It is a common refrain in sports discourse that one should try one's hardest in sports, or some other variation on this theme. In this paper I argue that there is no generalized duty to try one's hardest in sports, and that the claim that one should do so is ambiguous. Although a number of factors point in the direction of my conclusion, particularly salient is the claim that, in the end, the putative requirement is too stringent for creatures like human beings. The putative duty to try one's hardest in sports does not comport with psychological realism. That being said, there are contexts in which it is reasonable to expect athletes to try hard. Perhaps there is even a duty to put forth such effort. Even so, this obligation does not rise to the level of a generalized duty to try one's hardest in sports.

Questions about the role of luck in attributions of moral responsibility have troubled theorists for some time. In this paper I will explicate a position that acknowledges luck as a contributing factor to most, if not all, outcomes and consequences while denying luck the exculpatory role that some theorists contend it plays. I begin by going through the characterization of two perspectives on luck offered by Susan Wolf. From there I outline two necessary conditions for the legitimate attribution of praise or blame. The first condition is that of Control. The second condition is the agent's creation of "undue risk". I revisit Wolfs two perspectives and break down the relationship between the necessary conditions and each perspective. I contend that a legitimate theory of moral responsibility must allow for factors outside of an agent's control when attempting to attribute praise or blame. Luck can be seen as one of these factors and it should not be seen as playing an exculpatory role.

Using the moral work on trust and lying, I argue that allowing or encouraging children to believe you are their biological parent when you are not is a breach of trust in the parent-child relationship. While other approaches focus on specific harms or the rights of the child, I make a virtue theory argument based on our understanding of trust, lies, and the nature of the parent-child relationship. Drawing heavily on Nancy Potter's virtue theory of trustworthiness, I consider the nature of trust in the parent-child relationship and what this means for being a trustworthy parent.

Philosophical analyses of fast food have been relatively nonexistent. One of the only philosophers who provides a theoretical analysis of fast food is Douglas Kellner, who maintains that fast food is "dehumanizing." The most prominent scholarly or academic treatment of fast food is that of the sociologist George Ritzer, who advances the "McDonaldization" thesis, while claiming that fast food is "dehumanizing." Neither Kellner nor Ritzer offer a sustained analysis in defense of this claim. This paper will attempt to provide such an analysis, making use of the theory of technology put forth by Albert Borgmann. Fast food, it will be argued, is best understood as a "device" in Borgmann's sense. For Borgmann, devices lead to a "disconnected, disembodied, and disoriented sort of life." This aspect of fast food helps explain the reaction against it that we find in the work of Kellner and Ritzer.

Contemporary analyses of unmigration cannot accurately portray the realities of border crossing without paying attention to poverty as a common sense concern for citizens, just as the act of border crossmg must be understood from the perspective of people who face real decisions about crossing borders. Through a feminist analysis of common sense conceptions of poverty, this essay exposes the act of border crossing as conceived in the minds of those facing actual life and death situations. Situating this analysis primarily within U.S. American discourse, perhaps those best suited to explain the role that poverty plays are conmiunity organizers, public intellectuals and activists who unport notions of border crossings from theh experiences with impoverished communities in order to develop rich theoretical descriptions of border crossing. To that end, the essay considers the writing of Jane Addams, W.E.B. Du Bois, Suzanne Pharr and similar American thinkers.

Philosophers of the American tradition should be more proactive in their inclusion of Latino/a thinkers, even when the work of these thinkers does not directly connect back to classical tradition of American philosophy. This argument has two mterrelated parts. First, if the American philosophical tradition is committed to a social and political philosophy that begins from "lived-experience," then one area it has largely overlooked is the Latino/a experience. Second, if the contributions of the Latino/a community go unrecognized as a part of the American tradition, then the American philosophical tradition is tacitly assenting to what Chavez calls the "Latino Threat Narrative." The Latino Threat Narrative puts forth a view of the Latino/a community as inherently anti-American, not to be celebrated, and to be avoided as a perpetual threat. Following Chávez, I argue that the American philosophical tradition should place more effort in the construction of the Latino/a Contribution Narrative.