How might people be wronged in relation to their feelings, moods, and emotions? Recently philosophers have begun to investigate the idea that these kinds of wrongs may constitute a distinctive form of injustice: affective injustice. In previous work, we have outlined a particular form of affective injustice that we called emotional imperialism. This paper has two main aims. First, we aim to provide an expanded account of the forms that emotional imperialism can take. We will do so by drawing inspiration from William Reddy’s (2001) concept of an emotional regime and investigating ways in which colonial powers of the eighteenth to twentieth centuries sought to impose their emotional regimes on their colonial subjects. Second, we will offer more expansive accounts of both emotional imperialism and affective injustice that can accommodate these additional forms of emotional imperialism.

Anger gaslighting is behavior that tends to make someone doubt herself about her anger. In this paper, I analyze the case of anger gaslighting, using it as a paradigm case to argue that gaslighting can be an affective injustice (not only an epistemic one). Drawing on Marilyn Frye, I introduce the concept of “uptake” as a tool for identifying anger gaslighting behavior (persistent, pervasive uptake refusal for apt anger). But I also demonstrate the larger significance of uptake in the study of affective injustice: just as the concept of credibility names the epistemic behavior whereby we take someone seriously as an epistemic being, the concept of uptake names the uniquely affective cooperative behavior whereby we take someone seriously as an affective being. I answer Miranda Fricker’s epistemic notion of a prejudicial credibility economy with the affective notion of prejudicial uptake economies: uptake, like credibility, can be produced in a deficit for one social group relative to a surplus for another. Deviating from the parallels with Fricker, for whom the injustice of epistemic injustice is due to prejudice in the motives or character of individuals, as well as from accounts that ground it in aptness or affective goods, I suggest that the injustice of anger gaslighting behavior can be located at the structural scale of power relationships between social groups, in the tradition of Iris Marion Young. Anger gaslighting behavior counts as unjust wherever it (re)produces prejudicial uptake economies. Adapting sociological concepts of feeling rules and the emotion work they demand, I introduce the concepts of “uptake rules” and “uptake work” to further enable analysis of uptake economies as affective social structures, and to suggest a site for resistant or reparative affective agency.

What I call the unfelt in society refers to different ways in which certain events or conditions fail to evoke affective responses or give rise to merely sporadic or toned-down modes of emotive concern. This is evident in public (non)responses to the ecological crisis in the Global North. I sketch an approach to the unfelt, drawing on work in phenomenology and on the situated affectivity approach. I focus on structural apathy as the condition of spatial, social, and cognitive-affective distance from the devastation and suffering caused by capitalist modes of living. Most members of affluent societies live their lives spatially and ‘existentially’ removed from the dehumanizing living conditions of those whose exploited labor and (stolen) land enable and sustain that affluence. The resulting apathy amounts to a constitutional inability to grasp, fathom, and sympathize with the plight of those who are forced to endure those conditions. I hold that structural apathy is an underdiscussed baseline of affective injustice. Its analysis can generate insights into the conditions that make forms of affective injustice so pervasive and seemingly ‘natural’ in Western modernity. While the present text broadly contributes to the debate on affective injustice, it also voices some reservations about this debate and its guiding notion.

There is growing philosophical interest in “affective injustice”: injustice faced by individuals specifically in their capacity as affective beings. Current debates tend to focus on affective injustice at the psychological level. In this paper, I argue that the built environment can be a vehicle for affective injustice—specifically, “affective powerlessness.” I use resources from ecological psychology to develop this claim. I consider two cases where certain kinds of bodies are, either intentionally or unintentionally, deprived of access to goods affording the development and maintenance of their subjective well-being: hostile architecture and masking practices in autism. This deprivation, I argue further, leads to a significant weakening and diminishment of their spatial agency, hinders their well-being, and in so doing gives rise to a pervasive experience of affective powerlessness. By drawing attention to these themes, I show that an ecological approach helpfully supplements existing approaches. It highlights how affective injustice can emerge via the way bodies are positioned in space, and the central role that built environments play in determining this positioning.

Philosophers have started to theorize the concept of ‘affective injustice’ to make sense of certain ways in which people’s affective lives are significantly marked by injustice. This new research has offered important insights into people’s lived experiences under oppression. But it is not immediately clear how the concept ‘affective injustice’ picks out something different from the closely related phenomenon of ‘psychological oppression.’ This paper considers the question of why we might need new theories of affective injustice in light of the well-established cross-disciplinary literature on psychological oppression. I suggest that, whereas psychological oppression is found in the hearts and minds of people who are oppressed, affective injustice is most fruitfully understood as a structural phenomenon. It operates primarily outside of us: in affective norms, practices, and relationships that are embedded in social conditions of injustice. The account I offer is tentative and incomplete. But my hope is that it will help show how theorizing affective injustice has the potential to enrich existing theories of justice and theories of psychological oppression.

