The purpose of the paper is to analyze the (ordinary-language) distinction between conscious and unconscious mental states, as when people say "Admittedly I did (saw, desired, believed, etc.) X, but I wasn't conscious of it." It is argued that "unconscious" varieties of mental states, processes, or events---even perception---can be analyzed entirely in terms of the possession, exercise, acquiring, or loss, of dispositions, whereas conscious mental states involve the same dispositional items, temporally conjoined with at least one of a variety of appropriate experiences. The "temporal conjunction" relationship between behavior and "appropriate" experiences turns out to be much looser than recent causal or functional theories of mental concepts have allowed; the views of e.g., David Armstrong and Daniel Dennett are critically discussed.

Notes by Dr. Robert Gahringer, who was C.I. Lewis' assistant at Harvard, Dr. Francis H. Parker, and those of the editor were used to reconstruct Lewis' lectures in Phil. 130, Kant, as those lectures were presented at Harvard in the late 40's and early 50's. The test of the reconstruction includes a detailed discussion of European epistemology in the period before Kant in addition to Lewis' interpretation of Kant's epistemology, critique of metaphysics, theology, and a brief presentation of his moral philosophy.

This paper uses self-relation to reconstruct Hegel's reasoning in the Logic. In the sphere of "being," selfrelation is self-predication, and the predicate is the active, participial form of the category. Examining the first three and the last category in this sphere, I explain how Hegel argues that each category is itself engaged in the activity that it signifies. However, this self-predication adds new content to the category transforming it into a new category. Ultimately, this process leads to the collapse of "being" into "essence ." Categories in this later sphere exhibit a different kind of self-relation : each contains its relation to itself as an activity that negates itself and then, negating this negation, returns to itself. Hegel's analysis at the beginning of "essence" is, I argue, parallel to Kant's "Transcendental Deduction," but relations among categories replace the transcendental ego. The significance of self-relation is that it (1) effects transitions to new categories by an internal mechanism, thereby (2) allowing the Logic to be a self-exposition of the categories that (3) avoids an external (Kantian) transcendental ground.

In 'Kripke's Argument against the Identity Theory' Michael Levin argues that the private language argument can be used to undermine Saul Kripke's Cartesian claim to be able to imagine mental states and brain states existing apart, and, thus, refute his argument for dualism. In this paper it is argued that Levin's use of the private language argument relies implicitly upon the descriptivist theory of mental language, to which Kripke has provided a plausible alternative, viz., the causal theory of reference. Thus, using the private language argument in the way Levin suggests begs the question against the Cartesian line of argument.

Over the past several years John Hick has developed a view of theistic faith which is philosophically sophisticated and religiously sensitive. In this paper I first attempt to develop an overall interpretation of Hick's position and offer several piecemeal criticisms of it. I then offer "diagnosis" of why Hick cannot, in his own terms, develop a coherent defense of theism and suggest a basic strategy for avoiding the problems he encounters. This strategy results in a defense of theistic faith that is philosophically coherent, but its result is to lay bare the genuine difficulty with being a theist in the late twentieth century.

Sorely needed by scholars of nineteenth-century philosophy is a researdh bibliography on Francis Herbert Bradley (1846-1924). The existent bibliographic tools presently available on Bradley are very incomplete, inaccurate, and outdated, making them valueless for serious philosophical research on this very important contemporary philosopher. Every major book, review, doctoral dissertation, article, and note is cited exactly and completely. Approximately a thousand different citations are given indicating the tremendous influence Bradley's thought had on subsequent thinkers and movements. It is no minor thinker who could influence deeply a Russell, James, or Whitehead. Like Plotinus before'him, Bradley's place in philosophy has not been fully appreciated because of the artificial divisions of philosophy proposed by its historians. In any event, this bibliography is offered to scholars whose interests are English Idealism in general and Bradley's philosophic contributions in particular.

This paper criticises rationalist ideas of intellectual honesty, arguing that the ethics of belief reduces to an ethics of inquiry, and that the ethics of inquiry should be based not on the dubious concept of 'sufficiency' of evidence but on economic considerations, such as the availability of time, resources and opportunities. Thus an inquiry may be sufficient for one person and not for another - which makes intellectual honesty difficult to assess. Scientific inquiry is also concerned with belief (to be worth constructing a theory must be at least 'potentially credible'), and the same ethical and economic considerations apply, e.g. to choice between research programs. They apply also to discussion and teaching, e.g. in judging whether participants in discussion are as open-minded as they should be, or whether a teacher is giving due credit to a student whose opinions he disagrees with, or whether he exercises improper censorship.

