Cover of The Journal of Philosophy
Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:



Displaying: 1-4 of 4 documents


1. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 3
A. J. Cotnoir, Douglas Edwards From Truth Pluralism to Ontological Pluralism and Back
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Ontological pluralism holds that there are different ways of being. Truth pluralism holds that there are different ways of being true. Both views have received growing attention in recent literature, but so far there has been very little discussion of the connections between the views. The authors suggest that motivations typically given for truth pluralism have analogue motivations for ontological pluralism; they argue that while neither view entails the other, those who hold one view and wish to hold the other will find natural routes by which to do so. The authors additionally identify some disanalogies between the views, by considering whether certain “mixed” problems commonly pressed against truth pluralism have analogues for ontological pluralism.
2. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 3
Ran Wolff Emergent Privacy
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Defining privacy is a long-sought goal for philosophers and legal scholars alike. Current definitions lack mathematical rigor. They are therefore impracticable for domains such as economics and computer science in which privacy needs to be quantified and computed. This paper describes a game-theoretic framework in which privacy requires no definition per se. Rather, it is an emergent property of specific games, the strategy by which players maximize their reward. In this context, key activities related to privacy, such as methods for its protection and ways in which it is traded, are given concrete meaning. Based in game theory, emergent privacy demonstrates that the right to privacy can be derived, at least in part, on a utilitarian philosophical basis.
comments and criticism
3. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 3
Gil Sagi The Modal and Epistemic Arguments against the Invariance Criterion for Logical Terms
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The essay discusses a recurrent criticism of the isomorphism-invariance criterion for logical terms, according to which the criterion pertains only to the extension of logical terms, and neglects the meaning, or the way the extension is fixed. A term, so claim the critics, can be invariant under isomorphisms and yet involve a contingent or a posteriori component in its meaning, thus compromising the necessity or apriority of logical truth and logical consequence. This essay shows that the arguments underlying the criticism are flawed since they rely on an invalid inference from the modal or epistemic status of statements in the metalanguage to that of statements in the object-language. The essay focuses on McCarthy’s version of the argument, but refers to Hanson and McGee’s versions as well.
4. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 3
New Books
view |  rights & permissions | cited by