論 著 / articles |
1.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1985 >
Issue: 8
耶昆如
Kun-yu Woo
西漢社會哲學之研究
A Study on the Social Philosophy of the Former Han Dynasty
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
This study is divided into three' main parts, and additionally includes an introduction, conclusion and footnotes.The first section examines the historical development of the social philosophy propounded by Lu Chia (ca. 260-170 B. C.), Chia Yi (200-168 B. C.), Tung Chung-shu (179-104 B. C.), Liu An (179-122 B. C.) and Ssu-ma Ch'ien (145-85 B. C.) in the Former Han Dynasty.The second part deals with the essential contents of the social philosophy in the Former Han Period, namely the amalgamation of the Confucianism and the Taoism, furthermore the social principle and the social problems in that time.Finally we attempt critique on the values and the limitations of the social philosophy in the Former Han Dynasty.
|
|
|
2.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1985 >
Issue: 8
葉阿舟
Ah-Yueh Yeh
三法中的叭 "jñeya" (所知)與們 "vijñeya" (所識)之研免 一一以《阿昆達磨集論〉為中心一
The Theories of “jñeya" (所知) and “vijñeya" (所識) in the Three Dharmas from the Viewpoint of the Abhidharma-samuccaya
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
It is well known that the Three Dharmas (rūpa-skandha, dharma-dhātu and mana-āyatana) , not only represent the Fiveskandas, Eighteen-dhūtus and Twelve-āyatanas, but also contain the all dharmas, therefore, Asaṅga, the author of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (AS) chose the "Three-dharmas" for the name of the first chapter of his AS.Although there are many quotations and explanations from the texts of the Abhidharma and Vijñānavādin in the AS, they are organized scientifically and explained systematically with the Mahāyāna-theories of Vaipuly (方農) dharma. Especially the two famous Buddhist technical terms "jñeya" (所知) and "vijñeya" (所識) appear not only the texts of Abhidharma and Yogācāra..bhūmi, but also in the second subsection of the "Three dharmas", the first chapter of the AS with sorne special meanings.Therefore, in this paper I compare the theories of these two terms of the AS with other texts, and then explain Some subjects from the viewpoint of the AS as follows: (1) Theposition of the Three dharmas in the AS. (2) The meanings and characteristics of the "jñeya" and "vijñeya". (3) The diffrent meanings between the "jñeya-dharma" and "jñeya-vastu". (4) The relations of the "jñeya-dharma" and thirteen jñānas (十三智). (5) The characteristics and meanings of "vijñeya" (所識).In conclution, it can be said that the Three dharmas. Five dharmas and the Three natures (parikalpita-svabhāva, paratantra-svabhāva and pariniṣpanna-svabhāva) are altogether under the name of "jñeya" of object, or dharma ete., which represents the all dharmas in this world to be known or investigated by us for the purpose to find out the theories of anatman. Especially, the theories of "vijñeya" in the AS are different from the other texts, which show that the special characteristics and activities of ālaya-vijñāna and the other six consciousness, are also to be perceived or recognized by us, and altogether for the purpose to forsake the adherances of the "jānaka" (知者), "paśyaka" (見者) and "draṣṭṛ" (能見者) as the ātman. When we understand the Vijñāvādin's theories of the śunyatā (妻性), and practice the Bodhisattva's ways, we can not only purify our minds, but also carry out the welfare works for all people and countries; thus the highest purpose of the Vijñāvādin. The PEACE OF THE WORLD, will be accomplished.