St. Thomas is usually thought to have rejected abortion and euthanasia as murder (viz, the statement of The Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith "On Procured Abortion"). By going back to Aquinas' own words I show that this is mistaken: that he explicitly states abortion prior to a certain point of fetal development to be non-murderous and that his position, when consistently developed, allows for euthanasia under analogous circumstances. These claims are argued by presenting an analytical expose of Aquinas’ metaphysics of man and of human ontogenesis. The implications of this for current bioethical concerns are sketched briefly.

It is commonly believed that prostitution—i.e., the practice of indiscriminately selling sex—is morally wrong. In this paper it is argued that it is at least not obvious that prostitution is morally wrong, and that several arguments which seem to underlie the view that it is are unsound. The following claims are examined: (1) Prostitution is morally wrong because it is degrading. Several interpretations of this claim are considered, and each is criticized. (2) Prostitution is morally wrong because it promotes socially harmful consequences. The following purported social harms are discussed: the destruction of the institution of marriage, the spread of venereal disease, and an increase in crime. Special attention is given to the assertion that prostitution contributes to the destruction of the institution of marriage. This claim is challenged on a number of scores. More generally, it is argued that consequentialist claims which cite the foregoing social harms do not provide a firm basis for the belief that prostitution is morally wrong. (3) Prostitution is morally wrong because of what it is: the indiscriminate sale of sex. A number of attempts to justify this claim are discussed, and it is argued that none succeeds in establishing that prostitution is morally wrong.

This edition is of a notebook prepared by C.I. Lewis during 1910-11. The text covers the "predicament" of philosophy at the time of Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, and The Metaphysic of Morals. The highly detailed discussion of the Critique was "based on" Lewis' own outlines made in the Kant course conducted by Ralph Barton Perry.

In "Perversion and the Unnatural as Moral Categories" (Ethics, 90:191-202, January 1980) David Levy argues against a number of theories of perversion by means of the method of counter-example. This is inappropriate since many familiar accounts are not attempts to provide a "one-over-many" formula for a core of clear cases. Rather, like Levy himself, many understand perversions as "unnatural" or "non-human" actions, i.e. as distortions of human nature. Here there is agreement on the intension of the term. Differences in the extension arise in virtue of the relational character of the meaning. For what counts as a distortion of human nature depends on the paradigm of human nature one endorses. In these cases the appropriate way to decide between competing lists of perversions is to evaluate the competing paradigms of human nature on which they rest. Typically these paradigms embody important value assumptions.

I try to show that there is much sap (synthetic a priori) knowledge although one may not find many, or even any, sap true statements in most natural languages. Reasons are given for the difficulty of expressing sap truths in natural languages, but it is argued that these are not necessary features of language as such. There are, then, sap true statements in some possible languages.Admission of the sap gives one a way of distinguishing logical from metaphysical possiblity. Something is metaphysically impossible just in case it is a sap truth that it is impossible. I argue that the realm of logically possible entities is vastly larger than the realm of metaphysically possible entities.My .defence of the sap begins with a partial defence of the analytic/synthetic distinction. In particular, I attack the intentionality circle argument,Quine's indeterminacy thesis and some applications of the Kripke/Putnam theory of meaning for natural kind terms. Without being a conclusive defence of the analytic/synthetic distinction, this section makes the defence of the sap more secure. Arguments are then mounted in direct defence of the sap by showing that the purported reduction of sap truths to analytic truths is mistaken. Examples are adduced to show that, even where expressions of natural language fail, one can stipulate usage in ways that allow expression of sap truths. I then consider and reply to various objections, giving an example of the sort of meaning theory which illegitimately legislates the analyticity of any purported sap true statement.

This is a list of journal articles and chapters of hooks on locke's philosophy, published in the last fifty years or so. The subjects covered are those treated by locke in the Essay concerning Human Understanding, i.e. metaphysics, theory of knowledge, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and ethics. The bibliography was produced with the help of a computer, using the INFOL-2 program and RNF text processor. There are 202 distinct items. These are first listed chronologically, then alphabetically; then eight lists of items on special topics, selected from the master list, are given. The special topics are Innate Ideas, Primary and Secondary Qualities, Substance, Personal Identity, language, Essence, Knowledge, and locke and Leibniz.

