Cover of Logos & Episteme
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Displaying: 1-20 of 611 documents


research articles
1. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Domingos Faria The Problem of Religious Diversity or Disagreement: Recent Formulations and Solutions
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In this paper, we have two goals: Firstly, we intend to examine the most robust recent formulation of the problem of religious diversity or disagreement. We will argue that Sanford Goldberg’s version is better than John Greco’s. Secondly, we aim to examine different solutions and develop a new one based on Ernest Sosa’s virtue epistemology as a response to the problem of religious diversity or disagreement.
2. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Mohsen Hasannezhad A Phenomenological Solution to Gettier’s Problem
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In “Is Justified True Belief, Knowledge?” Gettier shows us two counter examples of analyzing Knowledge, as “Justified True Belief” or “JTB”. Lots of scholars have reconstructed similar counter examples to JTB but we can see they follow a similar algorithm. Other scholars have tried to re-analyze knowledge by adding a fourth element to JTB and reformulating knowledge in a “JTB+X” formula and some replaced justification with another alternative component (Y) and proposed a “YTB” analysis of knowledge. In this article I first overview Gettier’s problem and I show that we can construct a similar Gettier problem for each “JTB+X” or “YTB” formula. After that, I will focus on re-analyzing knowledge with a phenomenological attitude that can avoid Gettier’s problem.
3. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Seyyed Mohammad Ali Hodjati On Defence of Kripke: Necessary A Posteriori Proposition
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One of Kripke’s innovations concerning the philosophy of language is the doctrine that the truth of some metaphysically necessary propositions is only known a posteriori. The typical example he gives is the identity statement consists of two different proper names that refer to the same referent, like “Hesperus = Phosphorus”. By metaphysically necessary he means that the proposition is true in all possible worlds and by a posteriori knowledge he means that its truth is known by experiment or investigation. Some philosophers have given arguments against Kripke’s doctrine and claimed that such propositions can, also, be known a priori. In this paper, I will defend Kripke’s view by showing that his approach to the issue is linguistic not metaphysical, opposite to his critics.
4. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Olga Ramírez Providing Stability to Our World. Identity and Transference: Geach and Quine
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The problem of identity is central to epistemic transference. However, relative identity appears to be the only way to work out an epistemic useful notion of identity. Relative identity, on its part, is either parasitic on strict identity or not identity at all. If, on the contrary, we ought for a strict concept of identity capable of satisfying its requirements, we end up with a tautologic and epistemic worthless category. The paper provides an answer to this problem, which, while working with a strict notion, shows how it might still serve epistemic purposes. In doing so, it shows how a formal reconstruction of our objectual world and the identities we refer to poses a workable model upon which our messy epistemic one acquires stability. The paper focuses primarily on the Geach-Quine discussion on identity.
5. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Ioannis Telios Against Epistemic Akrasia
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Arguments against epistemic akrasia have been met with counterexamples from the higher-order evidence literature. Here, I present two counterarguments to address these challenges. Firstly, the attitude reclassification argument disentangles reason-responsiveness from the constraints of evidentialism and allows for the adoption of conflicting propositions by coherent doxastic attitudes. Secondly, the failure reclassification argument demystifies the loss of doxastic control in purported cases of epistemic akrasia by appealing to the more comprehensive and distinct phenomenon of self-deception.
discussion notes/debate
6. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Björn Lundgren Is a Moral Right to Privacy Limited by Agents’ Lack of Epistemic Control?
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In their Unfit for the Future, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu argued that there is no moral right to privacy, which resulted in a string of papers. This paper addresses an argument in their most recent contribution, according to which there is no moral right to privacy because individuals cannot control their access to information. Here their argument is first denied after which their epistemic conception of a moral right to privacy is criticized.
7. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky Manne, Moral Gaslighting, and the Politics of Methodology
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Kate Manne claims that her account of gaslighting rectifies regrettable deficiencies in existing theories. However, Manne hasn’t done enough to demonstrate the novelty of her view given that she fails to seriously engage with a significant portion of the gaslighting literature. This is an issue in the politics of methodology. Many theorists working on gaslighting exist within the margins, attempting to centre their perspectives over dominant points of view. We must listen to marginalised folk when aiming to understand a phenomenon that disproportionately affects them. If Manne had listened, she would have come to see difficulties with some of her suggestions, such as the possibility of unintentional gaslighting.
reviews
8. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Davide Fassio Daniel Whiting, The Range of Reasons: in Ethics & Epistemology
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9. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Notes on the Contributors
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10. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Notes to Contributors
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11. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Logos and Episteme: Aims and Scope
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research articles
12. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 4
Daniele Bertini The Refutation of Intentionalism
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My purpose is to refute the intentionalist approach to perception. Drawing from mainstream literature, I identify a principle on which any version of intentional theory relies. My paper is a detailed attack on the truth of the principle. In the first section I will introduce terminology and will taxonomize various statements of the intentional view. In the second section I will briefly outline a sketch of the skeletal intentionalist theory that develops from the assumption of the principle alone. Then, in the third section, I will advance my reasons against this theory. In the fourth section, I will set forth anintuitive and definitive counterexample to the adequacy of the principle of intentionalism to accounting for ordinary perception. Moving from this, in the fifth section, I will provide some reasons explaining why intentionalism is condemned at being unsuccessful. Finally, in the last section of the paper, I will give my conclusions.
13. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 4
Mark Anthony L. Dacela, Napoleon M. Mabaquiao, Jr. Collective Epistemic Traits as System Properties
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The essay deals with the issue of how a non-summativist account of collective epistemic traits can be properly justified. We trace the roots of this issue in virtue epistemology and collective epistemology and then critically examine certain views advanced to justify non-summativism. We focus on those considered by Fricker, including Gilbert’s concept of plural subjects, which she endorses. We find her analysis of these views problematic for either going beyond the parameters of the summativism-nonsummativism debate or contradicting common intuitions about epistemic trait ascriptions. As an alternative, we advance the idea that collective epistemic traits are system properties; or that epistemic traits act as system properties when attributed to collectives taken in their own right. Working as a system, the individual members of a collective perform their designated roles or tasks in coordination and cooperation with each other to achieve theirjoint intentions. Being attributes exclusive to systems, collective epistemic traits cannot, therefore, be attributed in the same respect to the individuals comprising these systems, thereby blocking any summative account of these traits. This model also easily sidesteps the problems besetting Fricker’s preferred one.
14. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 4
Mohammadreza Esmkhani The Post-epistemological Inquiry and the Ultimate Fate of Philosophy.: A Critical Discussion
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This essay examines the different fates of philosophy in Bloor’s and Rorty’s post-epistemological inquiries, tracing their sharp disagreement to their distinct conceptions of ‘naturalism’ and ‘language.’ To this end, the first section outlines their main reasons for overcoming the epistemologically-centered philosophy, as well as theirreassessments of key concepts such as objectivity. The second section draws a comparison between their proposed post-epistemological inquiries, i.e., Bloor’s empirically-informed ‘sociologism’ and Rorty’s pragmatist ‘conversationalism,’ emphasizing that while the former implies the ‘end’ of philosophy in a scientific culture, the latter proposes a ‘new role’ for philosophy in a conversational culture. The third section shows how, in contrast to Bloor’s dismissive attitude toward philosophy and the potential of intervocabulary discourse, which can chiefly be attributed to his scientific naturalism and his Wittgensteinian rule-governed view of language, Rorty’s conception of philosophy as a cross-cultural, conversational practice is enabled and sustained by his non-scientific naturalism coupled with his Davidsonian communicative view of language. Finally, as opposed to Rorty’s attempt to completely dismantle the ‘epistemology industry,’ the fourth section briefly explores the extent to which Bloor’s ‘theory’-oriented viewpoint is still affected by it.
15. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 4
Nicolas C. Gonzalez Identification and Appearance as Epistemic Groundwork
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The idea that appearances provide justifications for beliefs—the principle of phenomenal conservatism—is self-evidently true. In the case of cognitive penetration, however, it seems that certain irrational etiologies of a belief may influence the epistemic quality of that belief. Susanna Siegel argues that these etiologies lead to ‘epistemic downgrade.’ Instead of providing us with a decisive objection, cognitive penetration calls for us to clarify our epistemic framework by understanding the formative parts of appearances. In doing so, the two different but inseparable ideas of sensation and intellection provide us with a basis of our appearances. These appearances, in turn, provide us with the objective evidence needed to test our judgements. Thus, the extra-sensory concepts of intellectual identification and the appearances they help form become an epistemic groundwork.
16. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 4
Notes on the Contributors
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17. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 4
Notes to Contributors
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18. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 4
Logos & Episteme: Aims & Scope
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research articles
19. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
Frederik J. Andersen Uniqueness and Logical Disagreement (Revisited)
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This paper discusses the Uniqueness Thesis, a core thesis in the epistemology of disagreement. After presenting uniqueness and clarifying relevant terms, a novel counterexample to the thesis will be introduced. This counterexample involves logical disagreement. Several objections to the counterexample are then considered, and it is argued that the best responses to the counterexample all undermine the initial motivation for uniqueness.
20. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
Arnold Cusmariu Is JTB Knowledge Hopeless?
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An argument structure that covers both cases Gettier described in his 1963 paper reinforces the conclusion of my 2012 Logos & Episteme article that the justified true belief (JTB) conception of knowledge is inconsistent. The stronger argument makes possible identification of fundamental flaws in the standard approach of adding a fourth condition to JTB, so that a new kind of skepticism becomes inevitable unless conceptual change occurs.