|
|
|
3.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1985 >
Issue: 8
Fu-Tseng Liu
Fu-Tseng Liu
The Functions of 'Yes' and 'No' in Chinese and English
中丈和英丈'是' (Yes) 和電 '不' (No)
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
奏起悉中文字~J英文的人必定都知道,在這兩個語言中,電是, (Yes) 和聖不 是, (No) 在文法上的使用, 並不完全一樣。在本文中, 我們要顯示在這些 不同的背餒,有一些較深的玄機。那就是,在中文,費是,和電不是,可以免予經 為是分別用來肯定 (affirm) 和否定 (deny) 的,但是在英文,它們只-是用 來當做某種說話的約定或力量一一它們不是像英文字典說的是用來肯定和否 定的。試看下列的電是-不是,問答系絡:問:牽灣在亞洲嗎?答1 :是,它在亞洲。答2 :不,它不在亞洲。設曹 'Q' 為間伺部分, 'P' 為答何部分的質詢電是, 或電不( 是)' , 而 'A' 為 答何部分,但不合費是,或聖不'。鄭麼,不論在中文互交英文,我們都可把這 種是-不是問答系絡看成有序三<Q, P, A> 。顯然,不論在中文或英文,如果P是用來肯定或否定,在這個有序三中 對之而做7月「定或否定的,必定是Q。我們可以說,在Q中所肯定或否定的是 Q 的對象或內容。假定P 是用或背定和否定的。那麼, 在這兩個話中這發肯 定和否定的結果,都必定是整個A。現在如果P是用來肯定Q的對象p的, 則所得結果應該是A,其中A是p,或A,或A為一致並且、涵蓋P,或者p諂蓋為A所涵蓋者並且A和P一致。而如果P是用來否定的,則所得結果應 該是A,其中A和p相矛盾或者A至少和p反對。我們根據這個判準,顯示在英文中,電 'Yes' 和電 'No' 在許多重要情況中 不是用來肯定和否定的,而在中文中,電是'和電不是,則懿乎都是。
|
|
|
4.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1985 >
Issue: 8
郭博文
Po-Wen Kuo
羅益世的絕對觀念論
The Absolute Idealism of Josiah Royce
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
This paper attempts to offer a detailed exposition and a critical analysis of Josiah Royce's absolute idealism. Section one explains Royce's basic jdealistic position. Sections two and three deal respectively with Royce's refutation of realism and his treatment of other conceptions of Being. Section four expounds and clarifies the essential content of Royce's absolute idealism. Section five contains some critical remarks.Royce's theory represents an ingenious effort to integrate the insights and contributions of the past major idealistic philosophers into a systematic whole. His criticisms of realism are pointed and convincing. However, Royce's own idealisnl is not free from solipsistic tendency, and his argument for the absolute knower fails to do justice to ideas and judgments about the future.
|
|
|
5.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1985 >
Issue: 8
張為良
Jui-Liang Chang
蘊處界三概念之分析研究
An Analytic Study on Three Concepts of “Skandha", “Āyatana" and “ Dhātu"
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
In the Philosophy of Buddhism, the three concepts of "Skandha" "Āyatana" and "Dhātu" are the fundamental and important concepts.The contents are:The five skandhas (aggregates) include form (matter), perception, conception (idea), volition (will) and conciousness.The twelve ayatana include six sense organs and six sense objects.The eighteen dhātus include six sense organs, six sense objects and six senses.I explained, discussed and illustrated these concepts.Finally, I attained conclusion, that is to say, "Skandha", "Āyatana" and "Dhātu" are no substance (anātma) , no duration (anityā) and no bliss (duḥkhā) except Nirvāṇa.
|
|
|
6.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1985 >
Issue: 8
球文秀
Wen-Shiow Chen
休誤的位格同一論證研討
On Burne's Personal Identity
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
The present paper attempts to examine Hume's argument of personal identity. The first section points out that personal identity is a specific case of the general problem of identity, which has been one of the perenial problem in philosophy since the ancient Greeks. The problem of personal identity on the other hand has occuppied an important place in philosophical discussions since Locke.The second and third sections deal with Hume's views concerning identity, including unmerical identity, specific identity, identity and diversity, and the relationship of all those identities with personal identity. The fourth section discusses Hume's theory of the self. It explains how Hume criticizes the traditional philosopher's view of the self as a substance. It also examines Hume's position concerning the mind. The fifth section examines another of Hume's arguments of persmal identity. The sixth section points out the three basic assumptions in Hume's arguments. It also offers some brief criticisms of these assumptions.
