Cover of Polish Journal of Philosophy
Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Displaying: 1-13 of 13 documents


articles
1. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 2
Jiri Benovsky ‘Nothing over and above’ or ‘nothing’?: On Eliminativism, Reductionism, and Composition
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this article, I am interested in an issue concerning eliminativism about ordinary objects that can be put as the claim that the eliminativist is guilty of postulating the existence of something (atoms arranged tablewise), but not of something that is identical to it (the table). But, as we will see, this turns out to be a problem for everybody except the eliminativist. Indeed, this issue highlights a more general problem about the relationship between an entity and the parts the compose it. Furthermore, I am not interested in this issue only for its own sake and for the sake of understanding and defending eliminativism, but also for the way it allows me to discuss the differences and relations between eliminativism and reductionism. What difference is there between eliminating an entity and reducing it to something else?
2. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 2
Yves Bouchard KK-Thesis and Contextualism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this paper, I defend a contextualist reading of the KK-thesis. In the first part, I present the general problem and I contrast three concepts of knowledge with respect to the KK-thesis, (Hintikka, Lemmon, and Williamson) that all rely on a univocal interpretation of the K-predicate. In the second part, I provide a contextualist framework based upon an indexical interpretation of the K-predicate and the notion of epistemic context. I show how this framework can integrate different concepts of knowledge, and how it highlights the crucial significance of the KK-thesis for epistemology.
3. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 2
Kai Michael Büttner Truth Conditions and Behaviourism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Quine tries to combine truth conditional semantics with linguistic behaviourism. To this end, he identifies the truth conditions of a sentence with the conditions that prompt speakers to assign truth or falsity to the sentence. The first problem with this conception is that truth conditions determine not when truth-value assignments are made, but when they are correct. This fact vitiates Quine’s account of observation sentences (section 2). A second difficulty pertains only to theoretical sentences. The correctness of truth-value assignments to such sentences depends not on current experiences, but on what can be experienced on other occasions. This observation militates against Quine’s general verification holism and against his account of predications (section 3 and 4). Combining truth conditional semantics and linguistic behaviourism is possible, though, if both these lessons are taken into account (section 5).
4. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 2
Salvatore Italia Truth as One, Facts as Many: A Way to Gradual Realism
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
5. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 2
Michael J. Shaffer Lakatos’ Quasi-empiricism in the Philosophy of Mathematics
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Imre Lakatos' views on the philosophy of mathematics are important and they have often been underappreciated. The most obvious lacuna in this respect is the lack of detailed discussion and analysis of his 1976a paper and its implications for the methodology of mathematics, particularly its implications with respect to argumentation and the matter of how truths are established in mathematics. The most important themes that run through his work on the philosophy of mathematics and which culminate in the 1976a paper are (1) the (quasi-)empirical character of mathematics and (2) the rejection of axiomatic deductivism as the basis of mathematical knowledge. In this paper Lakatos' later views on the quasi-empirical nature of mathematical theories and methodology are examined and specific attention is paid to what this view implies about the nature of mathematical argumentation and its relation to the empirical sciences.
book reviews
6. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 2
Joseph Ulatowski Defending the Correspondence Theory of Truth
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
7. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 2
Leszek Wroński Probability
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
articles
8. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 1
Arkadiusz Gut Overcoming Logical Psychologism (Frege’s Influence on Husserl)
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The central and probably most controversial point concerning the psychologism — anti-psychologism debate is the problem of Frege’s alleged influence on the change in Husserl’s views. Contemporary thinkers investigating the early period of Husserl’s philosophy (between 1891—1895) have attempted to show that the opinion that Frege’s doctrine had a traumatic influence on Husserl’s views is not justified. This paper, which tries to maintain a balance between strictly philosophical argumentation and narrowly understood historical argumentation, suggests an alternative solution. By appealing to Frege’s works (known by Husserl) published before 1894, the locus of psychologism will be determined. Afterwards, I will present Husserl’s and Frege’s views on the elucidation procedure and the distinction between calculus and ‘lingua characteristica’. By discussing Husserl’s works from 1894-1897, I will show that his standpoint changed dramatically as he entered into the anti-psychological program, involving a new theory of concepts, judgment, and the so-called ‘pure Fregean flavour’ — a new account of logical content.
9. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 1
Stephen K. McLeod Two Philosophies of Need
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Instrumentalists about need believe that all needs are instrumental, i.e., ontologically dependent upon ends, goals, or purposes. Absolutists view some needs as non-instrumental. The aims of this article are: clearly to characterize the instrumentalism/absolutism debate that is of concern (mainly §1); to establish that both positions have recent and current adherents (mainly §1); to bring what is, in comparison with prior literature, a relatively high level of precision to the debate, employing some hitherto neglected, but important, insights (passim); to show, on grounds not previously to the fore in the literature, that insofar as instrumentalism’s advocates have provided arguments for the position, these are unsound (§2); to argue against instrumentalism using a new dilemma concerning whether ‘end’, ‘goal’, and ‘purpose’ are interpreted in a mentalistic manner (§3); to elucidate the implications of the needs/need-satisfiers and preconditions/means distinctions for the debate (§4).
10. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 1
John Shand Free Will and Subject
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Traditionally formulated, the problem of free will cannot be solved. We may nevertheless be justifiably confident that we have free will. The traditional formulation makes a solution impossible by juxtaposing contradictory objective and subjective accounts of whether there is free will, between which accounts there is no third way to choose. However, the objective stance inherently denies the conditions under which free will is possible, namely that there are subjects, and is thus question-begging. It gives us no good reason for our not having free will without our also accepting that there are no subjects. As subjects we may not deny that there are subjects, and that as subjects we have good reason, through our experience of free will, to hold that we have free will. The problem of free will is a footnote to how there may be subjects. In order to understand what free will is we need to look at how it is experienced, that is, at the phenomenology of free will.
11. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 1
Gianfranco Soldati Methodological Problems in the Phenomenology of Time
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
It is difficult to develop a coherent conception of time on the basis of our experience of time. The philosophical analysis of our experience of time is a central topic in phenomenology. So one might expect phenomenology to deliver a contribution to the solution of the most challenging puzzles of the philosophy of time. This paper deals with some methodological issues related to such an expectation. It opposes two main conceptions of the role of phenomenology in the philosophy of time. On the first conception phenomenology draws conclusions about the nature of time from the description of the qualitative features of our experience of time. On the second conception, phenomenology determines what we are rationally entitled to believe about the nature of time on the basis of the way we experience time. It is argued that if one aims at integrating different approaches in one’s philosophical conception of time, then it is the second conception one ought to choose.
critical discussion
12. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 1
Mats Volberg Implications of Paternalism and Buck-passing: A Reply to Quong
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In his latest book, Liberalism without Perfection (2011), Jonathan Quong argues against liberal perfectionism and defends Rawlsian political liberalism. In the course of his argumentation he presents us with a judgmental account of paternalism and the buck-passing account of truth in political philosophy. The aim of this paper is to critique both of those elements in Quong’s argumentation. I will first present the judgmental account of paternalism and then demonstrate that it will place impossible demands on us, insofar as paternalism is a prima facie wrong and we have a duty to reduce wrongness in the world. I will then turn to the buck-passing account of truth; after introducing it, I show that it will generate uncertain results for political philosophy, making it an unsatisfactory solution for the political liberal making truth claims in political philosophy.
book reviews
13. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 1
Nina Atanasova, Lisa A. Korf, Daniel J. Vecchio Book Reviews
view |  rights & permissions | cited by