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introduction
1. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 38
Zachary Hoskins, Joan Woolfrey Introduction
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part 1: keynote address
2. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 38
Mark Lance Revolutionary Repair
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part 2: revolutions and reparations
3. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 38
Erik A. Anderson Countering MacKinnon on Rape and Consent
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Feminists are divided on whether consent should be employed in legal definitions of rape. Catharine MacKinnon has criticized the usefulness of consent in enabling legal systems to recognize and prosecute instances of rape (MacKinnon 1989, 2005, 2016). In a recent article in this journal, Lisa H. Schwartzman defends the use of affirmative consent in rape law against MacKinnon’s critique (Schwartzman 2019). In contrast to MacKinnon, Schwartzman claims our understanding of rape must include both force and consent components. In this paper, I will argue in agreement with Schwartzman and against MacKinnon that the legal definition of rape should include an affirmative consent component. I will take Schwartzman’s discussion as my point of departure and consider whether she has responded adequately to MacKinnon’s criticisms of consent. I will argue that her responses are not fully adequate. In particular, she has not successfully rebutted the argument that an appeal to consent is unnecessary once we have accepted an expanded definition of coercion. I will then provide a more affirmative defense of affirmative consent in response to MacKinnon’s most challenging criticism.
4. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 38
Margaret Betz Any Woman: Rape, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistance Violence
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I argue that resistance violence is physical force carried out by members of politically vulnerable groups. It is not reducible to self-defense because it does not always involve protecting the life of the actor but, instead, is an expression of establishing one’s dignity and humanity. Applied to women as a vulnerable class in the face of sexual violence, this article looks at a case study of an enslaved teenager named Celia who killed her owner in order to end his sexual abuse. Various philosophies of epistemic injustices (including Fricker, Pohlhaus, Medina, Dotson, Mills, and Card) establish that socially/politically dominant groups help create a context in which compartmentalization, active ignorance, and inconsistencies contribute to the conditions in which marginalized groups reside in spaces of little to no protection from the state. As such, resistance violence emerges as a legitimate option. Selective epistemic attention that fails to contextualize resistance violence supports unjust systems.
5. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 38
Alycia LaGuardia-LoBianco Community Repair of Moral Damage from Domestic Violence
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I argue that communities have a moral responsibility to repair and prevent moral damage that some survivors of domestic violence may experience. This responsibility is grounded in those communities’ complicity in domestic violence and the moral damage that may result. Drawing on Claudia Card’s work on domestic violence, I first explain two forms of moral damage that some survivors may experience. These are: 1) normative isolation, or abusive environments that are marked by distorted moral standards about the abuse itself, and 2) coerced self-betrayal, the coercive entrapment of the survivor’s agency, emotions, and beliefs to express the will of the abuser. Though the abuser is always the primary cause of abuse, I argue that survivors’ communities can contribute to a climate that facilitates domestic violence by, for instance, sustaining harmful norms about gender roles, shaming survivors, protecting abusers, and not wanting to interrupt “private matters.” When this complicity exists, I argue that communities have a moral responsibility to create structures that repair and prevent moral damage from domestic violence. Finally, I sketch out some practical considerations for building these structures. These involve creating violence-resistant communities that protect survivors, hold abusers accountable, and help survivors reclaim their agencies.
6. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 38
Alex R. Gillham Willingly Making Reparations, Loss of Unjust Advantage, and Counterfactual Comparative Harm
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The Counterfactual Comparative Account (CCA) of harm holds that event e harms subject S when e makes S worse off than S would have been without e occurring. In this paper, I argue that CCA is unattractive because it entails that someone who willingly makes monetary reparations harms himself. I explain why I find this entailment unattractive. I then acknowledge that my intuition about the unattractiveness of this entailment might simply be mistaken, so I offer an argument for the claim that willingly making reparations is not a form of self-harm. I argue that willingly making reparations is not harmful to the person who makes them because losing an unjust advantage does not harm. I then consider some objections against my argument and respond to them. Although I concede that some of these objections do more damage to my argument than others, I conclude that CCA is at least prima facie unattractive for the reasons I give and that, at bare minimum, someone who does not think that willingly making reparations harms the maker and/or that losing an unjust advantage is harmful to the person who loses it could not consistently accept any of the formulations of CCA that I consider in this paper.
7. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 38
Kevin M. Graham, Anaja Arthur, Hannah Frazer, Ali Griswold, Emma Kitteringham, Quinlyn Klade, Jaliya Nagahawatte Slave Narratives and Epistemic Injustice
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Epistemic injustice is defined by Miranda Fricker as injustice done to people specifically in their capacities as knowers. Fricker argues that this injustice can be either testimonial or hermeneutical in character. A hearer commits testimonial injustice against a speaker by assigning unfairly little credibility to the speaker’s testimony. Hermeneutical injustice exists in a society when the society lacks the concepts necessary for members of a group to understand their social experiences. We argue that epistemic injustice is necessary to permit the functioning of race-based chattel slavery and that this necessity is illustrated in slave narratives. The testimonies of slave narratives like those of Frederick Douglass, Olaudah Equiano, Harriet Jacobs, and Mary Prince identify and transform a culture of race-based epistemic hermeneutic and testimonial injustice. Through telling their stories, these agents establish their capacity as knowers and thus resist the epistemic injustice that undergirds the oppressive system of race-based chattel slavery. The authors of slave narratives not only identify race-based epistemic injustice, but actively fight against it.
8. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 38
Joshua Anderson Hegel, Marx and Huey P. Newton on the Underclass
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This article is a discussion of the rabble in the context of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. The article will progress as follows: First, I present how Hegel discusses the formation of a rabble and consider Michael Allen’s and James Bohman’s arguments regarding the domination inherent in Hegel’s theory. Next, I critique Joel Anderson’s “Hegelian” solution to the problem of the rabble. Finally, I show that the rabble are precisely the “class” that Marx needs to bring about change in the organization of society. Interestingly, there is a surprising similarity between Hegel’s discussion of the rabble and justified disobedience and the Marxism of Huey P. Newton.
9. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 38
Ashley J. Bohrer The Speed of Crisis: Slow Violence, Accelerationism, and the Politics of the Emergency Brake
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This paper traces the history of accelerationism as a political philosophy, from its inception at Warwick University to its deployment by avowed white supremacists. Probing its philosophical commitment to a both a deterministic philosophy of history and a sacrificial logic of politics, I argue that even the initial elaborations of (non-race-based) accelerationism contained the seed of its development into violent white supremacy. The conclusion assesses a politics of deceleration as a strategy for countering accelerationism, ultimately arguing for the superiority of a Benjaminian politics of the emergency brake.
part 3: the 2020 nassp book award
10. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 38
Karen Adkins Summary of Serena Parekh’s No Refuge
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11. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 38
Shannon Fyfe Commentary on Parekh’s No Refuge
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12. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 38
Velimir Stojkovski Commentary: Serena Parekh’s No Refuge
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13. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 38
Karen Adkins The Inadequacy of Choice Language in Migration Debates
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14. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 38
Serena Parekh Remaining Agnostic about Blame and the Moral Status of Smugglers: Response to Commentaries
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contributors
15. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 38
Notes on Contributors
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editor's introduction
16. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 37
Zachary Hoskins, Joan Woolfrey, Greg Hoskins Introduction
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part i: keynote addresses and commentaries
17. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 37
Susan J. Brison What’s Consent Got to Do with It?
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What are we doing when we see rape as nonconsensual sex? What does this prevent us from seeing—and doing? On my account, the harm of rape—to the victim and to others—is not adequately captured by calling it “sex without consent.” If we want, first, to understand how rape harms its direct and its indirect victims and, second, to eradicate rape, or at least change the culture so that rape is less prevalent, the question “Did she consent to his doing this to her on that occasion?” may not be the most important question, or even a very helpful question, to ask, and focusing on it exclusively may be counterproductive. Defining rape as «sex without consent» or «nonconsensual sex» is, I argue, not only politically ineffective as an anti-rape strategy. It also constitutes an epistemic injustice against rape survivors who attempt to bear witness to the politically significant incessant and ubiquitous occurrence of male gender-based violence against women, which is something much larger than any one thing that was done to any one of them without their consent.
18. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 37
Sarah Clark Miller Criticizing Consent: A Reply to Susan Brison
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In this article I engage Susan Brison’s “What’s Consent Got to Do with It?” by offering multiple contributions regarding the limitations of the language and culture of consent. I begin by briefly appreciating what consent reveals to us morally about the harms of nonconsensual sex. I then offer five points regarding the language and culture of consent: (1) Conceptualizing rape as nonconsensual sex hides from view the moral harm of having one’s will subjugated by another. (2) The framework of consent renders women’s desires insignificant and invisible. (3) Epistemic gaslighting represents one major and underappreciated form of epistemic injustice that consent-based views of rape propagate. (4) Consent-centered accounts of sexual violence impede our ability to imagine better sexual futures. And (5) consent not only functions to normalize gender-based violence but also to normalize other forms of violence, such as those that erupt in light of race, ability, nationality, weight, and age.
19. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 37
Linda Martín Alcoff The Radical Future of #MeToo: The Effects of an Intersectional Analysis
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When feminist movements develop intersectional analyses of the problems they are addressing, especially to include race and class as well as other dimensions of society, their analyses of sexism will shift, and their demands will as a result become more structural, systemic, and radical. This paper will focus primarily on sexual harassment, with the understanding that harassment often escalates to coercive sex. I will argue that the future of the #MeToo movement not only should become more radical, but it must in order to achieve its own stated objectives of decreasing sexual harassment, assault and violence, given the significance of their institutional support systems and the fact that the highest incidence of sexual harassment is among low-wage workers. There are important issues of philosophical methodology involved in this shift. Including race and class alongside gender from the start means that considerations of “inclusion” cannot come in only after the central concepts and paradigms are created.
20. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 37
Ann J. Cahilll Power, Intersectionality, and Radical Critique: A Response to Alcoff
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In this response to Linda Alcoff, I argue that her theory of power, influenced strongly by Michel Foucault, is central to understanding more clearly the political potential of liberatory social movements, as well as the threats against them. I argue that conceptualizing power as diffuse and ubiquitous is necessary to challenging unjust social structures, and that those defending those structures are invested in a binary conceptualization of power. Refusing such a binary conceptualization allows for an understanding of institutions and movements as both embedded in and potentially challenging power dynamics; it is also a requirement for intersectional analyses such as Alcoff’s.