|
|
|
7.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1985 >
Issue: 8
張永偽
Jun-chun Chang
讀「上蔡語錄」所見
Thoughts from Reading “The Sayings of Shang-tsai (上蔡)"
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
Hsieh Shang-tsai (謝上蔡), with Yang Kwei-shan (楊龜山),two of the most distinguished disciples of the Cheng brothers(二程). Hsieh played an important role in the diffusion andtransimission of the ideas of the Cheng brothers. Both HuWu-feng (主胡鑫) and Lu Hsiang-shung (劉鼓山) were deeplyinfluenced by him in their philosophical development. Even ChuHsi in his early years was stimulated and inspired by him. Inthe present paper, I shall, based on my reading of "The sayingsof Shang-tsai", explore the sources, contents, and later expansionsof Hsieh's thought from the standpoint of philosophy andintellectual history. I shall assess his position in the Sung andMing Neoconfucianism, and I shall also discuss Chu Hsi's (朱熹jcriticssin of him.There are five basic points in Hsieh's philosophical thinking:(1) Perception (not sensory perception, but rather moral intuition) is Jen (仁) vitality is Jen.(2) Jen is rooted in human mind. Mind is function (spontaneous manifestation of the heavenly principle). 'True mind' as the true self' is the 'moral self'.(3) The heavenly principle is in my mind. To understand the heavenly principle is to recognize one's own mind. To investigate things and examine principles is to follow always the heavenly principle and discover the authentic mind.(4) The method of cultivating the authentic mind consists of five steps. (a) contemplation, (b) emptying the mind: becoming disinterested and innoceut. (c) sincerity: being constantly altest (常惺惺) and empathitic (spontaneous expression of the authentic mind-free self-awareness of the moral subject), (d) removing arrogance and restraining desires, (e) enjoying righteousness and principles.(5) Discriminatier between Confucianism and Buddhism: the Buddhists do not understand heaven, do not recognize principles, and do not see their own mind.
|
|
|
8.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1985 >
Issue: 8
楊志南
Huei-nan Yang
「空」否定了什麼? 一幢以龍樹《姐譯論〉為主的一個研究一一
What Does the 'Emptiness' in Nāgārjuna's Vigrahavyāvartanī Negate?
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
What does the 電Emptiness' in Nāgārjuna's Vigrahavyāvartanī negate? It negates 'svabhāva'-the intrinsic nature of things. This is a widely held view. However, Nāgārjuna himself in Vigrahavyāvartanī claimed, "I do not negate anything, I only 'make known' that the 'svabhāva' of things does not exist."Nāgārjuna's response was aimed at the Nyāya-one of the six schools in Indian philosophy. The Nyāya school said, "what is negated must be real; therefore, it is self-contradictory to say that the 'Emptiness' negates the 'real' thing." In order to counter this attack, Nagarjuna replied that the 'Emptiness' does not negate anything.
|
|
|
9.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1985 >
Issue: 8
茶信安
Denis Hsin-An Tsai
何必要有道德?
Why Should I Be Moral?
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
The paper deals with ethics by analyzing the ethical problems, such as "Why should I be moral?" The problem can be solved by seeing the "knot" of the questioner. When one has a difficulty of knowing why human being has to accept moral value, one might ask the question. Then, this question will become nonsensical.Moreover, the "knot" might be:(i) What is the nature of the highest good as the end of moral action? Or,(ii) Is the moral way the best one for us to procure the highest good? Or,(iii) Can we have a ground of moral faith?The problem can be solved or dismissed when the questioner has his answer to the question/ or questions.The last part of the paper indicates that ethics can be constructed as a ("game-theory" by a hermeneutical methodology.Those ethical rules have to be taken as a grammar of the humanities.
