s suggestion that “Plato was essentially a pantheist, yet in the guise of a dualist”.
5. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 26 > Issue: 2
Krzysztof Ziarek The (Techno-)Poetical Rescue
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This essay examines the notion of “poetical rescue” in Heidegger, which derives from Heidegger’s commentary on Hölderlin’s lines from “Patmos,” “Yet where danger is, grows also that which rescues.” Heidegger’s remarks on the two-faced essence of technology draw on these lines, characterizing the enframing as both the danger and the possibility of saving. The turn from danger to rescue depends on the possibility of a poetic revealing, which has been overshadowed, even disallowed, by the dominant revealing in modernity—namely, das Gestell. To free the possibility of the poetic revealing and the rescue spreading from it, humans, as Heidegger remarks, need to learn to become mortals. To be mortal means here being “capable of death as death”—that is, becoming attentive to the nothingness pulsing in every moment. The rescue Heidegger explores is thus the freeing of the experience proper to being mortal in the midst of a revealing that orders all that exists into the ready availability of a standing-reserve.
6. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 26 > Issue: 2
Magdalena Hoły-Łuczaj Being-toward-death in the Anthropocene: On the possibility of contributing-toward-the-death-of-others
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“No one can take the other’s dying away from him,” as Martin Heidegger famously claimed, but what he was significantly silent about was that beings, both human and non-human, can mutually contribute to each other’s death. By focusing on the interrelatedness of deaths, this paper presents a rever­sal of the Heideggerian perspective on the relation between Dasein’s mineness and “being-toward-death.” Drawing upon the structural meaning of death, which consists in the fact that no one can replace me in that I will die, I show that the phenomenon of contributing-toward-the-death-of-others individuates Dasein as well. This will allow us to reread the threat of the They in the context of the Anthropocene, elucidating the non-transferable character of my share in others’ death. Finally, the paper aims to deepen our understanding of the change in the character of death which has been brought about by technology in the Anthropocene.
7. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 26 > Issue: 2
George J. Seidel Heidegger and the Overcoming of Metaphysics
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Heidegger revisits German idealism after the “turn” in his thought in the mid-1930’s. There are a couple of reasons for this. One is philosophical, if not “theological” in his sense of that term. The other is personal. This later reason is emphasized by Otto Pöggeler, who suggests that after 1945 Heidegger sought to understand what had gone wrong in the tragic European debacle. Heidegger will lay the blame at the doorstep of what he terms onto-theology and the subjectivism he sees as endemic to the German idealist tradition, above all as exemplified in Hegel’s “onto-theo-ego-logy.” The article explores Heidegger’s reading of this tradi­tion of German philosophy as it begins with Leibniz and culminates in Nietzsche. It is the Event itself that makes possible the overcoming of metaphysics and its onto-theology. As Heidegger says in Contributions to Philosophy (From the Event), the ens realissimum (das Seiendste) “is” no more. It is the Event (Ereignis) that is the “most real,” since it is the Event that shows up and manifests itself as the revelation of the truth of Beinge in Da-sein, the being that is there in the Event.
8. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 26 > Issue: 2
Mark T. Nelson Could there be an Atheistic Political Theology?
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“Only a God can save us.” So says Martin Heidegger in his pessimistic assessment of merely human philosophy’s ability to change the world. The thought is not unique to Heidegger: another thinker who arrived at a similar conclusion was Heidegger’s contemporary and sometime admirer, Carl Schmitt, in his idea of “political theology.” I take up Schmitt’s version of the idea and use it to examine the New Atheism, a relatively recent polemical critique of religion by an informal coalition of English-speaking scientists, philosophers, and writers. Taking Sam Har­ris’s book The End of Faith (2005) as my test case, I ask whether the New Atheism can instructively be read as a Schmittian “political theology”, not least because of its strongly anti-liberal implications for toleration of religious belief and practice. I close by posing the question of what sort of theory would deserve to be called an atheistic political theology and whether such a theory exists, or could exist.