In this paper, I seek to describe the ‘other’ harms and forms of wrongdoing that an affective stereotype with specific racial and gender content, has. I will focus on the “Angry Black Woman” stereotype (or ABW stereotype), and I will reveal its intrinsic and direct extrinsic harms. I’ll then argue that it is a stereotype threat prime whose harm as an ‘affective injustice’ can cause agents to underperform on real-life affective, social, and political tasks. I also think prescriptively with Black feminist Audre Lorde about stereotype threat and how to respond to it. In doing so, I hope to contribute to the conversation that began with Larry Blum by expanding the harms that stereotypes inflict, particularly affective stereotypes of marginalized groups.

This article proposes that linguistic shame is a form of affective injustice and describes some of the benefits of classifying it as such. Linguistic shame involves feelings of embarrassment, a sense of inferiority, and attitudes of self-reproach that arise in relation to the way one speaks. The article gives an account of three main types of linguistic shame to which Latinx people are subject: the shame of the English as a second-language speaker; the shame of the Spanglish speaker; and the shame of the English-only speaker. In all cases, linguistic shame emerges in the context of linguicism, a system in which some ways of speaking are privileged and the way one speaks is an indicator of the speaker’s social status. Classifying linguistic shame as an affective injustice highlights the political nature of the emotion and provides some guidance for how to resist this injustice.

Because white supremacy is designed to deliver unearned privileges and advantages to white people, they especially have a responsibility to engage in antiracism. However, many white people fail to do so, time and time again. We posit that, in many cases, antiracist efforts are thwarted because individuals face what we call “the motivation problem.” The motivation problem is a persistent lack or reduction of motivation to engage in antiracist praxis. We suggest that “emotion regulation”—acts performed with the goal of modifying an emotion—plays a key role in the creation of the motivation problem. In some cases, emotion regulation can cause individuals to experience emotions ill suited for motivating antiracism. In other cases, individuals experience emotions that are well suited for motivating antiracism but they undergo emotion regulation that counteracts these feelings. In both cases, emotion regulation reduces motivation for antiracist praxis. To redress the motivation problem, we propose that people can repurpose emotion regulation strategies to increase motivation for antiracism. We thus suggest that emotion regulation is both a cause of and a solution to the motivation problem. Overall, the paper’s 164 first aim is to show that emotion regulation plays a unique and devious role in sustaining white supremacy via the motivation problem. Our second aim is to show that emotion regulation can and should be repurposed for antiracist ends.

This paper examines how we may fail other people in their capacity as affective beings, but instead of looking at failures of justice, I examine failures of love and care. Our evaluative attitudes and emotions—when they are fitting—are affective responses to the world that tell us things about the world: they tell us what is funny, what is blameworthy, what merits despair. They also—both when they are fitting and when they are not—tell us things about the person who has the response. When we ignore the reasons of fit that support someone’s evaluative attitude or emotion, perhaps because we take extrinsic reasons such as prudential reasons to be overriding, we may be participating in a system of affective injustice, or we may simply be failing to care about the importance to that person of having fitting attitudes and emotions. Both justice and care can require that we attend properly to other people’s reasons of fit. Evaluative attitudes and emotions are fitting when they reflect the way in which their object really matters, but because it is in subjective experience that something matters, fittingness is fundamentally subjective. It is only by idealizing in a certain way that we can speak—figuratively— of fittingness as “intersubjective.” Justice does require that we determine what is and is not “intersubjectively fitting,” and so we must rely on the figurative notion of “intersubjective fittingness.” Nevertheless, because the subjective experience of those we love and care for must matter to us in a way that exceeds the requirements of justice, we might fail those whom we love by applying 190 only “intersubjective fittingness conditions”—rather than subjective fittingness conditions—when assessing the reasons of fit for their evaluative attitudes or emotions. Some acts of care—such as helping someone identify what they subjectively value—call for a focus on what is subjectively fitting for them. However, unconditional love requires something entirely different; when we love unconditionally we step outside of any evaluative stance and thus outside of any stance from which reasons of fit are relevant, and step into a stance of acceptance.

What can Adam Smith can teach us about the emotional terrain of difficult conversations, particularly those that touch on lived realities of injustice, oppression, and marginalization? In Part One of the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith takes a few pages to dwell on the topic of interpersonal disagreement: more specifically, on how differently we feel about disagreements “with regard to such indifferent objects as concern neither me nor my companion” (TMS, 21) than we do when our own fortunes, feelings and even identity are bound up in the topic at hand. I argue that careful attention to Smith’s discussion of disagreement reveals a set of norms for navigating uncomfortable terrain that avoid the pitfalls of so-called tone-policing and other contemporary approaches to civility.

Feminist theorists have long recognized the social and political power of emotions, and they have frequently noted that these same emotions are often dismissed, especially when they are expressed by the oppressed. My aim in this paper is to offer a general account of the wrong of affective dismissal and consider whether this wrong might, in some circumstances, be understood as a kind of affective injustice. I begin by making a few observations about anger and its assessment. I then turn to the phenomenon of being dismissed and consider one influential attempt to make sense of it. After a brief interlude in which I introduce what I see as the most plausible account of valuing, I argue that affective dismissal is wrong because it displays utter disrespect for persons as valuers. In the last section of the essay, I consider whether affective dismissal should be understood as a type of affective injustice. I ultimately argue that existing accounts of affective injustice are vulnerable to objection, and I sketch an alternative.

