Commentators often construe Foucault as an anti-Enlightenment thinker; much of this criticism assumes that Foucault inherits early German Romanticism in some sense. This essay examines these claims by assessing the role the German Romantics play in Foucault’s work, both early and late. After a brief consideration of the meaning of the term “Romanticism,” the essay examines the role that language and literature plays in Foucault early texts before examining the place of self-formation or Bildung in his later work. I conclude that examining the relationship between Foucault and the German Romantics can help us better understand Foucault’s texts and thereby avoid what Foucault terms the “blackmail of the Enlightenment,” the idea that one must be either for or against Enlightenment ideals rather than critically interrogating them.

This essay interprets Hölderlin’s prose fragment On Religion as an extension of and response to The Oldest System Program of German Idealism. After a brief discussion of the historical reasons for considering these fragments in this relation, I argue that On Religion demonstrates Hölderlin’s sympathy to the goals of the System Program, but that it also provides a more satisfactory account of how Hölderlin planned to make good on the goals presented in the System Program. I argue that On Religion develops a conception of freedom that can only be ‘grounded’ through mythic, poetic discourse. I then explore the political implications of this point and claim that On Religion considers the creation of mythology as a public, communal event, in which the poet plays the role of giving measure and form, but not content, to the creation of mythology.

Derrida is typically taken to be the thinker most antithetical to Hegel, and deconstruction to be the philosophical antithesis to Hegel’s systematic rationality. While I do not dispute the accuracy of this perception, I argue in this paper that it does not offer an adequate or a complete picture. Specifically, much about Derrida and about deconstruction is more similar to Hegel than is typically realized. I argue that Derrida’s deconstruction shares a great affinity to the method of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, so much so that we could identify and articulate a latent Hegelianism in Derrida’s approach. I begin with a description of Derrida’s own project, then offer something of an apologia for his work. Finally, I describe Hegel’s method of exposition [Darstellung] and compare it to deconstruction, pointing out the fundamental similarities between the two thinkers.

My purpose is to compare Berkeley’s and Gentile’s idealism, interpreting Berkeley’s Treatise, §§22–23, and Gentile’s reading of this passage. The Italian philosopher finds in Berkeley’s master argument the original source of the true idealistic way of thinking, but he believes that Berkeley has not been sufficiently consistent in deducing all the consequences from his new principle. This criticism is the ground of Gentile’s actual idealism. Comparing the two positions is very instructive both to elucidate the general issue of idealism and to understand Berkeley’s philosophy.

The article tries to explain Wittgenstein’s thesis “death is not an event in life.” Death is neither a positive nor a negative fact, but a one-time event. Death is an event, which, not belonging to the world, constitutes the limit of all possible experience, and as such, it is inaccessible to any form of consciousness. While constituting the end of the subject as a prerequisite of the world, death is also the final annihilation of existence as such. The above analysis shows that Wittgenstein is a transcendental idealist. According to him death is not an event in life because: (1) it is the death of the subject, and the transcendental subject does not belong to the world, (2) the transcendental subject is a condition of the world, so the death of the subject is the end of the world.

Sartre’s relation to Kant in his essay The Transcendence of The Ego (TE) remains unexplained. In the last two decades, attention has increasingly been focused on TE for two main reasons. On the one hand, this essay provides an early formulation of a fundamental insight leading to Sartre’s masterpiece, Being and Nothingness. On the other hand, Sartre’s critical reflections on consciousness and self-consciousness remains relevant for our contemporary philosophical thinking. In TE, Sartre’s main goal is apparently to criticize Kant’s transcendental idealism and thereby establish his own thesis about the spontaneity of consciousness. Therefore, an explication and evaluation of Sartre’s critical reading of Kant is crucial to make sense of his own position. Though there has been attention in the discussion to TE, Sartre’s criticism of the Kant has not yet been adequately analyzed and well understood. This paper will focus on crucial elements in Sartre’s rejection of Kant’s transcendental idealism.