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1. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Allen Thompson Notes from the Editor
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2. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Marion Hourdequin, Allen Thompson Editors' Introduction to the 2020 ISEE Special Issue
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articles
3. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Blake Francis Climate Change Injustice
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Many climate change ethicists argue wealthy nations have duties of justice to combat climate change. However, Posner and Weisbach disagree because there is a poor fit between the principles of justice and the problem of climate change. I argue in this paper that Posner and Weisbach’s argument relies on what Judith Shklar calls “the normal model of justice,” the view that injustice results when principles are violated. Applying Shklar’s critique of normal justice, I argue that Posner and Weisbach’s argument limits injustice to include complaints that match rules and principles, shielding the unjust from responsibility and assuming falsely that judgments about injustice can be made from a singular perspective. Drawing on Shklar, this paper develops an account of climate change as a complement to mainstream climate ethicists. On this account, injustice results from indifference and the voices of those impacted by climate change and climate change policy have priority.
4. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Rachel Fredericks CLIMATE LEGACY: A Newish Concept for the Climate Crisis
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Individual and collective agents, especially affluent ones, are not doing nearly enough to prevent and prepare for the worst consequences of the unfolding climate crisis. This is, I suggest, partly because our existing conceptual repertoires are inadequate to the task of motivating climate-stabilizing activities. I argue that the concept CLIMATE LEGACY meets five desiderata for concepts that, through usage, have significant potential to motivate climate action. Contrasting CLIMATE LEGACY with CARBON FOOTPRINT, CLIMATE JUSTICE, and CARBON NEUTRALITY, I clarify some advantages of thinking in terms of the former. I conclude by discussing some climate legacy-enhancing practical proposals that merit consideration.
5. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Yasha Rohwer Infringing upon Environmental Autonomy with the Aim of Enabling It
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Part of what makes the environment valuable is its autonomy. There are some who think that any human influence on an environment is necessarily autonomy-compromising because it is a form of human control. In this article, I will assume human influence on the environment necessarily undermines autonomy. However, I will argue, even given this assumption, it is still possible for the intervention to enable autonomy in the long run. My focus is on genetic intervention into organisms, because some might think human influence in these cases cannot dissipate. I argue this is mistaken and, borrowing a concept from botany, I argue genes, even genes inserted into a genome by humans, can “naturalize.” Furthermore, they can function in ways that are autonomy-enabling to the individual and to the system to which the organism belongs.
6. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Daniel Weltman Covert Animal Rescue: Civil Disobedience or Subrevolution?
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We should conceive of illegal covert animal rescue as acts of “subrevolution” rather than as civil disobedience. Subrevolutions are revolutions that aim to overthrow some part of the government rather than the entire government. This framework better captures the relevant values than the opposing suggestion that we treat illegal covert animal rescue as civil disobedience. If animals have rights like the right not to be unjustly imprisoned and mistreated, then it does not make sense that an instance of animal rescue will be justifiable only if it meets criteria for justified civil disobedience, e.g., the requirement that the civil disobedient not rescue more animals than would be necessary to communicate their message. Thus, the framework of subrevolution is a more apt way to analyze animal rescue.
book reviews
7. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Jeremy David Bendik-Keymer Thomas Nail. Theory of the Earth
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8. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Rebeka Ferreira Jennie C. Stephens. Diversifying Power: Why We Need Antiracist, Feminist Leadership On Climate and Energy
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9. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Yogi Hale Hendlin Stan Cox. The Green New Deal and Beyond: Ending the Climate Emergency while We Still Can
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10. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Patrick Smith Kelly A. Parker and Heather E. Keith. Pragmatism and American Philosophical Perspectives on Resilience
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articles
11. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 43 > Issue: 4
Michel Bourban Strong Sustainability Ethics
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This article explains how strong sustainability ethics has emerged and developed as a new field over the last two decades as a critical response to influential conceptions of weak sustainability. It investigates three competing, normative approaches to strong sustainability: the communitarian approach, the Rawlsian approach, and the capabilities approach. Although these approaches converge around the idea that there are critical, non-substitutable natural resources and services, they diverge on how to reconcile human development and environmental protection. The aim of the paper is to provide a critical overview of these three perspectives, but also and mostly to show that when we put them into dialogue with each other, we can clarify the demands of sustainability. The paper concludes that the capabilities approach is the most suitable way to think about sustainability, but only if it goes beyond its dominantly anthropocentric view.
12. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 43 > Issue: 4
Igor Eterović Grounding Responsibility to Future Generations from a Kantian Standpoint
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The problem of responsibility to future generations is inherently related to responsibility for the environment. Attempting to provide a new grounding for the figuration of such responsibility, Hans Jonas used Immanuel Kant’s ethics as a paradigm of traditional ethics to provide a critique of their limitations in addressing these issues, and he found three crucial problems in Kant’s ethics (formalism, presentism, and individualism). Kant’s philosophy provides enough material for an answer to Jonas by building an account which 1) gives a teleological grounding of responsibility for the environment and consequently responsibility to future generations; 2) enables the establishment of collective responsibility towards the idea of moral progress, which includes future generations; and 3) answers Jonas’s challenge by extending moral concerns to other living and non-living beings and especially to future generations.
13. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 43 > Issue: 4
Espen D. Stabell Why Environmental Philosophers Should Be "Buck-Passers" about Value
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The value of nature has been extensively debated in environmental ethics. There has been less discussion, however, about how one should understand the relation between this value and normativity, or reasons: if something in nature is seen as valuable, how should we understand the relation between this fact and claims about reasons to, for example, protect it or promote its existence? The “commonsense” view is that value gives rise to reasons. The buck-passing account of value (BPA), on the other hand, implies that for an entity or state of affairs in nature to be valuable just is for it to have properties (other than that of being valuable) that provide reasons to promote or have a pro-attitude towards it. BPA has been extensively debated, but has received little attention in environmental philosophy. In this paper, it is argued that the view suggests a “reasons first” approach to environmental ethics, and that it should be preferred to competing accounts of value in the context of environmental ethics.
14. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 43 > Issue: 4
Jean-Paul Vessel Desert-Adjusted Utilitarianism, People, and Animals
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Recent decades have witnessed a surge in philosophical attention to the moral standing of non-human animals. Kantians, Neo-Kantians, utilitarians, and radical animal rights theorists have staked their claims in the literature. Here Fred Feldman’s desert-adjusted utilitarianism is introduced into the fray. After canvassing the prominent competitors in the dialectic, a conception of an overall moral ranking (relative to a moral choice scenario) consonant with desert-adjusted utilitarianism is developed. Then the conception’s implications regarding the particular locations of individual people and animals in such rankings across various scenarios is explored. Ultimately, it is argued that when it comes to evaluating whether or not some benefit (or burden) morally ought to be bestowed upon some specific person or animal, this new conception of an overall moral ranking is sensitive to a wider range of morally relevant phenomena than its more prominent competitors.
book reviews
15. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 43 > Issue: 4
Bryan E. Bannon Christian Diehm. Connection to Nature, Deep Ecology, and Conservation Social Science: Human-Nature Bonding and Protecting the Natural World
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16. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 43 > Issue: 4
Ben Mylius Steve Vanderheiden. Environmental Political Theory
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17. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 43 > Issue: 4
Richard Newman John Lauritz Larson. Laid Waste! The Culture of Exploitation in Early America
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18. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 43 > Issue: 4
Referees 2021
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19. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 43 > Issue: 4
Index to Volume 43
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20. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 43 > Issue: 3
News and Notes
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