While in the research area known,as ’philosophy of science' there is a growing interest in separate disciplines of the empirical sciences, applied sciences and even technologies, one can find hardly any reference to the discipline of chemistry other than some preliminary discussions of chemical concepts or studies concerning the rational reconstruction of the history of chemistry. No analyses, which might be called 'philosophy of chemistry’ can be found to date. It is hoped that this review paper on what has been published on the philosophy of chemistry will show that chemistry is a philosophically rich field. After an introduction, in section 2, a more detailed classification is given of the various areas from which a (marginal) interest in the philosophy of chemistry has emerged.In section 3 there is a review of the opinions on the subject matter of chemistry, be it straightforward definition or indications of the relation to other natural sciences, in particular physics. In section 4 publications on the philosophy of chemistry are reviewed which fit the conventional format of the philosophy of science (discussing laws, theories,explanations , models). In section 5 some of the literature on the concept of chemical species is reviewed. In section 6 and 7 a review of the literature on the concepts of chemical structure and chemical reactions is presented.

What is the general nature or logical status of existence? This question is the (logically) first question of ontology. Moore, in his early article "The Nature of Judgment", and Russell, in The Principles of Mathematics, offer the same answer to it, and their answer has philosophical—as well as historical—importance. Existence is what Moore calls a "concept" and what Russell calls a "term". The chief features of the early Moore-Russell ontology, their attempt to understand the ultimate constituents of the world and the connections among them, are delineated and evaluated. Though their ontology has its successes (e.g., a useful, univocal concept of existence), it ultimately is a failure, and the reasons for its failure are deeply rooted and instructive.

This article seeks to make a contribution toward the eventual construction of an adequate formulation of rule-utilitarianism by explaining same of the difficulties the notion of supererogation poses for such an enterprise, and by describing a rule-utilitarian theory of supererogation which would resolve those difficulties. The first difficulty that the notion of supererogation raises for rule-utilitarianism is that beliefs concerning acts "beyond the call of duty" are not an insignificant part of many persons' considered moral opinions and any theory, rule-utilitarian or not, which does not provide a place for them will be found lacking on that account. Secondly, I shall argue that without an adequate theory of supererogation it is extremely unlikely that the rule-utilitarian will succeed in arriving at a moral code which will maximize utility. Thirdly, without an adequate theory of supererogation, rule-utilitarian accounts of basic moral concepts such as "right", "obligatory", and "wrong" will be unsatisfactory, even frcm a utilitarian point of view. I begin in section I by considering how best to define 'supererogation." I propose a reforming definition at the end of that section. In section II I claim that rule-utilitarians must recognize a distinction between two types of rules if they hope to avoid the difficulties mentioned above. In section III I attempt to explain and to resolve the difficulties supererogation poses for rule-utilitarianism.

Donald Davidson's argument for the nonlawlike nature of psycho-physical generalizations is discussed and refuted. It is shown that his appeals to the rational and holistic character of intentional description do not support his conclusion of anomalism. An alternative methodological role is suggested for the concept of rationality in application to current empirical research in cognitive psychology.

Since Hartshorne rejects Whitehead's doctrine of eternal objects, this seems to deny Hartshorne's God any causal influence via providing initial subjective aims to the world's creatures. If there are no specific eternal objects as possibilities to be actualized by creatures, there can be no specific initial aims. Hartshorne's metaphysics, however, can be rendered coherent at this point by interpreting the initial aims as hierarchies of indeterminate possibilities which are not specific until rendered so by creatures. Such an interpretation is coherent with his doctrine of possibility understood as a hierarchy of indeterminate potentiality. A further issue remains, nevertheless, in regard to Hartshorne's claim that the possibilities offered by God to creatures are both infinite and yet limited. It is difficult to see how they can be both.

After pointing out a meaning difference between "that which is possible not to be at some time is not" and "that which is possible not to be exists for only a finite time", we consider the assumptions necessary in a Thomistic context to derive the conclusion that if everything is contingent then at one time nothing was in existence. The needed key is in limiting the amount of matter which has ever existed, or, since "matter" is not a count-noun, that some 'basic' particulars are finite in number; i.e., particulars which must exist if any physical particulars are to exist. (Though it is not essential to the argument, it is convenient and probably not far off historically to regard "things which are possible not to be" as physical objects.) Given some other assumptions it is then shown the desired conclusion will follow in both a "Genesis" and a "Doomsday" version. We then try to match the argument developed with the Thomistic corpus.