articles on other subjects
9. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 26 > Issue: 2
Mark Sultana What is Time Like?: The Relation Between Self-Consciousness and Time
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In this paper, which is situated in the broad stream of the confluence between analytic philosophy and phenomenology, I shall attempt to articulate the relation between self-consciousness and time consciousness. I shall show that the primary meaning of time entails a self-conscious being, and that time and change are related, but in an analogous way. Different forms of life—with concomitant different forms of self-consciousness—are qualitatively different in their capability of experiencing the flow of time. In making this claim, I shall discuss Husserl’s distinction between pre-reflective or tacit self-awareness (inner-consciousness) and reflective self-consciousness (inner perception), and I shall show that this view is similar to Augustine’s distinction between nosse and cogitare and Aquinas’ distinc­tion between ”habitual” and “actual” self-knowledge. It will also be intimated that simultaneity is associated with empathy.
book reviews
10. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 26 > Issue: 2
Curtis Hancock A Companion to Polish Christian Philosophy of the 20th and 21st Centuries, eds. Piotr S. Mazur, Piotr Duchlinski, Pawel Skrzydlewski
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11. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 26 > Issue: 2
Reviewers of Articles Submitted in 2021
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12. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 26 > Issue: 2
Note about Forum Philosophicum
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13. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Jacek Surzyn The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Forum Philosophicum
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14. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Piotr S. Mazur Polish Christian Philosophy of the Twentieth Century
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15. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Ted Peters Natural Science within Public Christian Philosophy and Public Systematic Theology
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Christian philosophy provides the form and systematic theology the substance when the church turns its intellectual face toward the wider public. This united front is vital in the context of a global competition between worldviews, where naturalism in the form of aggressive scientism has declared war on all things religious. Through discourse clarification the philosopher should distinguish between genuine science and the naturalistic reductionism that attempts to co-opt it; and through worldview construction the theologian should then demonstrate how nature viewed by science belongs within a picture where all reality is oriented toward the one God of grace. In the battle between competing explanations of real­ity, the public Christian philosopher along with the public systematic theologian should offer a worldview with greater explanatory adequacy.
16. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Michał Chaberek The Metaphysical Problem for Theistic Evolution: Accidental Change Does Not Generate Substantial Change
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This paper focuses on one of the metaphysical problems facing theistic conceptions of evolution: namely, that of evolutionary transition from one specified substantial form to another. According to the evolutionary account, new substantial forms appear due to accidental changes in previously existing substances. However, accidental change may only lead to the production of new accidents, not entirely new and distinct substantial forms. The solutions proposed by modern Thomists go in two directions: reducing the number of substantial forms (species), and rejecting substantial form altogether. Both proposals deviate from classical metaphysics. The evolutionary account of the origin of species is ultimately obliged to challenge the real existence of species, and so leads to nominalism. As such it cannot be reconciled with classical metaphysics.
17. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
James D. Capehart Étienne Gilson: Three Stages and Two Modes of His Christian Philosophy
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In this paper, I demarcate the three main stages of development of Étienne Gilson’s doctrine concerning Christian philosophy through an examination of some of his key works, treated in chronological order. Thus, I proceed to explicate how Gilson’s doctrine developed from its gestational stage in the 1920s, through the first Christian philosophy debate of the 1930s, into its second phase of birth and infancy from the 1930s through the early 1950s, ending with its third period, that of maturity, in the later 1950s and 1960s. Furthermore, I note that implicit throughout those three stages are conceptions of Christian philosophy as existing in two modes: one as the philosophical component present within theology, and the other as, properly speaking, outside of theology—though by no means outside of the influence of Christianity. Additionally, Gilson’s influence upon St. John Paul II’s treatment of Christian philosophy in Fides et Ratio is addressed. The paper culminates in a demonstration of how Gilson’s mature doctrine regarding Christian philosophy is relevant as a guide for the pursuit of Christian philosophy in this, our Third Christian Millennium.
18. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Anna Varga-Jani From the Husserlian Transcendental Idealism to the Question on Being: An Original Linkage between Phenomenology and Theology in Edith Stein’s Thinking
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It is a well-known fact that Husserl’s Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and phenomenological Philosophy I, published in 1913, was disappointingly received in the phenomenological circle around Husserl, and started a reinterpretation of Husserlian phenomenology. The problem of the constitution was a real dilemma for the studentship of Munich–Gottingen. More of Husserl’s students from his Gottingen years reflected in the 1930s on transcendental idealism, which they originated from the Ideas and found fulfilled in Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations and Formal and transcendental Logic. The remarkable similarity between these papers lies in how the question of being is incorporated into the problematic of the method in Husserlian phenomenology. But this parallelism in the problem reveals the origin of the religious phenomenon in Husserlian phenomenology as well. Adolf Reinach’s religious terms such as gratitude (Dankbarkeit), charity (Barmherzigkeit), etc. in his religious Notes, Heidegger’s notion of being as finiteness in Being and Time, Edith Stein’s concept of the finite and eternal being in Finite and Eternal Being are fundamental to the problem of constitution in transcendental phenomenology, but these two phenomena of being point at the constitution theologically. In my paper I would like to show the transition from the critique of Husserlian transcendental idealism to the roots of the experience of religious life through the phenomenological problem of being in Edith Stein.
19. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Wojciech Szczerba The Concept of Universal Salvation: Apokatastasis in the Thought of Friedrich Schleiermacher. An Outline
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The article analyzes the concept of universal salvation—apokatastasis in the thought of Friedrich Schleiermacher especially with reference to his early Speeches on Religion and the later treatise The Christian Faith. It moves from Schleiermacher’s understanding of religion per se to his soteriological and escha­tological theories. He understands the nature of religion as the feeling-intuition of the Infinite and points to a certain aspect of mystery, which religion contains. He rejects in the Speeches on Religion the anthropomorphic understanding of God and speaks of God-Universum. In the treatise Christian Faith, he reinterprets the theological concept of original sin and depravation, and points to a natural process of development of humankind from Godless-consciousness to God-consciousness. From the Protestant-reformed tradition Schleiermacher adopts the concept of predestination. However, he rejects the so called “double predestination” of sal­vation and condemnation. According to him, all people are chosen to be saved “in Christ”. This way, Schleiermacher continues the Reformed tradition, however he understands the election in universal categories. He rejects God, who chooses for salvation only some people, but accepts God-Universum, who maintains the unity of creation and leads people to perfect communion. This drives the German thinker to universalistic beliefs. In the convictions pointing to the final unity of humankind, Schleiermacher exposes his deep humanism. He assumes that it is impossible to reconcile the traditional view of eternal hell with God’s love. Divine punishment can serve as an aspect of overall paidagogia, leading to the maturing of humanity. However, it cannot be understood as a retribution, based on God’s wrath and cruel lex talionis. Such an understanding of God is for Schleiermacher unacceptable. Understanding soteriology in these terms, Schleiermacher refers to the apokata­static tradition of the Church Fathers and the classical concept of apokatastasis. In the modern context he continues and develops the personal aspect of apokatastasis, but also—through his affinities to the thought of Spinoza—draws near to its macro-scale, cosmological form.
20. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Jean Gové Distributed Cognition, Neuroprostheses and their Implications to Non-Physicalist Theories of Mind
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This paper investigates the notion of “distributed cognition”—the idea that entities external to one’s organic brain participate in one’s overall cognitive functioning—and the challenges it poses to the notion of personhood. Related to this is also a consideration of the ever-increasing ways in which neuroprostheses replace and functionally replicate organic parts of the brain. However, the litera­ture surrounding such issues has tended to take an almost exclusively physicalist approach. The common assumption is that, given that non-physicalist theories (chiefly, dualism, and hylomorphism) postulate some form of immaterial “soul,” then they are immune from the challenges that these advances in cognitive science pose. The first aim of this paper, therefore, is to argue that this is not the case. The second aim of this paper is to attempt to elucidate a route available for non-physicalists that will allow them to accept the notion of distributed cognition. By appealing to an Aristotelian framework, I propose that non-physicalists can accept the notion of distributed cognition by appealing to the notion of “unitary life” which I introduce, as well as to Aristotle’s dichotomy between active and passive mind.