|
|
|
10.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1985 >
Issue: 8
Fu Pei-Jung
傅佩崇
The Justification of William James's “Religious Experience"
論詹拇士「宗教經驗」概念之證成
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
戲廉﹒詹姆士(William James, 1842-1910) 主張實用主義( Pragmatism) 。他會列舉八種對食用主義的通俗誤解, 一一加以駁斥, 然後正面 指出: r食用主義的原創住在於使用兵體的觀看法。」他昕謂的「兵體的觀 看法」其質正是指實用主義者心目中的「經驗」而言。因此,實用主義可以 說是一套「經驗之哲學」。這種特性與當代思潮的主流,像存在哲學、現象學、與維根斯坦學氓,非常相契,因而值侮吾人對它蓋新手以評價。「經驗」概念在實用主義J思想中扮演關鏈角色,因此要想真正欣賞這派 思想,首先必須適切了解這個概念。如所周知,安用主義者與英國經驗論者 雙方對於「經驗」概念的內涵與外延的看法互不相伴。不僅如此,實用主義者, 如皮爾士 (C. S. Peirce) 、詹姆士、與杜威 (John Dewey), 彼此之間的 「經驗」概念亦不盡相同。在進一步探討這個問題之前,本文擬專就詹姆士一人的見解深入評析。對於研究宗教哲學的人而言?詹姆士的例子顯然較為鳴目。這不僅因為 他會寫過「宗教經驗之種種J這本名薯,而且因為他的全部作品的焦點是 「嘗試建立一套在今日科學時代仍然生動有殼的宗教立揚。」從另一方面來 君,經驗若不加上某一範疇一一如美學、倫理學、或宗教一一的限定,貝u只 能用以表現「個別事物的流轉生鐵J ,而不足以展示目的性,更不足以引發 適當的行動。「宗教經驗」一詞不僅指稱某種特臻的經驗,而且暗示了某種 探討宗教的特殊進路,亦即經由經驗來探討宗教。本文擬自以下四方面分析詹姆士「宗教經驗」概念之證成: ~一)由心理學 觀點注意這種經驗的出發點; ,斗由倫理學觀點檢證這種現象的發展過程;臼 由形上學觀點透觀這種經驗的基聽;但)荐自神學觀點評估其效應。本文之作,得益於耶魯大學哲學系更正誼教授(Professor John E. Smith) 在「實用主義及其評論者」一課之啟發與討論, 特此誌謝。
|
|
|
11.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1985 >
Issue: 8
黃金色梅
Yih-Mei Huang
清代哲學中格物致知理論之探究
On the Theories of Ko-Wu and Chih-Chih in Ch'ing Dynasty
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
Under the influence of Koa-Cheng, the Ko-wu and Chih-chih becomes fundamental concepts to moral theories. Philosophy in Ch'ing Dynasty did not have theories of intellectual knowledge. Knowledge is nothing but for the sake of knowledge rather than for morality. This paper indicates this point by a discussion of thoughts of Wang Fu-chih, Huang Tsun-hsi, Ku Yen-wu, Yen Yüan, Li Kung, Tai Chen, and Chiao-Hsün.
|
|
|
12.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1985 >
Issue: 8
黃皮明
Ching-Huang
休如論實然與應然
Hume on “Is" and “Ought"
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
This paper deals with "is-ought" in order to indicate an ambiguity in Hume's ethical theory. Concerning the notion of "is-ought" there are two inconsistent interpretations of it. The one is provided by the emotivists, such as C. L. Stevenson. They contend that t "is" cannot entail "ought". Our moral judgment is an expression of our moral feeling. It does not report a fact. The other interpretation is provided by naturalists and descriptivists. The concept of "ought" can be derived from that of "is". Our moral judgment is a report or a description of our feeling and a fact.These two interpretations both can have its own evidences from the Hume's writings. The ambiguity cannot be clarified by the Humean ethical theory itself.
|
|
|
|
13.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1985 >
Issue: 8
哲學系簡訊
哲學系簡訊
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|