Why do people endorse conspiracy theories? There is no single explanation: different people have different attitudes to the theories they say they believe. In this paper, I argue that for many, conspiracy theories are serious play. They’re attracted to conspiracy theories because these theories are engaging: it’s fun to entertain them (witness the enormous number of conspiracy narratives in film and TV). Just as the person who watches a conspiratorial film suspends disbelief for its duration, so many conspiracy theorists do not believe the theories they endorse; rather, they suspend disbelief in them. I argue that the serious play hypothesis explains some characteristic features of conspiracy theories, such as their gamification and the kind of relationship they have to evidence.

At times, weird stories such as the Pizzagate spread surprisingly quickly and widely. In this paper I analyze the mental attitudes of those who seem to take those absurdities seriously: I argue that those stories are often imagined rather than genuinely believed. Then I make room for the claim that often these imaginings are used to support group ideologies. My main contribution is to explain how that support actually happens by showing that motivated cognition can employ imagination as a seemingly rational tool to reinforce and protect ideologies.

When membership of a community depends on commitment to shared beliefs, the community is a belief-based coalition, and the beliefs are identity-defining beliefs. Belief-based coalitions are pervasive features of human social life and routinely drive motivated cognition and epistemically dysfunctional group dynamics. Despite this, they remain surprisingly undertheorized in social epistemology. This article (i) clarifies the properties of belief-based coalitions and identity-defining beliefs, (ii) explains why they often incentivize and coordinate epistemically dysfunctional forms of communication and cognitive labor, and (iii) argues that they provide a better explanation of many epistemic problems on social media than the concepts of epistemic bubbles, echo chambers, and gamification.

Self-deceptive projects are frequently supported by our social environment, with others influencing both our motives and capacities for self-deception. Digital spaces offer even more opportunities for interactive self-deception. Digital platforms are incentivized to sort us and capture our engagement, and online users also have desires to be sorted and engaged. The execution of self-deception is partially offloaded to algorithms and social networks that filter our evidence, selectively draw our attention to evidence, offer rationalizations, and give us repetitive and emotion-laden feedback. Nevertheless, this is not so different from what we find in offline environments. Further, most of this offloading of information processing is willingly accepted by users and is in line with their desires. As such, responsibility for any motivationally biased beliefs largely lies with the individual internet user.

A popular claim is that social media is a cause of contemporary high levels of political polarization. In this paper, I consider three of the most common kinds of arguments for the thesis. One type lays out a narrative of causes, tracing the causal steps between logging on to social media and later becoming more polarized. Another type uses computer modeling to show how polarized effects can arise from systems that are analogous to use of social media. The final type considers straightforward experimental evidence for the polarizing effect. I reject each of these arguments and explain why they are unconvincing.

According to many theories of testimony, acts of testimony confer certain epistemic rights upon recipients, e.g., the right for the recipient to complain or otherwise hold the testifier responsible should the content of that testimony turn out to be false, and the right to “pass the epistemic buck”, such that the recipient can redirect relevant challenges they may encounter back to the testifier. While these discussions do not explicitly exclude testimonial acts that occur online, they do not specifically address them, either. Here, then, I will ask the following questions: do the differences between communicating in online and offline spaces affect our testimonial epistemic rights, and if so, how? While there is no singular “online space”, here I will focus on such spaces in which users communicate with one another, and in which communicated information can be vetted by other users (for example, social media). I argue that the characteristics of online testimony should make us think about testimonial epistemic rights differently, in two ways. First, whereas such rights have traditionally been conceived of as existing between the recipient and testifier, in many different types of online communication these rights exist between the recipient and a community. This is a result of the fact that online testimony is mediated, and in some cases partially determined by, a community of users. As such, testimonial epistemic rights in online spaces may be widely extended: while the original testifier still bears the brunt of responsibility for challenges, and is the primary buck-passee, all other members of the relevant community will also bear some such responsibilities. Second, the grounds of testimonial epistemic rights may differ in online spaces. Existing theories tend to ground such rights either in assurances provided by the testifier, or else norms that govern speech acts. I argue that testimony in online spaces should cause us to look to a third option, what I call norms of information sharing. The idea is that, given the highly social nature of online communication, a recipient acquires testimonial epistemic rights in virtue of having a reasonable expectation that information that is shared and vetted by the community meets certain standards. The grounds of online testimonial epistemic rights, then, is not primarily interpersonal or norms-based, but social.

Scientific curation, where scientific evidence is selected and shared, is essential to public belief formation about science. Yet common curation practices can distort the body of evidence the public sees. Focusing on science journalism, we employ computational models to investigate how such distortions influence public belief. We consider these effects for agents with and without confirmation bias. We find that standard journalistic practices can lead to significant distortions in public belief; that preexisting errors in public belief can drive further distortions in reporting; that practices that appear relatively unobjectionable can produce serious epistemic harm; and that, in some cases, common curation practices related to fairness and extreme reporting can lead to polarization.