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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Erik J. Olsson
Klein on the Unity of Cartesian and Contemporary Skepticism
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Henry E. Allison
“Whatever begins to exist must have a cause of existence”:
Hume’s Analysis and Kant’s Response
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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David Enoch, Joshua Schechter
How Are Basic Belief-Forming Methods Justified?
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In this paper, we present an account of in virtue of what thinkers are justified in employing certain basic belief-forming methods. The guiding idea is inspired by Reichenbach’s work on induction. There are certain projects in which thinkers are rationally required to engage. Thinkers are epistemically justified in employing a belief-forming method that is indispensable for successfully engaging in such a project. We present a detailed account based on this intuitive thought, and address objections to it. We conclude by commenting on the implications that our account may have for other important epistemological debates.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Peter Baumann
Contextualism and the Factivity Problem
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Epistemological contextualism - the claim that the truth-value of knowledge-attributions can vary with the context of the attributor - has recently faced a whole series of objections. The most serious one, however, has not been discussed much so far: the factivity objection. In this paper, I explain what the objection is and present three different versions of the objection. I then show that there is a good way out for the contextualist. However, in order to solve the probleIn the contextualist has to accept a relationalist version of contextualism.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Todd Buras
Three Grades of Immediate Perception:
Thomas Reid’s Distinctions
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Adina L. Roskies
A New Argument for Nonconceptual Content
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This paper provides a novel argument against conceptualism, the claim that the content of human experience, including perceptual experience, is entirely conceptual. Conceptualism entails that the content of experience is limited by the concepts that we possess and deploy. I present an argument to show that such a view is exceedingly costly---if the nature of our experience is entirely conceptual, thenwe cannot account for concept learning: all perceptual concepts must be innate. The version of nativism that results is incompatible with naturalistic accounts of concept learning. This cost can be avoided, and concept learning accounted for if nonconceptual content of experience is admitted.
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book symposia |
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Alva Noë
Précis of Action In Perception: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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John Campbell
Sensorimotor Knowledge and Naïve Realism
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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M.G.F. Martin
Commentary on Action in Perception
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Sean Dorrance Kelly
Content and Constancy:
Phenomenology, Psychology, and the Content of Perception
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Alva Noë
Reply to Campbell, Martin, and Kelly
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Jesse Prinz
Précis of Gut Reactions
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Justin D’Arms
Prinz’s Theory of Emotion
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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David Hills
Response to Gut Reactions
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Jesse Prinz
Response to D’Arms and Hills
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Anthony Brueckner
Scepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Carl Ginet
Teleological Realism
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Georges Dicker
Kant’s Transcendental Proof of Realism
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Issue: 3
Recent Publications
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
Volume >
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Issue: 2
John L. Pollock
What Am I?:
Virtual Machines and the Mind/Body Problem
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When your word processor or email program is running on your computer, this creates a “virtual machine” that manipulates windows, files, text, etc. What is this virtual machine, and what are the virtual objects it manipulates? Many standard arguments in the philosophy of mind have exact analogues for virtual machines and virtual objects, but we do no want to draw the wild metaphysical conclusions that have sometimes tempted philosophers in the philosophy of mind. A computer file is not made of epiphenomenal ectoplasm. I argue instead that virtual objects are “supervenient objects.” The stereotypical example of supervenient objects is the statue and the lump of clay. To this end I propose a theory of supervenient objects. Then I turn to persons and mental states. I argue that my mental states are virtual states of a cognitive virtual machine implemented on my body, and a person is a supervenient object supervening on this cognitive virutal machine.
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